This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In re the Marriage of:
James Richard Huntsman, petitioner,
Zenith Annette Huntsman,
County of Washington, intervenor,
Filed June 26, 2007
Washington County District Court
File No. F7-98-2231
Douglas H. Johnson, Washington County Attorney, Julie A. Mougin, Assistant County Attorney, 14949 62nd Street North, P.O. Box 6, Stillwater, MN 55082 (for respondent intervenor)
Considered and decided by Chief Judge Toussaint, Presiding; Lansing, Judge; and Peterson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
In this appeal arising out of a marital dissolution, pro se appellant-father James Huntsman challenges various district court rulings made in proceedings to enforce his obligations under the dissolution judgment and subsequent orders. We affirm.
parties’ January 2000 dissolution judgment awarded respondent-mother Zenith
Huntsman sole physical custody of their child, and set father’s child-support,
spousal-maintenance, and related obligations.
The case has been in constant litigation since that time in both the
district and appellate courts, and mother has been awarded attorney fees. See
Huntsman v. Huntsman, No. A05-2168 (Minn. App. Sept. 26, 2006) (detailing history
of the case), review denied (
D E C I S I O N
Father argues that the October 2005 income-withholding order is defective because there was no enforceable child-support order until December 2005 when, in connection with a related prior appellate matter, this court directed entry of judgment on the district court’s September 30, 2005 order. Father is incorrect. Judgment need not be entered on a support order for the order to be effective. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.57, subd. 2 (2004) (requiring dissolution court to make an “order” regarding support); .64, subd. 1 (2004) (allowing modification of support “order”); .24 (2004) (allowing court to require security for obligation in support “order[,]” to sequester obligor’s assets, to appoint a receiver for sequestered assets, and to “cause the personal estate and the rents and profits of the real estate to be applied according to the terms of the order”); Erickson v. Erickson, 385 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. 1986) (affirming determination that district court did not abuse its discretion in using its contempt power “to enforce the child support order”).
We review de novo father’s argument
that, under certain state and federal statutes and federal regulations, he was
entitled to notice of withholding before withholding occurred. See Lewis-Miller v. Ross, 710 N.W.2d 565,
state authority that father cites to support his argument says that
administrative actions listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.5513, subd. 5 (2004), are
“subject to due process safeguards, including requirements for notice[.]”
Father argues that not affording him pre-withholding notice deprives him of due process of law because a post-withholding challenge to administrative withholding improperly moves the burden of proof to him. Claims of denial of due process are reviewed de novo. Zellman ex rel. M.Z. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999).
aside the fact that father did receive notice of withholding in the dissolution
judgment, we note that income withholding is a mechanism for enforcing
judicially determined obligations and “does not involve the determination of
legal or factual claims by employing procedures similar to judicial
proceedings.” Gerber v. Gerber, 714 N.W.2d 702, 705 (
of that question, when considering a procedural-due-process challenge, courts
evaluate the procedure in question by balancing the private interest at stake,
the risk that the procedure used will result in erroneous deprivation of the
private interest, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and
the state’s interest in the procedures provided, including the administrative
burden and expense that additional procedures would require. In re
Conservatorship of Foster, 547 N.W.2d 81, 85 (
Finally, because the nature and extent of father’s obligations has been the subject of extensive litigation in multiple courts for more than six years, it cannot be said that father was unaware of the existence of his obligations, or that the nature and extent of those obligations has not been the subject of considerable judicial process.
Because father has not shown that he was erroneously deprived of pre-withholding notice of withholding, we do not address his arguments that he is entitled to a pre-withholding hearing to challenge the withholding, that the county is liable to him for violating his statutory right to pre-withholding notice, and that Minn. Stat. §§ 518.6111, .68, subd. 2(6), are facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him because they deprive him of pre-withholding notice and a pre-withholding opportunity to contest the withholding.
that the withholding order simply states that it is “based on the support or
withholding order from
Father argues that the district court should have vacated the withholding order because, after funds he posted as a supersedeas bond in connection with prior appellate proceedings were used to satisfy his support arrears on November 11, 2005, the county lost IV-D authority to impose withholding. But the “support orders” for which income withholding is allowed include orders for spousal maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subds. 4a(3), 15 (Supp. 2005) (defining “support order” to include order for spousal maintenance and noting public authority’s “[i]ncome withholding only services” are available for maintenance obligations) (respectively). Father is still obligated to pay maintenance, and he does not allege that income-withholding services do not apply to maintenance.
also argues that between the county’s seizure of funds posted as a supersedeas
bond and the amount the county directed father’s employer to withhold from
father’s pay, the county seized $7,526.73 more than the amount he posted as a
supersedeas bond, and that these excess funds must be returned to him. But father does not argue that, after
accounting for the dispersal of the funds posted as a supersedeas bond, he does
not owe at least this amount to mother.
Nor does he argue that he was not given credit for the $7,526.73 against
the amounts that he owes mother. Thus, even
if an error occurred in the mechanics of the county’s enforcement procedures,
father has not shown that he was prejudiced by that error, and relief is
Ctr. Assocs., 306
 This fact renders irrelevant father’s challenge to the district court’s finding that the statutory notice was attached to the child-support orders involved in this appeal.
 The unpublished opinion father cites for the proposition that he is entitled to pre-withholding notice of the withholding is distinguishable.
 The district court found that father did not dispute
the fact that he owes mother arrearages for maintenance, health insurance, and
attorney fees. Father alleges that this
finding is clearly erroneous, citing a portion of his district court memorandum
reciting his monthly obligations, but not mentioning the amount, if any, that he
had paid on those obligations. If father
is asserting that a recitation of his monthly obligations constitutes a
challenge to the finding that he had arrearages, we reject that assertion. If father is arguing that he made
arrears-related challenges in a prior appeal to this court, we note that those
challenges were rejected. Huntsman v. Huntsman, No. A05-2168
(Minn. App. Sept. 26, 2006), review