This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).







State of Minnesota,





Douglas Charles Brandsoy,



Filed February 6, 2007


Ross, Judge


Faribault County District Court

File No. CR-05-54


Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and


Brian D. Roverud, Faribault County Attorney, 412 North Nicollet, P.O. Box 5, Blue Earth, MN 56013 (for respondent)


John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)


            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Ross, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


ROSS, Judge

Douglas Brandsoy appeals his conviction for making terroristic threats.  He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that evidence that he threatened to shoot the bar owner and patrons as they expelled him established only that he acted in transitory anger, and was, therefore, insufficient to show the requisite mens rea of intent or reckless disregard.  Because record evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm.


Douglas Brandsoy, a regular at Forever Berma’s bar in Kiester, arrived at the bar early one evening in February 2005.  Theresa Drescher, the bar’s owner, sat behind the bar where Brandsoy and two other patrons, Donald Jensen and Steven Alphs, were seated.  Drescher and Alphs saw Brandsoy masturbating as he sat on his stool.  Drescher immediately ordered Brandsoy to leave. 

Brandsoy complied, but before leaving he turned to look at the three and said he was going to shoot them.  Jensen testified that Brandsoy appeared angry and was scowling.  Alphs said that Brandsoy appeared to be very upset.  Drescher testified that Brandsoy’s behavior differed from his customary politeness.  She feared that Brandsoy might retrieve a weapon from his car and return, so she walked to the door and “watched him pull away so [she] knew he wasn’t coming back in.”  Drescher then called the police.  Brandsoy told the arresting officer that he had announced at the bar that he had a gun because he was angry about being kicked out.

At trial, Brandsoy testified that he did not remember much about the incident, but he admitted that he had told the others that he had a gun and that he did so because he feared they might follow him into the parking lot.  The district court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the meaning of reasonable doubt, the elements of terroristic threats and the definitions of “intent to terrorize” and “reckless disregard.”  The jury found Brandsoy guilty of terroristic threats and indecent exposure.  This appeal from the terroristic-threats conviction follows.


Brandsoy argues that the record evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.  We review a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to determine whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged in light of the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts.  State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978).  This court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and assumes that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence.  Id.  We will not reverse a guilty verdict if the jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the state’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty.  Id. 

A person is guilty of making terroristic threats if that person “threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”  Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2004).  Purpose means “aim, objective, or intention.”  State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 400, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1975).  “Terrorize” means “to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.”  Id. at 399, 237 N.W.2d at 614. 

Brandsoy maintains that his “statement that he had a gun, or that he would kill the bar’s patrons” was not a terroristic threat.  He contends that it was merely the product of transitory anger.  Terroristic threats do not include oral threats expressing only transitory anger.  State v. Dick, 638 N.W.2d 486, 492-93 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002).  Transitory anger is short-lived and not intended to terrorize.  Id. But viewing the record in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, as we must, we see sufficient grounds for conviction.

There is ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Brandsoy’s threats were intended to terrorize.  Brandsoy exhibited anger at being ordered to leave, and he stated that he saw himself as an outsider being treated unfairly.  Most important, Brandsoy admitted to the jury that the reason he referred to a gun was to restrain the bar occupants from following him into the parking lot.  This admission allowed jurors to conclude that he intended his threat to cause fear that he might actually fire upon his listeners.  Drescher took the threat seriously, stating that she did not know if Brandsoy would return and that she continued to watch him to make sure he was gone before calling the police.  See State v. Marchand, 410 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that “[a] victim’s reaction is circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1987). 

Brandsoy also contends that because he had consumed more than three beers he could not have formed the intent to terrorize.  But there is no evidence that Brandsoy was intoxicated, and no evidence that he could not have formed the necessary intent to make a terroristic threat.  See State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d 609, 617 (Minn. 2001) (holding that a defendant’s consumption of alcohol does not create a presumption of intoxication, and the possibility of intoxication does not mean a defendant is incapable of forming requisite intent).  Brandsoy’s alcohol consumption does not affect the outcome.

Brandsoy’s testimony supports the conclusion that his statement was calculated to cause the bar occupants to fear him or that he recklessly disregarded that his statement might cause fear.  See Marchand, 410 N.W.2d at 915 (finding defendant’s testimony that he intended to cause victims to fear towing his car provided sufficient evidence of intent to make terroristic threat rather than being merely out of transitory anger).  The jury rendered its guilty verdict upon proper instruction regarding presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, as well as the definitions and elements necessary for a terroristic-threats conviction.   See State v. Skramstad, 433 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Minn. App. 1988) (concluding that jury could reasonably have inferred intent after being instructed regarding the intent to terrorize), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1989).  The record supports Brandsoy’s conviction.