This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Welfare of:
Stearns County District Court
File No. J9-05-50777
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Jodie L. Carlson, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant M.T.L.)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Patrick J.W. Conness, Assistant County Attorney, 448 Administration Center, 705 Courthouse Square, St. Cloud, MN 56302 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Ross, Judge.
A juvenile court adjudicated M.T.L. delinquent and ordered him to pay restitution after he pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary. On appeal from the restitution order, M.T.L. challenges the court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. M.T.L. also argues that the district court erred by denying his challenge to the restitution request because he failed to comply with the requirements for submitting his challenging affidavit. M.T.L. asserts that the restitution statute violates the Equal Protection Clause and the separation of powers doctrine. Because we find that M.T.L. intelligently pleaded guilty, we deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because M.T.L. failed to contest the constitutionality of the restitution statute in the district court, the issue is waived on appeal. Because M.T.L. failed to meet the statutory requirement for the timely filing of his affidavit challenging the restitution order, we affirm.
The state filed a delinquency petition against M.T.L. in June 2005 alleging that he and J.M.A., another juvenile, broke into a machine shed in Stearns County and stole various items. The state charged M.T.L. with two counts of burglary. J.M.A. admitted to police that he and M.T.L. had broken into the shed and stolen items. The court arraigned M.T.L., and he pleaded not guilty. At that time, M.T.L., his counsel, and one of his parents signed a Delinquency Statement of Rights form, which identified the charges against M.T.L. and explained his right to counsel, his trial rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty. The victim met with M.T.L.’s and J.M.A.’s parents, and they agreed to a list of items that each juvenile would be responsible for returning or replacing. The items attributed to M.T.L. were valued at $415 total. J.M.A. repaid the victim for or returned all the items for which the list made him responsible.
M.T.L. pleaded guilty to one of the burglary charges in exchange for the state dismissing the other. M.T.L. acknowledged his understanding of the plea agreement on the record, acknowledged having read and executed the Delinquency Statement of Rights form, and confirmed that he had sufficient time to speak with his attorney. M.T.L. admitted that he entered the machine shed with J.M.A. without permission and that he stole items to keep for himself or to sell. The court found that M.T.L. knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and provided a sufficient factual basis for the court to accept the guilty plea, and the court concluded that M.T.L. committed third-degree burglary based on the plea.
The victim filed a restitution affidavit at a September 12, 2005 disposition hearing that listed $415 worth of items subject to restitution. M.T.L. conceded that he was liable for $130 in restitution, but he argued that the balance was inappropriate and indicated that he would move for a restitution hearing. The court adjudicated M.T.L. delinquent, placed him on indefinite probation with conditions, and ordered him to pay “no less than” $130 in restitution, pending a restitution hearing. The state argued that M.T.L. had failed to comply with the procedural requirements to challenge the restitution request.
On October 6, 2005, M.T.L. filed a request for a hearing under Minnesota Statutes, section 611A.045 (2004), to challenge the amount of restitution. The court scheduled the restitution hearing for January 19, 2006. On that day, M.T.L. faxed to the court the statutorily required affidavit to support his challenge to the restitution amount. The state objected because M.T.L.’s affidavit was untimely. M.T.L. conceded that it was untimely but claimed that the delay was excusable.
The court denied M.T.L.’s request for a hearing to challenge the restitution amount because he failed to comply with the statutory timing requirements. The court ordered M.T.L. to pay the full amount requested in restitution. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
M.T.L. argues that he can withdraw his guilty plea because the juvenile court failed to comply with the rules of procedure in accepting his plea. He claims that he did not make a knowing and intelligent plea because the court did not conduct an on-the-record inquiry to first determine whether he understood his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty. M.T.L. also asserts that the plea was unacceptable because it lacked a factual basis. M.T.L. makes these arguments for the first time on appeal.
Ordinarily, this court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). The rules of juvenile delinquency procedure permit a juvenile to request to withdraw a guilty plea at any time in the juvenile court when necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 2(B). M.T.L. never moved the juvenile court to withdraw his guilty plea. As a general rule, this court will not decide issues that were not first raised before the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Although M.T.L. first challenges the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal, we address the challenge because the record provides a sufficient basis for meaningful appellate review. See State v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 413 & n.1 (Minn. App. 2004) (holding that defendant could challenge guilty plea for first time on appeal when based entirely on matters in record and no material-fact dispute exists).
