This opinion will
be unpublished and
may not be cited
except as provided by
Minn. Stat. §
480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF
State of Minnesota,
Randall A. Radunz,
Filed April 3,
County District Court
File No. K1-04-4681
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower,
445 Minnesota Street,
St. Paul, MN 55101;
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig,
Assistant County Attorney, 50 Kellogg Boulevard West, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN
55102 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, James R. Peterson,
Assistant Public Defender, 2221
University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis,
MN 55414 (for appellant)
and decided by Kalitowski,
Presiding Judge; Ross,
Judge; and Collins,
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
assisting in the investigation of the death of T.C. in Ramsey
County in May 2003, Wisconsin
authorities conducted a warranted search of the rural Wisconsin
residence of appellant, Randall Arthur Radunz.
Among items seized were firearm ammunition, 18 small packages of crack
cocaine of between one and four grams each, and 40 sandwich bags with corners
cut off in a manner characteristic of cocaine packaging. Appellant, who was on probation following a
2002 Wisconsin conviction of prohibited-firearm
possession, was arrested at the direction of his probation agent. The next day, appellant’s farmhand turned in
two handguns that had been kept by appellant contrary to conditions of his
probation. Appellant admitted to buying,
processing, and using cocaine. In
September 2003, appellant’s probation was formally revoked and he was sentenced
to two years in prison measured from the date of his arrest.
began to inquire about the status of the Minnesota
investigation as early as December 2003, but the matter was not presented to a Ramsey County
grand jury until December 2004.
Appellant was indicted for second-degree (unintentional) murder,
first-degree manslaughter, and second-degree manslaughter in T.C.’s death. Although appellant periodically inquired
about the prosecution of the charges, he was detained until the expiration of
his Wisconsin sentence before being transferred to Ramsey County
custody on April 26, 2005.
subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter, reserving the
opportunity to argue for jail credit for the entire time he was in custody
since May 15, 2003. Appellant contends that
authorities then had the requisite probable cause to charge him because the
search that produced the evidence of his probation violations was conducted in
conjunction with the Ramsey
investigation. At the sentencing
hearing, after detailing the controlling law and the court’s obligation to
apply it, the district court determined that the Wisconsin custody was not
solely related to the Minnesota case and that
appellant was not entitled to jail credit for the Wisconsin
incarceration. The district court
sentenced appellant to 88 months in prison with jail credit only since April
26, 2005. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
contends that because (1) his arrest on May 15, 2003, for violations of his
Wisconsin probation occurred only by virtue of the Minnesota
homicide investigation, and (2) there was then probable cause supporting the Minnesota charges, the entirety of his Wisconsin
incarceration was “in connection with” the Minnesota charges, requiring that appellant
be granted jail credit. We disagree.
“The granting of
jail credit is not discretionary with the [district] court.” State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778
(Minn. App. 1987) (citing State v. Doyle, 386 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. App. 1986)), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15,
1988). When the district court imposes a
sentence, it must
assure that the record accurately
reflects all time spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral
incident for which sentence is imposed.
Such time shall be automatically deducted from the sentence and the term
of imprisonment including time spent in custody as a condition of probation
from a prior stay of imposition or execution of sentence.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd.
4(B). The defendant has the burden of
establishing entitlement to jail credit.
State v. Willis, 376 N.W.2d
427, 428 n.1 (Minn.
served in other states is properly credited toward a Minnesota
sentence when the incarceration was “solely in connection with” the Minnesota offense. State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984), abrogated
on other grounds by State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006).
That has occurred when the other state’s revocation of probation was
based solely upon the Minnesota crime, State
v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn.
1985), or after the other state’s charges have been satisfied. Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 429. Incarceration by authority of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) after a defendant posted bail for a Minnesota charge “was served ‘in connection with’ his Minnesota offense.” State v. Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d 30, 33
(Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 21, 2004). However, time
attributable to an out-of-state charge may not be credited toward the Minnesota
sentence, Brown, 348 N.W.2d at 748, including time served after
Minnesota sought to obtain the prisoner while another state’s charges were
pending, Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 428-29, or while the defendant was
serving a sentence for a conviction in the other state. Parr, 414 N.W.2d at 779-80.
Wisconsin authorities searched appellant’s rural residence seeking items
belonging to T.C. or bearing upon the circumstances leading to her death,
including “[c]ontrolled substances including cocaine, crack cocaine, [illicit]
drugs, any drug paraphernalia, records indicating drug activity…” that
independently would be violations of appellant’s probation. Indeed, after the drug-related contraband was
discovered in his constructive possession, appellant was taken into custody
that night on an apprehension warrant issued by his probation officer, without
reference to the nascent death investigation.
