This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Terrence Davone Olive,
Stearns County District Court
File No. K5-05-3018
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Cathryn Middlebrook,
Assistant Public Defender,
Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
Appellant challenges his judgment of conviction for second-degree criminal-sexual conduct, arguing for the first time on appeal that the guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent. Appellant contends that he (a) did not understand the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty; (b) felt coerced into pleading guilty; and (c) did not understand that by entering a guilty plea, he gave up his right to call and confront witnesses. Because the record demonstrates that appellant’s plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, we affirm.
Appellant Terrence Olive was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal-sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2004). Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for dismissal of the other count. The district court accepted the plea and committed appellant to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a stayed 33-month sentence. This appeal follows.
contends that the district court erred by accepting his guilty plea because his
plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent. Appellant brought his appeal directly to this
court, without the district court’s consideration of the issue. Generally, the court of appeals does not
address an issue until the issue has been raised in district court. State
v. Hemstock, 276
a timely motion, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea at any time, before or
after sentencing, if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
first contends that his plea was not accurate, but does not specify the
applicable law or relevant facts to support this contention. We generally do not consider unsupported
issues. State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (
accurate plea is one entered without improper inducement and with a full
understanding of the possible consequences and one that demonstrates that the
defendant is guilty of a crime at least as serious as that to which he is
pleading guilty. Beaman v. State, 301
At the plea hearing, appellant acknowledged touching a child’s breasts on July 2, 2005. He admitted that he touched the child with sexual or aggressive intent. He also acknowledged that the child was ten years old at the time and that he was more than three years older than the child. These admissions demonstrate that appellant was guilty of second-degree criminal-sexual conduct.
Appellant also indicated that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Appellant understood that pursuant to the plea agreement, he could serve up to 180 days in jail, be required to undergo a psychological evaluation, complete sex-offender training, and follow all conditions of his probation. The record demonstrates that appellant’s plea was accurate.
appellant contends that his plea was involuntary. Specifically, appellant claims that he was
being pressured to plead guilty, that his attorney failed to file motions on
his behalf, and that his attorney told him that he had little chance of acquittal
if the matter went to trial. “The
purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to insure that the defendant is not
pleading guilty because of improper pressures.”
State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d
248, 251 (
Here, at the beginning of the plea hearing, appellant indicated that he felt pressure to accept the plea agreement. He raised concerns about the representation he was receiving from his attorney, a feeling of being “railroad[ed].” Appellant also expressed his feeling that pleading guilty was his only option and said that he was “just trying to get a way out of it.” But after expressing his concerns, appellant changed his mind and decided to accept the plea agreement. Prior to accepting the plea, the district court questioned appellant regarding his decision. In response, appellant indicated a desire to go forward with the plea, that he had not received pressure to enter a guilty plea, and that he wanted to accept the plea agreement because he was guilty. Appellant also indicated that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Thus, we conclude that appellant’s plea was voluntarily entered.
appellant contends that his plea was not intelligent because he did not
understand that by pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to confront
witnesses and present his own witnesses.
A plea is intelligent when the defendant “understands the charges, the
rights being waived, and the consequences of the guilty plea.” Brown
v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (
Here, appellant indicated his understanding that by pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to a trial. He was informed that at trial, “the prosecutor . . . would be required to have all prosecution witnesses testify in open court” and that he would have the right to question those witnesses. He was also informed that he could call witnesses in his defense at a trial. Finally, appellant acknowledged that he could not be forced to testify at a trial and that the prosecutor could not comment on his failure to testify. Appellant acknowledged an understanding of these rights before waiving them on the record. Based on this record, we conclude that appellant’s plea was intelligently entered.