To be valid, a plea must be made intelligently, voluntarily, and accurately. In re Welfare of J.J.R., 648 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. App. 2002). A plea is intelligently and voluntarily made if the defendant knows and understands the trial rights he is waiving and the consequences of his plea. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989) (stating plea is intelligent if defendant understands charges, rights being waived, and consequences of guilty plea). A plea is accurately made if it is supported by a factual basis. J.J.R., 648 N.W.2d at 742. Before accepting a juvenile’s plea, a court must first determine that the juvenile understands his trial rights and that there is a factual basis for the plea under the totality of the circumstances and based on the juvenile’s statements either on the record or contained in a document signed by the juvenile and his counsel. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 1(A), (B).
M.T.L. acknowledged reading and executing the Delinquency Statement of Rights form, and he confirmed that he understood his rights and knew that he was waiving the rights explained on the form by pleading guilty. M.T.L., his counsel, and one of his parents signed the form. The form also explained the trial rights afforded to M.T.L. and that the consequence of pleading guilty included waiving these rights. M.T.L. confirmed that he had sufficient time to speak with his attorney before pleading guilty. See Berkow v. State, 573 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn. App. 1997) (recognizing presumption that defendant who has consulted with counsel is aware of constitutional rights), aff’d, 583 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1998); State v. Lyle, 409 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn. App. 1987) (recognizing presumption that defendant represented by counsel informed of nature of charges and of his alternatives). We find that the court properly determined that M.T.L. pleaded guilty knowingly and intelligently.
The district court also properly determined that a factual basis existed to support the plea by M.T.L.’s on-the-record verification of the facts supporting the elements of third-degree burglary. Contrary to M.T.L.’s claim on appeal, the district court obtained his on-the-record express acknowledgement of the truth and accuracy of specific facts constituting the elements of the charged offense. We therefore hold that M.T.L. has failed to show that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
M.T.L. next argues that the district court erred by denying his request for a hearing to challenge the restitution amount. Based on the statutory requirement for the timely filing of an affidavit to challenge a restitution request, the argument is unpersuasive.
M.T.L. maintains that the victim’s affidavit was late and that the timing of M.T.L.’s affidavit should not bar his contest to restitution. We reject both assertions. The victim’s affidavit requesting restitution was delivered to the court administrator by September 7 and filed with the court on September 12, 2005, the date of the disposition hearing. Contrary to M.T.L.’s claim, the victim timely filed his affidavit. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2004) (indicating that restitution information is timely if it is received by court administrator at least three business days before sentencing or dispositional hearing).
The victim-restitution statute puts the burden of pleading and the initial burden of production on a defendant challenging a restitution request. Id. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2004); State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d 231, 234–35 (Minn. App. 2000). The accused must challenge restitution and request a hearing within 30 days after receiving written notice of the amount of restitution requested or within 30 days after sentencing, whichever is later. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b). He must also produce evidence challenging the restitution, the evidence must include a detailed sworn affidavit defining all challenges, and the “affidavit must be served on the prosecuting attorney and the court at least five business days before the hearing.” Id., subd. 3(a); see also Thole, 614 N.W.2d at 235 (stating that affidavit is both sole vehicle by which offender can meet burden of pleading and an essential element of offender’s burden of production). We construe the statute’s deadline to be mandatory. Although M.T.L. filed his request for a hearing on October 6, 2005, he failed to submit his supporting affidavit (which he provided by facsimile) until January 19, 2006, the date of the restitution hearing. While M.T.L. timely requested the restitution hearing, he did not timely file his challenging affidavit. Because M.T.L. failed to comply with the requirements of the statute by not timely filing his affidavit, the district court neither misread the statute nor abused its discretion by denying M.T.L.’s request for a hearing on that basis.
M.T.L. contends for the first time on appeal that the victim-restitution statute is unconstitutional because it infringes on his right to equal protection and violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. He argues that the statute treats victims and defendants differently without any rational basis, emphasizing that while a defendant’s failure to timely file an affidavit precludes his challenge to restitution, a victim’s failure to timely provide restitution evidence does not preclude the victim from preserving the request. M.T.L. argues that the statute violates separation of powers because it prevents the court from considering relevant evidence to evaluate a victim’s restitution request based on the timely filing of the offender’s affidavit.
Constitutional challenges to a statute generally may not be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 839 (Minn. 2002). Because M.T.L. failed to first raise these constitutional arguments in the district court, the issues are waived, and we do not reach their merits.