This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Dianna S. Bach, as Legal Guardian of the Person
of Brett L. Bach, et al.,
Filed October 10, 2006
Hennepin County District Court
File No. PI 03-19354
David M. Bolt, Christopher J. Hoffer, Soucie & Bolt, 100 Anoka Office Center, 2150 Third Avenue North, Anoka, MN 55303 (for appellants)
Frank J. Rajkowski, Laurel J.
Pugh, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd.,
Daniel A. Haws, Stacy E. Ertz, Murnane Brandt, 30 East Seventh Street, Suite 3200, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent Case Corporation)
Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Forsberg, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
In this tort action, appellants challenge the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of their claims after a jury trial. Appellants argue that several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings had a prejudicial effect on the jury verdict and warrant a new trial. We affirm.
On October 4, 1998, at approximately
8:55 p.m., Brett Bach was traveling southbound in his car on Highway 101 near
Appellants Dianna S. Bach, Bach’s wife and legal guardian of Bach’s person, and Joseph Vogel, the conservator of Bach’s estate, sued Gehl and Case for damages. Appellants claimed that (1) Gehl negligently operated the combine on the night of the accident and thereby directly caused the collision and Bach’s injuries; (2) Case negligently designed the bean head by not putting lights or “adequate reflective devices” at its extremities; (3) Case “breached the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for its intended purpose” by selling a bean head that was not fit for travel on public roads; and (4) Case was strictly liable for the defective design and manufacture of the bean head without “proper illuminating mechanisms.”
At trial, appellants argued that Gehl and Case were responsible for the accident because, when it occurred, Gehl was driving his combine with the bean head extending four feet over the center line into the oncoming lane, and Bach could not have seen the bean head in his lane, either because there were no lights or reflective devices at the ends of the bean head or because the lights on the combine were so bright that they blinded Bach. Respondents argued that Bach did not see the bean head because he was distracted and not keeping a proper lookout. Bach, who has no memory of the accident, did not testify, and other than Gehl, there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. Gehl testified (1) that he believed that the bean head was not over the center line at the time of the accident and (2) that Bach did not slow down or move to the right of his lane or react in any other way to the presence of Gehl’s combine.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found damages for appellants in the amount of approximately $33,000,000 but determined that Bach was 90% at fault, Gehl was 10% at fault, and Case was 0% at fault. Based on the verdict, the district court dismissed appellants’ claims against respondents with prejudice. Appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, a new trial on liability, arguing that several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings “constituted reversible prejudicial error.” The district court denied appellants’ motions, and this appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
an erroneous interpretation of the law, the question of whether to admit evidence
is within a district court’s broad discretion. Kroning
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by allowing testimony and statements during opening and closing argument regarding the absence of prior collisions involving Gehl’s combine and Case combines in general.
As a threshold matter, respondents argue that appellants waived any objection to the admission of evidence of no prior collisions by introducing the evidence in appellants’ case-in-chief. The record shows that before trial, appellants made two motions in limine on the subject, one requesting that the district court prohibit Gehl from testifying that he had never had another collision with his combine and that other cars had passed him safely on the night of the accident. The second motion asked the district court to exclude all references to the absence of prior collisions involving Case combines because Case could not meet its “foundational burden regarding such evidence.” The district court denied the motions, and in their case-in-chief, appellants examined Gehl and current and former Case employees regarding the prior-collisions issue. Appellants now challenge that testimony on appeal.
claim of “error in admission of evidence can be waived either by failing to
make timely objection or by a party introducing the evidence himself.” Jones
v. Fleischhacker, 325 N.W.2d 633, 639 (
B. Gehl’s Testimony
Appellants first argue that the district court committed reversible error by allowing Gehl to testify (1) that he had never had another collision with his combine, (2) that other cars passed Gehl’s combine safely the night of the accident, and (3) that Gehl’s neighbors had never told him that his combine was not illuminated properly. Appellants argue that this testimony allowed respondents to imply improperly that Bach “was negligent because [Bach] ‘ran into’ the combine’s header where others had avoided it.”
