This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).







State of Minnesota,





Randall A. Radunz,




Filed April 3, 2007


Collins, Judge*



Ramsey County District Court

File No. K1-04-4681



Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN  55101; and


Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, 50 Kellogg Boulevard West, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102  (for respondent)


John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, James R. Peterson, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414  (for appellant)



            Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Collins, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Appellant argues that he is entitled to jail credit[1] for time served in Wisconsin because the discovery of evidence supporting appellant’s Wisconsin probation revocation stemmed from the Minnesota homicide investigation, and there was then probable cause supporting the Minnesota charges for which appellant was later indicted.  Alternatively, appellant contends that equitable principles and equal protection support a discretionary grant of jail credit.  We affirm.


            While assisting in the investigation of the death of T.C. in Ramsey County in May 2003, Wisconsin authorities conducted a warranted search of the rural Wisconsin residence of appellant, Randall Arthur Radunz.  Among items seized were firearm ammunition, 18 small packages of crack cocaine of between one and four grams each, and 40 sandwich bags with corners cut off in a manner characteristic of cocaine packaging.  Appellant, who was on probation following a 2002 Wisconsin conviction of prohibited-firearm possession, was arrested at the direction of his probation agent.  The next day, appellant’s farmhand turned in two handguns that had been kept by appellant contrary to conditions of his probation.  Appellant admitted to buying, processing, and using cocaine.  In September 2003, appellant’s probation was formally revoked and he was sentenced to two years in prison measured from the date of his arrest.

            Appellant began to inquire about the status of the Minnesota investigation as early as December 2003, but the matter was not presented to a Ramsey County grand jury until December 2004.  Appellant was indicted for second-degree (unintentional) murder, first-degree manslaughter, and second-degree manslaughter in T.C.’s death.  Although appellant periodically inquired about the prosecution of the charges, he was detained until the expiration of his Wisconsin sentence before being transferred to Ramsey County custody on April 26, 2005.

            Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter, reserving the opportunity to argue for jail credit for the entire time he was in custody since May 15, 2003.  Appellant contends that Ramsey County authorities then had the requisite probable cause to charge him because the search that produced the evidence of his probation violations was conducted in conjunction with the Ramsey County investigation.  At the sentencing hearing, after detailing the controlling law and the court’s obligation to apply it, the district court determined that the Wisconsin custody was not solely related to the Minnesota case and that appellant was not entitled to jail credit for the Wisconsin incarceration.  The district court sentenced appellant to 88 months in prison with jail credit only since April 26, 2005.  This appeal follows.



            Appellant contends that because (1) his arrest on May 15, 2003, for violations of his Wisconsin probation occurred only by virtue of the Minnesota homicide investigation, and (2) there was then probable cause supporting the Minnesota charges, the entirety of his Wisconsin incarceration was “in connection with” the Minnesota charges, requiring that appellant be granted jail credit.  We disagree.

“The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the [district] court.”  State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing State v. Doyle, 386 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. App. 1986)), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988).  When the district court imposes a sentence, it must

assure that the record accurately reflects all time spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident for which sentence is imposed.  Such time shall be automatically deducted from the sentence and the term of imprisonment including time spent in custody as a condition of probation from a prior stay of imposition or execution of sentence.


Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B).  The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to jail credit.  State v. Willis, 376 N.W.2d 427, 428 n.1 (Minn. 1985). 

            Time served in other states is properly credited toward a Minnesota sentence when the incarceration was “solely in connection with” the Minnesota offense.  State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006).  That has occurred when the other state’s revocation of probation was based solely upon the Minnesota crime, State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. 1985), or after the other state’s charges have been satisfied.  Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 429.  Incarceration by authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) after a defendant posted bail for a Minnesota charge “was served ‘in connection with’ his Minnesota offense.”  State v. Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2004).  However, time attributable to an out-of-state charge may not be credited toward the Minnesota sentence, Brown, 348 N.W.2d at 748, including time served after Minnesota sought to obtain the prisoner while another state’s charges were pending, Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 428-29, or while the defendant was serving a sentence for a conviction in the other state.  Parr, 414 N.W.2d at 779-80.

            Here, Wisconsin authorities searched appellant’s rural residence seeking items belonging to T.C. or bearing upon the circumstances leading to her death, including “[c]ontrolled substances including cocaine, crack cocaine, [illicit] drugs, any drug paraphernalia, records indicating drug activity…” that independently would be violations of appellant’s probation.  Indeed, after the drug-related contraband was discovered in his constructive possession, appellant was taken into custody that night on an apprehension warrant issued by his probation officer, without reference to the nascent death investigation.  Later evidence of prohibited handgun possession and appellant’s admission to cocaine procurement and use further supported the probation-violation charge. 

            The Minnesota investigation, which Wisconsin authorities described as incomplete and complex due to jurisdictional issues, was not a factor in the probation-revocation proceedings.  Both the prosecutor and appellant’s attorney at the Wisconsin probation-revocation hearing distinguished the firearms-and-drug-related grounds for revocation from the Minnesota investigation for which appellant had not been charged with a crime.  At the time, the Minnesota investigation was too speculative to have any bearing on appellant’s probation.  Thus, the execution of appellant’s Wisconsin sentence resulted solely from his violations of probation restrictions.

