This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Ryan Michael Fisher,
Filed August 8, 2006
Reversed and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 06001198
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800
Peter A. MacMillan, Michele R. Wallace, Assistant Crystal
City Attorneys, MacMillan, Wallace & Athanases, P.A.,
Ryan Michael Fisher,
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Minge, Judge.
Appellant challenges the district court’s order dismissing the charges against respondent on the ground that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop respondent. We reverse and remand.
December 2005 in
officer initiated a stop of respondent’s vehicle and observed indicia of
intoxication. Following the stop and
investigation, appellant State of
the omnibus hearing, the officer testified to his observations and his
knowledge of the
The district court found that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop and stated that the officer was merely acting on a “hunch.” In support of its decision, the district court stated that “it’s not clear [respondent] violated a law.” Consequently, the district court ruled that the stop was unconstitutional and suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The state appeals from that order.
If the state
appeals from a pretrial suppression order, it “must ‘clearly and unequivocally’
show both that the [district] court’s order will have a ‘critical impact’ on
the state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order
constituted error.” State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (
Here, the district court found that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping respondent’s vehicle. As a result, the district court suppressed evidence of intoxication obtained from the stop, which would require dismissal of the driving-while-impaired charges. Thus, the critical-impact test has been met.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I of the Minnesota Constitution provide protection
against unlawful searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV;
To establish a reasonable suspicion
justifying a stop, the state must show that the officer “had a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (
Here, the officer observed respondent accelerate rapidly from a stop sign. In the words of the officer’s testimony, the acceleration was at “a high rate of speed.” The officer followed respondent after observing this driving conduct and observed respondent again accelerate from a stop sign at a high rate of speed. The officer also testified that he heard the engine of respondent’s vehicle rev loudly. The officer stated that he believed the acceleration to be at a “dangerous rate.” Furthermore, in his training and experience, the officer testified that this driving conduct is an indicator that the driver may be under the influence.
the officer testified that
It is unlawful to start or accelerate any motor vehicle with an unnecessary exhibition of speed on a public or private way within the city limits. Unreasonable squealing or screeching sounds emitted by the tires or the throwing of sand or gravel by the tires of the vehicle or both is prima facie evidence of unnecessary exhibition of speed.
Because we conclude that the district court erred by determining the officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop respondent, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.