This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Jeremy Douglas Brandt,
Filed June 13, 2006
LeSueur County District Court
File No. K0-04-295
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
Brent Christan, LeSueur County Attorney, Jason L. Moran, Assistant County Attorney, 65 South Park Avenue, P.O. Box 156, Le Center, MN 56057 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
On appeal from a conviction of second-degree controlled-substance offense, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because (1) the testimony of an informant who set up a controlled buy in exchange for a reduction in his charges was not credible; (2) the testimony of a jailhouse informant was not credible; and (3) the controlled buy was inadequately monitored. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant Jeremy Douglas Brandt argues that the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. In considering a claim
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, our role “is limited
to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit
the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State
v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (
This court’s review includes
an analysis of the facts presented and the inferences the jury could reasonably
draw from those facts. State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 366 (
Appellant concedes that the fact-finder determines whom to believe, but argues that the testimony of two informants was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Here, R.K. was facing charges for manufacturing methamphetamine when he told officers that appellant was selling methamphetamine. R.K. testified that he received a “break” by cooperating with the officers. Following his arrest, appellant shared a jail cell with L.D. who was also being held on a drug charge. L.D. informed officers that appellant confessed to selling drugs to R.K. L.D. testified that he attempted to secure a deal, but did not; ultimately pleading guilty to one charge, in exchange for the state dismissing a second charge.
testified that he did not sell drugs to R.K. and that R.K. merely visited him
to talk and repay appellant the money that he owed him. Appellant further testified that he kept a
copy of the complaint in his cell and discussed it with L.D., which is how L.D.
knew the details of his case. A jury is
free to disbelieve a defendant’s reasonable alternative explanations of what
occurred. State v. Collard,414 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn.
App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988). Apparently the jury
disbelieved appellant’s testimony, and we must credit that finding. State v. Folkers,581 N.W.2d 321, 327 (
Appellant also argues that the informants’ testimony required
corroboration because both had reasons to fabricate stories. But under
Appellant next argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the officers failed to adequately monitor the controlled buy. Appellant contends that officers never saw R.K. enter appellant’s trailer to deliver the money. It is true that officers did not observe R.K. go into appellant’s trailer, but R.K. testified that he gave appellant money, a witness testified that he saw R.K. give appellant money, and appellant admitted that he received money from R.K. Appellant asserts that there was no surveillance of R.K. after he left appellant’s trailer and that R.K. could have hidden the money after leaving the trailer. While this is possible, R.K. was searched, and the officers found no large amounts of cash on him. Further, the jury heard no testimony that R.K. hid the money, and it is undisputed that appellant received money from R.K.
Appellant also suggests that because officers did not see R.K. enter appellant’s trailer, R.K. could have stashed the drugs and retrieved them before he met with appellant. The day of the controlled buy, R.K. went to appellant’s trailer, but was told to come back later. An officer watched R.K. play basketball and then walk back toward appellant’s trailer. The officer was unable to see R.K. enter appellant’s trailer, but after R.K. signaled that the sale was complete, he was back in the officer’s sight within a minute. R.K. delivered a baggie that contained a white crystal-like substance that tested positive for methamphetamine. “A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the second degree if: (1) on one or more occasions within a 90-day period the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a total weight of three grams or more containing . . . methamphetamine[.]” Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1 (1) (2002). A witness testified that he saw baggies containing a white substance in appellant’s trailer, and R.K. delivered a baggie containing a white substance. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, the record supports the jury’s verdict.