This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Mary Ann Cannon, petitioner,
Filed January 2, 2007
Washington County District Court
File No. K6-02-2565
Mary Ann Cannon,
Mike Hatch, Attorney General,
Doug Johnson, Washington County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County Attorney, 14949 Upper 62nd Street North, P.O. Box 6, Stillwater, Minnesota 55082-0006 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her request for early release from probation because (1) her sentence and conviction violate her constitutional rights and the laws of Minnesota and the United States; (2) the district court did not make findings regarding the reasons it denied appellant’s motion; (3) the district court misrepresented the plea agreement; (4) the district court denied appellant the opportunity to present a defense; (5) the district court violated the terms of the plea agreement; (6) the district court refused to hear and consider the evidence of appellant’s case; (7) the district court is biased against appellant and that bias is reflected in its rulings; and (8) she relied on the district court’s “promise” when she entered the guilty plea. We affirm.
Appellant Mary Ann Cannon pleaded guilty to and was convicted of second-degree assault in November 2002. Appellant was sentenced on January 10, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement. The terms of the plea agreement included 200 hours of community work service, a $300 fine, anger-management and psychological evaluations, and seven years of probation. On January 17, 2003, appellant appeared before the district court for “clarification” of her sentence, during which the following exchange took place:
Appellant: Your Honor, could you just tell me one more time why I am being sentenced to seven years probation?
The Court: Because of the nature of the offense, Ms. Cannon. But if you follow through on these terms, you get the community work service done, you pay the fine, you remain law-abiding, you have no problems with the terms of probation, get the anger management evaluation, you either—if they say no treatment is required, no classes are required, that would satisfy it; if they say you need to do some classes and you do those classes, and the State of Georgia, your place of residence recommends an early discharge from probation, you get an early discharge from probation.
(Emphasis added.) The district court subsequently amended appellant’s sentence by eliminating the requirement that she obtain a psychological evaluation and by specifying the time in which she needed to pay her fine and complete her community work service. No further modifications were made to appellant’s sentence.
Appellant argues that at the January 17, 2003 hearing, the district court promised her an early release from probation if certain conditions were met. She contends that those conditions have been met, and by refusing to release her from probation, the district court is violating the plea agreement. She also argues that she would not have agreed to the plea agreement but for the alleged promises made by the court and that she is entitled to withdraw her guilty plea or have the probationary term vacated.
court “review[s] a postconviction court’s findings to determine whether there
is sufficient evidentiary support in the record” and “afford[s] great deference
to a district court’s findings of fact and will not reverse the findings unless
they are clearly erroneous.” Dukes
v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (
arguments regarding the constitutionality and legality of her sentence, the
district court’s alleged denial of her opportunity to present a defense, the
district court’s refusal to hear and consider evidence, and the district
court’s alleged bias are procedurally barred because they were not argued
before the district court. Therefore, we
decline to address those issues. See Roby
v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (
remaining arguments are meritless.
First, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to make findings articulating the reasons for denial of appellant’s
motion, but she cites no legal authority to support her argument. Assignment of error based on “mere assertion”
and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error
is obvious on mere inspection. State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558
N.W.2d 770, 772 (
Next, appellant argues that she would not have agreed to the plea agreement but for the district court’s promise that she would get an early release from her seven-year probationary term and that the district court misrepresented the plea agreement. However, the record does not contain any indication that early release from probation was contemplated at either the time appellant pleaded guilty or at the time she was sentenced. Appellant pleaded guilty and agreed to the plea agreement before the alleged “promise” was made by the district court, and she has not shown that that promise influenced her decision to plead guilty.
also argues that the district court violated the plea agreement. When determining whether a plea agreement has
been violated, courts look at “what the parties to [the] plea bargain
reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State
v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (
Appellant also argues that the district court’s denial of her motion was influenced by a factually inaccurate report from a probation officer. She alleges no facts and cites no legal authority to support this argument; therefore it is waived. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d at 772.
Finally, appellant argues that she
should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea now because had she realized that
the early release from probation was not guaranteed, she would have withdrawn
her guilty plea at the January 17, 2003 hearing. A criminal defendant has no absolute right to
withdraw a plea of guilty once it has been entered. Alanis
v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for early release from probation.
 The district court observed that appellant has misconstrued the district court’s language from the January 17, 2003 “clarification hearing” regarding “early” discharge from probation to automatically mean “immediate” discharge from probation.