This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Glen A. Huber,
Anoka County District Court
File No. K6-03-9851
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800
Robert M.A. Johnson,
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Philip Marron,
Assistant Public Defender,
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
Appellant challenges a district court order revoking his probation. Appellant argues that the district court’s finding that the need for confinement outweighs policies favoring probation is not supported by sufficient evidence. Because we conclude that the district court’s finding is supported by sufficient evidence, we affirm.
Appellant Glen Huber was charged with: count 1, first-degree driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 1(1), 3 (2002); count 2, first-degree driving while impaired (test refusal) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2002); and count 3, driving after cancellation in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2002). Subsequently, appellant pleaded guilty to count two, and the two remaining counts were dropped. At sentencing, appellant received the 42-month presumptive sentence. The district court stayed execution of the sentence and placed appellant on probation under the conditions that appellant: (1) serve one year in jail; (2) pay a $700 fine and related fees; (3) complete aftercare programming as recommended by Anoka County Community Corrections Department (Corrections); (4) submit to drug testing at his own expense; (5) refrain from using mood-altering chemicals or alcohol; (6) complete Project Save; (7) complete cognitive programming as directed; (8) remain law-abiding and of good behavior; and (9) obey rules of probation.
October 26, 2004, Corrections filed a felony-probation-violation report recommending
that the district court hold a probation-violation hearing and vacate
appellant’s stay of execution. According
to the report, appellant tested positive for methamphetamine on April 11, 2004,
while serving his one-year workhouse sentence, and again on July 13, 2004. Appellant also failed to remain law-abiding. On October 7, 2004, appellant was arrested
for driving after cancellation of his license. Additionally, appellant did not maintain
contact with his probation officer and failed to provide requested urinalysis
samples. Finally, appellant did not
complete chemical-dependency treatment in accordance with the plea
agreement. Pursuant to Corrections’
recommendation, appellant was ordered to appear in court on December 8, 2004,
for a probation-violation hearing.
Appellant failed to do so. Consequently,
a warrant was issued for appellant’s arrest.
On April 27, 2005, appellant was arrested in
appealed to this court. Relying on State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602 (
district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear
abuse of that discretion.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (
sole argument on appeal is that, even though the district court made the required
finding under the third
Here, the district court found that “the need for confinement clearly outweighs the policies favoring probation . . . .” The district court’s finding is amply supported in the record. The court based its finding on appellant’s ten prior DWI’s, appellant’s failure to successfully complete chemical-dependency treatment, appellant’s failure to remain drug-free during his probationary period, and appellant’s thorough disregard of his probationary status. Moreover, the court explicitly found appellant unamenable to treatment. All of these facts are supported by the record.
appellant offered multiple explanations for his probation violations, those
violations are undisputed and, considering appellant’s extensive DWI history, appellant’s
violations are not minor or technical.
Moreover, the district court did not credit appellant’s explanations. The district court’s finding was not
reflexive, but grounded on appellant’s criminal history and probationary
conduct. The district court’s
substantive reasons for revocation under the third