This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).








Wiley E. Stratton,





Hannon Security Services, Inc. (1991),



Department of Employment and Economic Development,




Filed July 3, 2006


Hudson, Judge


Department of Employment and

Economic Development

File No. 1265105



Wiley E. Stratton, 3457 Third Street North, Apartment 210, St. Cloud, Minnesota 56303 (pro se relator)


Hannon Security Services, Inc. (1991), 9036 Grand Avenue South, Bloomington, Minnesota 55420-3634 (respondent)


Linda A. Holmes, Department of Employment and Economic Development, 332 Minnesota Street, Suite E200, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-1351 (for respondent Department)


            Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Worke, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


Relator Wiley Stratton brings a certiorari appeal of the decision of the unemployment-law judge that relator is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  Because relator quit his employment for a medical reason, but did not so inform his employer or request accommodation, relator does not satisfy the statutory exception, and we affirm. 


Generally, an employee who quits employment is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2004).  An employee who quits may nonetheless qualify for benefits if (1) his serious illness or injury makes it medically necessary to quit, (2) the employee informs the employer of the serious illness or injury and asks for accommodation, and (3) the employer makes no reasonable accommodation available.  Id., subd. 1(7).  No other exception to the general rule of disqualification applies here.

We review the decision of the unemployment-law judge (ULJ) to determine “if the substantial rights of the [relator] may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision” were contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence.  Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2005). 

The record reflects that relator was employed by respondent Hannon Security as a security officer from November 11, 2004, until he quit on January 14, 2005.  Relator experienced difficulty with patrolling alone, at night, around the buildings and decided he could not continue the work out of concern that he could not handle an emergency if one were to arise.  Because he was embarrassed about his condition and he thought it was personal, he did not tell the employer about it when he quit on January 14.  Although relator began seeing a doctor about his condition while he was still employed by respondent, he was not diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder until May 2005.  Since then, he has received disability payments.

The department initially determined that relator quit due to a serious illness, but the employer appealed.  The employer stated it was unaware of the illness and that relator told his supervisor that he was quitting because he was moving out of state.  Relator made it clear in his response to the appeal that he did not tell the employer about his condition nor did he think his problem with the employment was the employer’s fault.  In addition, relator did not tell the employer why he quit.  Because the facts are undisputed that relator did not know what his condition was at the time he quit, and the employer was not informed of a medical condition or given a chance to accommodate relator before relator quit, the unemployment-law judge’s decision that relator does not fall within the medical exception to disqualification is supported by substantial evidence. 

After the ULJ issued the decision, relator requested reconsideration.  For the first time on reconsideration, relator stated that the night supervisor treated him rudely and this rude treatment was the reason he initially cut back his hours and stopped working at one building.  Relator argues that this treatment is enough to change the ULJ’s decision. 

Under the new statutory provisions allowing requests for reconsideration, the ULJ “shall not” consider any evidence that was not submitted at the evidentiary hearing.  Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (Supp. 2005).  Relator made no mention of alleged rude treatment in the initial appeal papers or at the evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, the ULJ was limited to considering relator’s explanation as provided at the hearing.

Even if the ULJ could have considered the alleged bad treatment, however, unemployment law still requires that the employee inform the employer of an adverse working condition so that the employer has an opportunity to accommodate.  Id., § 268.095, subd. 3(b) (2004).  There is no evidence that relator notified the employer of this particular problem with the night supervisor.  There is evidence that, upon relator’s complaint about working at one building, the employer allowed him to work at another building.  In short, the evidence does not show notice to the employer of an adverse condition or a failure of the employer to accommodate, and the new evidence of rude treatment would not have changed the outcome.

Relator also argues that the ULJ stated that he “got paid 8 times the amount” he made.  The language used by the ULJ, however, was simply the statutory language regarding disqualification duration.  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 10.  Therefore, this was not an error in the ULJ’s decision.