Minnesota, evidence of the absence of prior accidents resulting from the same
inanimate cause, under substantially similar circumstances, is admissible to
prove that the inanimate cause was not dangerous or likely to cause such
accidents and that the person responsible for the inanimate cause was unaware
of its dangerous character. Nubbe v. Hardy Cont’l Hotel Sys. of
Gehl’s allegedly negligent operation of the combine and bean head could not be an inanimate cause of the accident, but Case’s allegedly negligent design and manufacture of the bean head could be. Therefore, Gehl’s testimony was admissible because it was relevant to the questions of whether the absence of extremity lighting on the bean head was dangerous or likely to cause accidents and whether Gehl was aware that his bean head was a danger to other drivers because it did not have lights at its extremities.
1. Gehl’s Testimony Regarding No Prior Collisions with His Combine
record shows that Gehl did not specifically testify that he had had no prior collisions
with his combine. But Gehl did testify
to how he has driven his combine with the bean head in the past, stating that
over many years, he has always driven as far to the right of the road as
possible and that he “always drove as safe as [he] could.” This testimony is not relevant to the alleged
inanimate cause of the accident—the lack of lighting on the ends of the bean head—but
rather is relevant to Gehl’s allegedly negligent operation of the combine. Gehl’s testimony that he always drove as far
to the right of the road as possible is admissible habit evidence. See
2. Gehl’s Testimony Regarding Other Cars Passing Safely
The record shows that Gehl testified that 20 to 30 cars passed him safely during the approximately 30 minutes that elapsed from the time that he left his field until the time of the accident. Appellants argue that this testimony was inadmissible because the conditions when these cars passed Gehl were not substantially similar to the conditions at the time of the accident. Appellants point to Gehl’s testimony that there was still some sunlight when he left the field, and the parties agree that it was completely dark at the time of the accident. But the record shows that Gehl testified that several cars safely passed him moments before the accident.
Because the record supports the conclusion that the conditions at the time that several other cars safely passed Gehl were substantially similar to the conditions at the time of the accident, that fact was admissible to prove that the alleged inanimate cause of the accident—the lack of extremity lighting on the bean head—was not dangerous or likely to cause an accident and that Gehl was unaware that the unlit ends of the bean head were dangerous. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Gehl’s testimony regarding other cars passing him safely.
3. Gehl’s Testimony Regarding the Absence of Complaints About His Bean Head
record also shows that Gehl testified that none of his neighbors had ever told
him that his combine was dangerous because the bean head was hard to see at
night. Appellants argue that this
testimony was inadmissible hearsay. But
the record shows that appellants did not object to the testimony at trial. When a party fails to object to evidence at
trial, that party has generally waived any objection. Steiner
v. Beaudry Oil & Serv., Inc., 545 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21, 1996); see also Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)
(requiring “a timely objection or motion to strike” to claim erroneous
admission of evidence). Regardless of
the fact that appellants waived this issue by failing to object, we note that,
although there might be a question here as to relevance, testimony that another
person did not say anything is not hearsay.
C. Case’s Statements Regarding No Reported Collisions
Appellants next argue that the district court abused its discretion by “allowing [Case] to allege, in its opening and closing arguments, that it has sold 136,000 combines with no reported accidents” and by allowing testimony from Case employees regarding the absence of prior collisions involving Case combines.
Case argues that appellants are objecting only to Case’s statements in its opening and closing arguments and not to witness testimony regarding the absence of prior collisions involving Case combines. Although appellants focus on the statements that Case made in its opening and closing arguments, appellants state in their brief that the district court “should have excluded all reference to the alleged absence of prior accidents by [Case] and its employees.”
argue that statements regarding the absence of prior collisions involving Case
combines lacked proper foundation because “Case made no competent showing that
its accident reporting system would have been aware of other accidents had they
occurred, or that the combines were similar, and being used under similar
circumstances.” Counsel is given wide
latitude when arguing to a jury as long as counsel’s statements are based on the
evidence and proper inferences therefrom.
Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel,
Appellants argue that Case’s accident-reporting system is inadequate because dealers are the primary reporting sources, and the custodian of Case’s accident-reporting files testified at her deposition that the dealers were not required to report accidents to Case; and, in this case, she did not know of the accident involving Gehl’s combine until three years after appellants filed their notice of claim with Case. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the foundation was sufficient to admit the Case-employee testimony regarding the absence of prior collisions with Case combines; appellants’ arguments go to the weight of the testimony rather than to its admissibility. Because the Case-employee testimony was admissible, Case’s statements in its opening and closing arguments regarding the absence of prior collisions involving Case combines were based on the evidence.
argue that the district court abused its discretion by allowing respondents,
over appellants’ objections, to suggest in their closing arguments that Bach
was suicidal, and appellants claim that they were “entitled to a curative jury
The record shows that during its closing argument, Case’s attorney made the following statement in the context of discussing damages:
The wage loss issue. Look at the driving record. . . . [Bach’s employer] didn’t know about the traffic citation that [Bach] got within about a month of the accident for speeding that would have cost him his job. By admission, he would have lost that job. . . . Maybe [Bach] knew that when he went to work the next day he was going to lose his job that he had had for a year and a half . . . .”
(Emphasis added.) And during Gehl’s closing argument, Gehl’s attorney made the following statement while describing the accident:
[T]here’s not one bit of physical evidence to show that [Bach] reacted at all, not one mark on the road to show at least the initial scuff or turning to the right. Not one shadow of a brake mark or ABS systems, if he had hit his brakes when he saw it.
Nothing to indicate that he was doing anything other at the time of collision than still going straight ahead or angling to the left. Why in the world would he be angling to the left. If he saw it, he wouldn’t, unless he was suicidal or he didn’t see it, he didn’t see it at all, he never reacted, and the only reason he didn’t react was because he was distracted. Nobody knows — how can you know without [Bach] to tell us why he was distracted.
(Emphasis added.) Out of the presence of the jury, appellants
objected to both of the above statements, arguing that respondents had implied
that Bach was attempting to commit suicide at the time of the accident. The district court overruled appellants’
objection and gave 4
statements during their closing arguments do not support the conclusion that
respondents claimed that Bach was suicidal on the night of the accident; to the
extent that the statements might suggest that possibility, these two vague and
discrete references in respondents’ closing arguments, covering 100 transcribed
pages, do not constitute prejudicial error.
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Bach’s complete driving record over appellants’ objection, claiming that it was inadmissible character evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404 and was more prejudicial than probative.
Respondents deny that they offered Bach’s driving record into evidence to show that Bach was driving on the night of the accident in accordance with his prior bad driving record. Respondents argue that they offered Bach’s entire driving record to dispute appellants’ wage-loss claim by showing that Bach would have lost his job as a driver with QuickSilver Express Courier soon after the date of the accident because he had recently received a second speeding ticket in a two-year period, which was grounds for dismissal by QuickSilver. Appellants argue that respondents could have achieved that goal by offering Bach’s driving record for the three years preceding the collision and that because Bach’s entire driving record included charges of driving while impaired from 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1991 and “an official finding that [Bach] was ‘inimical to public safety,’” the jury would be prejudiced and believe that Bach “was a habitually drunk driver.” Respondents argue that even if it was error to admit Bach’s entire driving record, the error was not prejudicial because the jury awarded damages in the exact amounts proposed by Bach’s expert.
Here, Bach’s driving record was admissible because it related to his claim for loss of future earnings. His driving record could have affected not only the length of his employment with QuickSilver but also his ability to obtain a job as a driver with another employer. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence, that the probative value of the evidence to the damages question outweighed any prejudice, and that the admission of this evidence is not grounds for JNOV or a new trial.