            Minnesota caselaw also supports the conclusion that appellant’s Wisconsin incarceration was not in connection with the Minnesota crime.  Unlike the Wisconsin probation revocation in Mattson, in which revocation was based solely on a sexual assault in Duluth, 376 N.W.2d at 416, only passing reference to the Minnesota investigation was made in appellant’s probation-revocation proceedings.  Nor does the Ramsey County indictment and resulting detainer against appellant support granting credit because in Willis only the jail time after satisfaction of the other state’s charges was “in connection with” the Minnesota charge.  376 N.W.2d at 429.  Here, appellant was serving his sentence resulting from his Wisconsin probation violation.  Thus, appellant’s activity in the two states is separate as it was for the appellant in Parr, who was awaiting sentencing for charges in New York when he was charged with perpetrating a similar fraud in MinnesotaSee 414 N.W.2d at 778, 779-80.  Appellant’s Wisconsin charges did not develop automatically from the Minnesota charges, unlike the INS action against Hadgu, whose release on bail on Minnesota charges was immediately met by arrest and detention-hold for the INS.  Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d at 32-33.

            The district court correctly denied jail credit for appellant’s Wisconsin incarceration because appellant’s sentence executed following revocation of his Wisconsin probation was not served “in connection with” the Minnesota charge.


            Applied to issues of intrajurisdictional jail credit, “[a]wards of jail credit are governed by principles of fairness and equity and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”  State v. Bradley, 629 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2001).  Jail credit is granted to avoid a de facto departure from Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines resulting in a consecutive sentence or to prevent the total length of the sentence from “turn[ing] on things that are subject to manipulation by the prosecutor or things that are irrelevant such as whether the defendant pleads guilty or insists on his right to a trial.”  State v. Arden, 424 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Minn. 1988). 

            Credit should be granted based on prosecutorial manipulation when a prosecutor delays filing new charges until the defendant posts bail on other charges.  State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn. 1989).  When the charging date may be manipulated after establishing probable cause, “a defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent in custody following arrest, including time spent in custody on other charges, beginning on the date the prosecution acquires probable cause to charge defendant with the offense for which he or she was arrested.”  State v. Fritzke, 521 N.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Minn. App. 1994).

            Probable cause exists when police “in the particular circumstances, conditioned by their own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police experience, reasonably could have believed that a crime had been committed by the person to be arrested.”  State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).  But “[t]he determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions.”  United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 793, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (1977).  Therefore, a delay in proceeding with charges after establishing probable cause, for purposes of investigation or merely for choosing not to prosecute the charge immediately, does not alone support an inference of prejudice.  State v. Lussier, 695 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791-94, 97 S. Ct. at 2049-51), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005).  Furthermore, a defendant who pleads guilty also waives the right to challenge on due-process grounds the prosecution’s alleged delay in filing a charge because the lack of a trial eliminates prosecutorial prejudice at trial.  Id. at 654.

            Here, appellant would have us alter Minnesota law to the effect that jail credit for interjurisdictional cases complies with law established for intrajurisdictional cases.  Appellant argues that probable cause for Minnesota charges existed as early as May 15, 2003, when he was arrested following the search of his property.  But at that time the cause of T.C.’s death had not been certified, and it remained uncertain as late as appellant’s probation revocation hearing.  Nor does appellant’s indictment 18 months into his two-year sentence prove that the Ramsey County prosecutor manipulated the investigation or the charging process to gain de facto consecutive sentences, given the complexities of the cause-of-death and jurisdictional issues.  Other than the delay in charging, appellant has not shown any act or intent supporting a claim of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct.  Because appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, he would not qualify for jail credit even if he had been incarcerated in Minnesota for the probation violation.

            Likewise, appellant fails to show that the denial of jail credit for the Wisconsin incarceration violates his federal and Minnesota equal-protection rights.  States shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and “[n]o member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”  Minn. Const. art. I, § 2.  To satisfy equal protection, absent the involvement of either a suspect classification or fundamental right, persons similarly situated must “be treated alike unless a rational basis exists for discriminating among them.”  Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1985).  “Review of an equal protection challenge under the federal rational basis test requires (1) a legitimate purpose for the challenged legislation, and (2) that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose.”  State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887-88 (Minn. 1991) (citation omitted).  Minnesota also requires “a reasonable connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory goals.” 889. 

            Appellant claims that his disparate treatment in receiving jail credit arises only from being incarcerated outside of Minnesota, compared with treatment of inmates similarly situated within Minnesota.  We resolve this claim by application of the rational-basis test.  Minnesota’s distinction between jail time served in Minnesota and out-of-state has a legitimate purpose in maintaining Minnesota’s law-enforcement and correctional standards, which may differ among states.  By distinguishing between defendants who have jail time in Minnesota and in other states, Minnesota law reasonably promotes uniformity of sentencing, based either upon Minnesota standards governing intrajurisdictional jail-time credit or the interjurisdictional test requiring that the out-of-state incarceration be “in connection with” the Minnesota charge.  By maintaining the distinction, Minnesota courts reasonably promote the legitimate purpose of sentencing conformity.


*  Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 

[1] “The term ‘jail credit’ is commonly used to encompass any time spent in custody between the time of arrest and sentencing, regardless of whether the time was spent in a jail or some other type of correctional facility.”  State v. Fritzke, 521 N.W.2d 859, 860 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994).