Later evidence of prohibited handgun possession and appellant’s
admission to cocaine procurement and use further supported the
Minnesota investigation, which Wisconsin authorities described as incomplete and complex
due to jurisdictional issues, was not a factor in the probation-revocation
proceedings. Both the prosecutor and
appellant’s attorney at the Wisconsin probation-revocation hearing distinguished
the firearms-and-drug-related grounds for revocation from the Minnesota investigation for which appellant
had not been charged with a crime. At
the time, the Minnesota
investigation was too speculative to have any bearing on appellant’s probation. Thus, the execution of appellant’s Wisconsin sentence resulted solely from his violations of
Minnesota caselaw also supports the conclusion that
appellant’s Wisconsin incarceration was not in connection with the Minnesota crime. Unlike the Wisconsin probation revocation in Mattson,
in which revocation was based solely on a sexual assault in Duluth, 376 N.W.2d
at 416, only passing reference to the Minnesota investigation was made in
appellant’s probation-revocation proceedings.
Nor does the Ramsey County indictment and resulting detainer against
appellant support granting credit because in Willis only the jail time after
satisfaction of the other state’s charges was “in connection with” the Minnesota charge. 376 N.W.2d at 429. Here, appellant was serving his sentence resulting
from his Wisconsin probation violation. Thus, appellant’s activity in the two states
is separate as it was for the appellant in Parr, who was awaiting
sentencing for charges in New York when he was
charged with perpetrating a similar fraud in Minnesota.
See 414 N.W.2d at 778, 779-80.
Appellant’s Wisconsin charges did not develop automatically from the Minnesota charges, unlike the INS action against Hadgu,
whose release on bail on Minnesota
charges was immediately met by arrest and detention-hold for the INS. Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d at 32-33.
to issues of intrajurisdictional jail
credit, “[a]wards of jail credit are governed by principles of fairness and
equity and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” State v. Bradley, 629 N.W.2d 462, 464
(Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15,
2001). Jail credit is granted to avoid a
de facto departure from Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines resulting in a
consecutive sentence or to prevent the total length of the sentence from “turn[ing]
on things that are subject to manipulation by the prosecutor or things that are
irrelevant such as whether the defendant pleads guilty or insists on his right
to a trial.” State v. Arden, 424 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Minn. 1988).
should be granted based on prosecutorial manipulation when a prosecutor delays
filing new charges until the defendant posts bail on other charges. State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn. 1989). When the charging date may be manipulated
after establishing probable cause, “a defendant is entitled to credit for all
time spent in custody following arrest, including time spent in custody on
other charges, beginning on the date the prosecution acquires probable cause to
charge defendant with the offense for which he or she was arrested.” State v. Fritzke, 521 N.W.2d 859,
cause exists when police “in the particular circumstances, conditioned by their
own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police
experience, reasonably could have believed that a crime had been committed by
the person to be arrested.” State v.
Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn. 1989), aff’d,
495 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
But “[t]he determination of when the evidence available to the
prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and
reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions.” United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 793, 97 S. Ct.
2044, 2050 (1977). Therefore, a delay in
proceeding with charges after establishing probable cause, for purposes of
investigation or merely for choosing not to prosecute the charge immediately,
does not alone support an inference of prejudice. State v. Lussier, 695 N.W.2d 651, 655
(Minn. App. 2005) (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S.
at 791-94, 97 S. Ct. at 2049-51), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). Furthermore, a defendant who pleads guilty
also waives the right to challenge on due-process grounds the prosecution’s
alleged delay in filing a charge because the lack of a trial eliminates prosecutorial
prejudice at trial. Id. at 654.
appellant fails to show that the denial of jail credit for the Wisconsin
incarceration violates his federal and Minnesota
equal-protection rights. States shall
not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and “[n]o member of this state shall
be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his
peers.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 2. To satisfy equal protection, absent the
involvement of either a suspect classification or fundamental right, persons
similarly situated must “be treated alike unless a rational basis exists for
discriminating among them.” Bernthal
v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1985). “Review of an equal protection challenge
under the federal rational basis test requires (1) a legitimate purpose for the
challenged legislation, and (2) that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to
believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that
purpose.” State v. Russell, 477
N.W.2d 886, 887-88 (Minn.
1991) (citation omitted). Minnesota also requires
“a reasonable connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical,
effect of the challenged classification and the statutory goals.” Id.at 889.