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of past incidents of domestic abuse involving Bach and his wife, claiming that this evidence was irrelevant. Respondents argue that this evidence was relevant to Dianna Bach’s loss-of-consortium claim because it called into question the prospective longevity of her marriage to Bach and that the evidence was relevant to show that Bach’s history of violence before the accident explains Bach’s problems with aggression after his traumatic brain injury. The record shows that before trial appellants filed a motion in limine, requesting that the court exclude all references to prior incidents of domestic abuse involving Bach and his wife, which the district court denied, concluding that it was relevant to the loss-of-consortium claim.
record shows that between March 1996 and January 1997 three incidents of
domestic abuse occurred between Bach and his wife, two of which resulted in assault
charges against Bach. The last incident
occurred approximately 22 months before the accident. Evidence is relevant if it makes the existence
of any material fact more or less probable then it would be without the
We decline to reach the question of whether the evidence of the domestic-abuse incidents was relevant also to show that Bach’s history of violence explains Bach’s current aggression problems. Even assuming, without deciding, that the domestic-abuse incidents are not relevant to Bach’s current problems with aggression, appellants cannot show that the admission of evidence of these incidents prejudiced their damage award because the jury awarded the amounts that appellants asked for.
Appellants argue that even if the evidence of prior incidents of domestic abuse is relevant, such evidence is more prejudicial than probative because it could have led the jury to “decide the case based upon its dislike of [Bach’s] prior conduct, rather than the circumstances surrounding the collision and the damages which resulted.” The fact that Bach committed domestic abuse in the past does not give rise to the inference that he is a bad driver; therefore, we conclude that the admission of this evidence was not prejudicial to the outcome of the trial and is not grounds for JNOV or a new trial.
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence the code of ethics of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE) and the European standard for lighting and refusing to allow any discussion of the code and standard during the trial. The record shows that appellants filed a motion in limine to admit ASAE standards 279.8 and 279.9, which describe the requirements for the lighting and marking of tractors and other self-propelled equipment, including bean heads. The district court granted appellants’ motion, but during trial, the district court sustained respondents’ objection to any references to the ASAE code of ethics and specifically struck the following from a Case engineer’s deposition that was read at trial:
Q. Do you know generally the code of ethics and the canons of ASAE?
Q. I will read one to you.
. . . .
Q. It says, “Engineers uphold and advance the integrity and honor and dignity of the engineering profession by, one, using their knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare, and, two, being honest and impartial and serving with fidelity the public, their employees and clients.” Do you agree with that, generally?
A. Yes, I would agree.
. . . .
Q. “Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties.” Do you agree with that generally?
Q. And do you agree with the principle that one death or serious injury is too many if it could be avoided by reasonable engineering practices?
In sustaining respondents’ objection, the district court concluded that the “one death or serious injury” question was a rhetorical question to which there is no answer and that the code of ethics was not helpful to the jury in resolving any of the issues in the case. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the ASAE code of ethics was not relevant to the issues here and that appellants’ “one death or serious injury” question could be inflammatory and therefore prejudicial. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the ASAE code of ethics and any references to it from trial.
A request for the admission into evidence of the European standard for lighting does not appear to have been included in appellants’ motions in limine. None of the parties cites, and we do not find, where in the 2,448 pages of trial transcript the district court denied appellants’ attempt to admit that standard into evidence. Nor does a copy of the European standard appear to be in the record. An appellant “is responsible for ensuring that an adequate appellate record is presented to decide the issues raised by appellant.” State v. Brown, 709 N.W.2d 313, 319 n.3 (Minn. App. 2006). Because appellants have failed to provide an adequate record on this issue, we decline to review it. See id. (concluding that an inadequate record precluded review of a claim).
Appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion by allowing hearsay into evidence in the form of an evaluation report on the “Case IH 1680 Self-Propelled Combine” by a Canadian organization, the Prairie Agricultural Machinery Institute (PAMI), which states that the combine is well lit from the perspective of the combine operator. Appellants objected to the admission of the PAMI report during respondents’ cross-examination of appellants’ expert witness, but the district court overruled the objection, allowing the admission of the report under the learned-treatise exception to the hearsay rule. The learned-treatise exception allows
[t]o the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
the PAMI report was admitted as an exhibit and not just read into the
record. The rules of evidence provide
that statements from a learned treatise “may be read into evidence but may not
be received as exhibits.”
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Bach’s employer’s “driver’s handbook” into evidence without adequate foundation in the form of evidence that Bach had reviewed it. The record shows that during appellants’ direct examination of Dean Herbst, the general manager and part owner of Quicksilver Express Courier, Herbst testified that when Bach was an employee, Quicksilver had its drivers watch a defensive-driving-system video and then take a test, and that a completed test was in Bach’s employee file, although the test was not scored.
Later, during the testimony of one of respondents’ accident-reconstruction experts, appellants objected when respondents sought to offer as an exhibit a workbook for a defensive-driving course that was in Bach’s employee file, along with the answer sheet to the driving test mentioned in Herbst’s testimony. It appears from the record that the workbook is the document that appellants refer to in their brief as Quicksilver’s “driver’s handbook.” Appellants argued that respondents did not lay a proper foundation for introducing or discussing the workbook. Respondents responded that appellants opened the door to this evidence when they asked Herbst about Bach’s training as a driver; the district court agreed, concluding that “the door has been opened and the jury should be entitled to see what education [Bach] had that might be different than other drivers.” Respondents then read to their accident-reconstruction expert portions of the workbook regarding driving maneuvers for avoiding collisions. Before reading from the workbook, counsel for Case stated that the workbook included a “reference to collision avoidance that [Bach] would have read and passed on.”
determination of the adequacy of foundation lies within the discretion of the
district court. Smith, 297
Here, the record shows that Herbst testified that when Bach worked at Quicksilver, they used “the Smith defensive driving system and they had videos that they watched and then they would take a little question and answer test afterwards.” Coleman is not precedential, and we do not find it persuasive in this case because the record here shows that Herbst did not mention the workbook in his testimony. And although the workbook has the words “Defensive Driving Course” on its cover, there is nothing indicating that it is part of the “Smith defensive driving system” mentioned by Herbst. Further, despite respondents’ claim that it is undisputed that Bach received the driving workbook, there appears to be no testimony in the record laying foundation for the defensive-driving workbook or the fact that Bach passed his defensive-driving test, which was not scored.
we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
workbook into evidence. But we also conclude
that it was not prejudicial error because there was already in evidence the
fact that Bach saw a defensive-driving video, and the workbook was therefore
cumulative evidence regarding Bach’s defensive-driving training. See
W.G.O. v. Crandall, 640 N.W.2d 344, 349 (
argue next that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that they
could not admit the
We conclude that it was within the district court’s discretion not to admit the manual into evidence and to allow appellants to use the manual only during cross-examination. Even if we were to decide that the district court abused its discretion by not admitting the manual, it was not prejudicial error because appellants were able to read the relevant portions of the manual in front of the jury.
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by excluding portions of a Case engineer’s deposition that included questions and responses regarding whether, before the accident, Case had considered issuing a recall to retrofit light kits on its bean heads, including the one on Gehl’s combine. The district court allowed testimony regarding the fact that Case issued a service bulletin to its dealers regarding the availability of retrofit light kits but excluded, as irrelevant, all questions and answers regarding whether Case had ever contemplated a recall because of lighting issues.
The record shows that the Case engineer testified that he probably had a discussion regarding whether to recall or authorize a retrofit of bean heads with extremity lights but that there was at the time no history of accidents involving bean heads that would justify a recall. Appellants argue that this excluded testimony was “[e]vidence that [Case’s] engineers considered a recall of this combine/header” and that such evidence “is relevant to show that Case knew that its product posed a substantial risk of harm.” Respondents argue that the excluded evidence is not relevant to appellants’ claims and that, although such evidence might be relevant to a claim that Case breached a “post-sale duty to warn,” appellants made no such claim.
