This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Tara Marie Krieger,
Filed May 29, 2007
St. Louis County District Court
File No. K5-05-600089
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Tibor M. Gallo, Assistant Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Melanie Sue Ford, St. Louis County Attorney, St. Louis County Courthouse, 100 North Fifth Avenue West, #501, Duluth, MN 55802 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Klaphake, Judge.
Tara Marie Krieger appeals from her conviction for fifth-degree controlled substance crime, arguing that the district court erred when it refused to suppress evidence that was found in her vehicle after a warrantless search. Because the police officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity that supported his request for permission to search appellant’s vehicle and because appellant consented to a search, the district court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence.
court reviews de novo the district court’s determination of the legality of a
stop based on reasonable suspicion, and reviews the court’s findings of fact
for clear error. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, a limited investigatory traffic
stop is a well-established exception to the rule. State
v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (
[T]he scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop . . .[a]nd any intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under article I, section 10 [of the Minnesota Constitution] unless there is independent probable cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.
Id. (quotations omitted). The question of probable cause or reasonable suspicion is evaluated by examining the totality of the circumstances and must be “particularized” and “individualized” to the driver. Id. (quotations omitted).
does not challenge the original stop, which occurred because she had been
involved in an accident with another vehicle.
Rather, she challenges the expansion of the stop, as it changed from an
accident investigation to an inquiry into whether appellant had contraband in
her vehicle. Because an investigatory
stop of a vehicle is limited by the original justification for the stop, any
expansion in scope is unreasonable unless justified by a reasonable articulable
suspicion of other criminal activity. State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (
Here, the officers asked for consent to search appellant’s vehicle only after discovering that (1) James Ecklund was a passenger in the vehicle when the accident occurred; (2) there was an active order for protection (OFP) prohibiting contact between appellant and Ecklund; and (3) Ecklund, who returned to the accident scene in another vehicle and who was placed under arrest for violation of the OFP, had drugs and a weapon in this other vehicle. Appellant freely gave her consent and does not challenge the voluntariness of the consent. Because Ecklund had been a passenger in appellant’s vehicle, officers had a reasonable suspicion that they would find contraband in appellant’s vehicle.
We therefore affirm the district court’s order refusing to suppress evidence discovered during the search.
Although additional facts were included in the police reports filed
simultaneously with appellant’s arrest, we limit our review to the omnibus
hearing testimony because appellant is challenging the omnibus order. The state must offer law enforcement reports
into evidence if it intends to rely on them at the omnibus hearing. See