This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Hollis J. Larson, Petitioner,
Joan Fabian, Commissioner of Corrections,
Filed May 16, 2006
Washington County District Court
File No. C3-05-478
Hollis J. Larson, OID #114153, Minnesota Correctional Facility, Oak Park Heights, 5329 Osgood Avenue North, Stillwater, MN 55082 (pro se appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Jon
K. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, 900 Bremer Tower,
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion for appointment of counsel and failure to rule on several of his motions, including his claim that he was illegally arrested following a violation of his intensive supervised release. We affirm.
Appellant Hollis J. Larson
is serving prison time for multiple convictions of criminal sexual conduct in
In June 2003, respondent commissioner of corrections placed Larson on Intensive Supervised Release (ISR), subject to various conditions. On August 23, 2003, Larson’s parole agent obtained an administrative arrest warrant based on the allegation that Larson violated his release terms. Larson was taken into custody on that day. The respondent held a revocation hearing on September 2, 2003, revoked Larson’s release, gave him 365 days of confinement, and required that he complete a treatment program.
On January 11, 2005, Larson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and moved on February 9, 2005, for an evidentiary hearing so that he would be able to “challenge the many constitutional rights violations he alleges in the petition.” The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and, in a detailed memorandum, the court addressed each of the issues Larson raised in his petition. Alleging various abuses of judicial discretion and errors of law, Larson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Before a court may issue a
writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must set forth sufficient facts to
establish a prima facie case for discharge.
State ex rel. Fife v. Tahash,
Larson raises 17 categories
of issues in this appeal. They may be
grouped generally into questions relating to (1) probable cause and habeas
corpus procedures; (2) discovery; (3) convictions and sentencing; (4) representation
by defense counsel; and (5) procedures used and sanctions imposed by the
commissioner of corrections. Most of the
issues have been considered or could have been raised in one or more of
Larson’s three prior appeals and thus are no longer reviewable. State
v. Knaffla, 309
Intensive Supervised Release
The commissioner placed Larson on ISR in June 2003. Larson claims that the placement was in violation of statute and occurred under a law that did not exist when he was convicted, thus constituting an ex post facto violation.
Under the laws in existence when Larson was sentenced for
his various crimes, the commissioner of corrections had broad authority to
adopt rules regarding the supervision and release of prison inmates. Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subds. 1(d), 2
(1990). That authority included the
discretion to impose intensive community supervision for all or a portion of an
inmate’s supervised-release term. Minn.
Stat. § 244.12, subd. 1 (1990).
Thus, at the time Larson was convicted, the commissioner had legal
authority to require supervised release for his “parole” term and to impose
intensive supervision in the community.
A later codification of that authority and the commissioner’s
application of the new statute did not violate the ex post facto law
prohibition, Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6 (2002), for two reasons. First, that authority previously
existed. Second, an ex post facto law
is one that “renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not
punishable when it was committed.” State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 247 (
Larson also challenges, on the same grounds, the requirement that he participate in treatment and register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 5 (2004). The commissioner had the broad authority at the time of Larson’s convictions to impose release conditions that the commissioner found to be necessary and appropriate. Minn. Stat. § 244.15, subd. 7 (1990). Larson has not demonstrated that the condition of treatment was inappropriate for him as a repeat sex offender. Thus, the commissioner properly imposed the condition of treatment.
Registration requirements such as those at issue here are
nonpunitive and within the state’s civil regulatory power. Boutin
v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (
Larson contends that there was no probable cause for the
arrest warrant that ultimately led to the revocation of his supervised release. In the context of an arrest warrant for a
parole violation, probable cause exists if there is a reasonable factual basis
on which to conclude that the parolee has violated a condition of his
release. See In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (
Larson contends that he should have been given an opportunity to be heard on the probable-cause allegation, that he should have had a preliminary revocation hearing, and that he was entitled to a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing.
As noted above, probable cause was established by Larson’s acknowledged statement to his release agent. Although he could have been given an opportunity to explain his intent, the words themselves are sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Thus, any failure to allow an evidentiary hearing, even if error, was harmless.
Generally, a preliminary revocation hearing is held prior
to a final decision on a revocation allegation so that a parolee’s liberty is
not significantly infringed. Pearson v. State, 308
An inmate does not have an absolute right to a habeas
corpus evidentiary hearing. Dinneen, 272
In his motion for a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, Larson asserted that a hearing was necessary to address “many constitutional rights violations.” Most of those alleged violations related to his convictions and sentences and to procedures and sanctions relating to his incarceration. None of these allegations raised genuine fact issues that would necessitate an evidentiary hearing. As to the supervised-release revocation, a hearing was held in a timely manner, and Larson had the opportunity to be heard as to all matters pertinent to the alleged release violation and the question of revocation. There were no further factual disputes for the district court to consider; rather, Larson’s issues were questions of law that the district court could resolve on the record. Furthermore, the issues of good time and release date were matters of computation that the court could reasonably accomplish without an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the court correctly held that Larson’s “continued imprisonment is within the term of the sentence he was committed to.”
Appointment of Counsel
Larson contends that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to appoint defense counsel for the habeas corpus
We find no merit in Larson’s remaining contentions. Briefly, he erroneously relies on federal law respecting his “good-time” calculations and fails to show how calculations under state law were erroneous; his false-imprisonment claim, relating to January 30, 2003, is moot, as the district court held; as to the various “good-time” issues and disciplining sanctions, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as the district court held; and his parole-transfer request is without merit to the extent it has previously been denied and is premature as it might relate to a future transfer request.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.