In their amended complaint, appellants claim that Case “owed Plaintiffs . . . a duty to design, develop, select materials for, manufacture, assemble, test, inspect, sell, promote, provide warnings for, and distribute the subject combine and bean head in a manner that rendered it safe” and that Case “failed to adequately warn against foreseeable and/or intended uses of the bean head [without lighting or adequate reflective devices] at night.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude that appellants’ complaint sufficiently states a claim for breach of a post-sale duty to warn.
a seller knows or reasonably should know that a product poses a substantial
risk of harm is relevant to a claim of post-sale failure to warn. Hodder
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833 (
Even if we were to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by excluding this testimony, the exclusion was not prejudicial because appellants were allowed to introduce the engineer’s testimony that Case had issued a service bulletin to its dealers regarding “header lighting retrofit parts” that explained how to mount on an old combine a new header with extremity lights and that, although Case had parts that made it possible to add extremity lights to an old header, Case did not issue a service bulletin regarding this fact. This evidence was relevant to the question of whether Case knew that its unlit bean heads posed a risk of harm, and the testimony regarding discussion of a recall would have been cumulative.
Appellants also argue that the recall testimony in the Case engineer’s deposition was admissible to impeach other Case-employee testimony that Case did not know of anything wrong with its combine and bean head and that in their opinions the bean head did not need extremity lighting. The record does not show that appellants argued to the district court that the recall testimony was admissible for impeachment purposes, but even if they had, the excluded testimony is not inconsistent with the other Case-employee testimony. Therefore, the recall testimony would lack impeachment value. See In re Welfare of D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 901 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that prior inconsistent statements are admissible for impeachment purposes).
argue that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the opinions
of two of its experts, Myron Lofgren, an accident-reconstruction expert, and
Ellie Francis, a visual-and-human-factors expert, regarding the “causation” of
the accident. A district court’s decision
regarding whether to admit expert testimony will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639,
The district court did not allow Lofgren to respond to the following question on the ground that it called for speculation: “[I]s it more predictable, in your experience as a highway patrol officer and a reconstructionist, what people will do when they’re faced with a flashing light in their lane of travel than in those other two situations where the lights are all contained in the other lane?” And the district court did not allow Francis to respond to the following question because of lack of foundation: “Do you have an opinion as to whether the absence of flashers on the Gehl header was a substantial contributing factor in causing this collision using all of the knowledge you’ve gained in these demonstrations and your background as a vision specialist in the perception side of—?” The record shows that the jury watched a video that showed what a combine and bean head would look like to a driver at night under circumstances similar to those that existed on the night of Bach’s accident.
this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by prohibiting the witnesses from responding to the above questions. The question to Lofgren called for
speculation. See Hudson, 326 N.W.2d at
155 (providing that experts should not be allowed to speculate). And the question to Francis was an attempt to
elicit her opinion regarding what caused the accident when the jury had seen
the same reenactment evidence that Francis did; therefore, the issue of
causation was not outside the realm of common knowledge, and it would not have
been helpful to the jury to hear Francis’s opinion on who or what caused the
Appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion by allowing respondents to cross-examine Lofgren regarding what a “reasonable driver” might do under circumstances similar to those that existed on the night of Bach’s accident. Although appellants claim in their brief that they objected to this line of questioning, review of the trial transcript shows that appellants made no objection, and appellants did not make a motion in limine regarding “reasonable-driver” questions to appellants’ experts. When a party fails to object to evidence at trial, that party has generally waived any objection. Steiner, 545 N.W.2d at 44; see also Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring “a timely objection or motion to strike” to claim erroneous admission of evidence).
Because we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion in its evidentiary rulings that warrants a new trial, we affirm.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.