This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Kevin Lee Huck,
Filed July 18, 2006
Stearns County District Court
File No. K4-04-5283
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County Attorney, Administration Center, Room 448, 705 Courthouse Square, St. Cloud, MN 56303 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Parker, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
On appeal from conviction of third-degree controlled-substance crime, appellant argues that (1) the district court committed plain error in allowing the arresting officer to testify as to which of the vehicle’s occupants he believed possessed the methamphetamine found in the car, and (2) he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that the district court did not err, and that appellant failed to establish a basis to reverse the conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant Kevin Lee Huck
argues that the district court committed plain error in allowing the arresting
officer to testify as to which of the car’s occupants he believed possessed the
methamphetamine found in the car. Appellant did not object to the question or
answer at trial. “Evidentiary rulings
rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the
[district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby
prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (
At trial, the arresting officer was asked, “Based on your training and experience and your discovery of the evidence found in the car and on the defendant, who did you believe possessed these drugs?” The officer responded, “The defendant.” Appellant argues that the officer’s testimony infringed upon the jury’s job to determine facts and judge a witness’s credibility. A review of the evidence shows that there is no reasonable possibility that even if the question rose to the level of plain error, it could significantly affect the jury’s decision to convict appellant.
admissible, expert testimony must be helpful to the jury.
Finally, in his pro se supplemental brief, appellant argues that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial. To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
[t]he defendant must affirmatively prove that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d
558, 561 (
argues that his trial attorney’s failure to call witnesses on his behalf was
gross failure on his attorney’s part to represent appellant to the best of his
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be raised in a postconviction
petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal. See Robinson v. State, 567 N.W.2d 491, 494 & n.3 (
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.