This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the
Filed May 8, 2007
Goodhue County District Court
File No. J3-05-50615
John M. Stuart, State Public
Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Jodie L. Carlson, Assistant Public Defenders,
Lori Swanson, Attorney General,
Stephen N. Betcher, Goodhue County Attorney, Erin L.K. Schmickle, Assistant County Attorney, Goodhue County Justice Center, 454 West Sixth Street, Red Wing, Minnesota 55066 (for respondent state)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Dietzen, Judge; and Collins, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant S.A.W. challenges his adjudication of delinquency for second-degree criminal sexual conduct and the constitutionality of the statute requiring juveniles to register as predatory offenders. Because there is sufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings, and because the application of the predatory-offender registration statute to juveniles is constitutional, we affirm.
On numerous occasions in 2005, appellant—then fifteen years old—babysat A.J., the six-year-old daughter of his mother’s friend. In September 2005, A.J. disclosed to her mother that appellant had inappropriately touched her. A.J.’s mother reported the incident to the Red Wing Police Department.
A Red Wing police officer interviewed A.J. using anatomically correct drawings to assist A.J. in identifying the parts of her body appellant touched. A.J. pointed to the drawing’s genitals, mouth, buttocks, and chest. In addition, A.J. intimated that appellant penetrated her. Goodhue County charged appellant with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(a), .343, subd. 1(a) (2004).
At trial, A.J. testified that appellant undressed her, put his privates on hers, “humped” her, and ejaculated on her mother’s blanket and pillow. A.J. used anatomically correct dolls to simulate the various sexual activities that appellant perpetrated. But A.J. did not testify that appellant penetrated her; nor did the state present any evidence proving that appellant penetrated A.J.
At the completion of the bench trial, the district court concluded that appellant was not guilty of the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charges, but he was guilty of the second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge. After adjudicating appellant delinquent, the district court ordered appellant to be placed on six months of probation and to register as a predatory offender. This appeal follows.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence on which his adjudication of delinquency for second-degree
criminal sexual conduct is predicated. When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, appellate courts must determine “whether the facts in the record and
the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [fact-finder] to
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d 520, 525 (
At the conclusion of the bench
trial, the district court concluded that appellant committed second-degree
criminal sexual conduct but not first-degree criminal sexual conduct. A person is guilty of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct if the person “engages in sexual contact with another person” and the other person “is under 13
years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the
When victims of sexual abuse change
their stories, issues of credibility are for the fact-finder to resolve. State
v. Erickson, 454 N.W.2d 624, 629 (
Here, A.J. offered graphic and disturbing testimony regarding appellant’s sexual conduct. She testified that he undressed her, put his privates on hers, and “humped” her. Although the district court did not find this testimony credible enough to establish penetration—a determination it had the prerogative to make—this testimony was sufficient to support the district court’s adjudication. Appellant’s proposition that a failure to establish penetration precludes a finding of sexual contact defies logic; not all sexual contact requires penetration. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s adjudication of delinquency for second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
challenges, on due-process grounds, the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. §
243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (2006), which requires certain juveniles to
register as predatory offenders.
Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are reviewed de
novo. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 135 (
supreme court has held that predatory-offender registration requirements do not
violate due process because they are “civil and regulatory in nature and are
imposed in the interest of public safety.”
Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d
900, 905 (
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.