This opinion will be
may not be cited except as
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08,
subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Scott Dean Rodahl, petitioner,
State of Minnesota,
Filed May 23, 2006
Affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded.
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Red Lake County District Court
File No. K9-02-110
John M. Stuart,
State Public Defender, G. Tony Atwal, Assistant State Public Defender, 2221 University Ave., S.E., Suite 425,
55414 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445
Minnesota St., St. Paul, MN 55102; and
Daniel Geller, Red Lake County Attorney, Lower
Level-Courthouse Annex, Post Office Box 416, Red Lake Falls, MN 56750 (for
Considered and decided by Toussaint,
Chief Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Willis, Judge.
N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
On appeal from denial of his postconviction petition,
appellant Scott Dean Rodahl argues that the double durational departure
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004),
and that his conviction must be vacated because his rights under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainees (IAD) were violated.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In July 2002, appellant was charged in Red Lake County, Minnesota,
with one count of issuing dishonored checks.
On April 29, 2003, while appellant was serving a sentence in a North
Dakota jail, he signed a waiver of extradition to Minnesota.
Appellant made an appearance in Red Lake County District Court on June
30, 2003, for a combined Rule 5 and Rule 8 hearing. He was then apparently
returned to jail in North Dakota.
pleaded guilty to the Minnesota
bad-check charge in July 2003. He was
sentenced to 45 months in prison, more than twice the presumptive
sentence. The district court supported
the departure under the career-offender statute by finding that appellant had
committed five or more prior felonies and that his current offense was
committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
did not file a direct appeal. But, in
October 2004, he filed a postconviction petition claiming the upward departure
violated his right to a jury trial under Blakely. Appellant also claimed that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to move to dismiss the
charge based on a violation of the IAD “anti-shuttling” provision. The district court denied the petition,
ruling that Blakely did not apply
retroactively to appellant’s sentence and that appellant was not prejudiced by
his attorney’s failure to raise an IAD challenge.
E C I S I O N
1. Application of Blakely
Appellant argues that the greater-than-double upward
departure, imposed under the career-offender statute, violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.
Blakely, the Supreme Court held that
the greatest sentence a judge can impose is “the maximum sentence [that may be
imposed] solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004). Appellant argues that his Sixth Amendment
rights under Blakely were violated
when his sentence was increased based on facts not found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that Blakely
applies retroactively to his 2003 sentence.
The determination whether a decision applies retroactively is a legal
question, which this court reviews de novo.
State v. Petschl, 692 N.W.2d
463, 470 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2005).
they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applied to those cases which have become final
before the new rules are announced.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 1075 (1989). A case becomes final
when “the availability of direct appeal has been exhausted, the time for a
petition for certiorari has elapsed or a petition for certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court has been filed and finally denied.” O’Meara
v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Minn.
did not file a direct appeal. His
conviction, therefore, became final in November 2003, when his time to file a
direct appeal expired. Thus, Rodahl’s
conviction became final before Blakely
acknowledges that the supreme court in Houston held
that Blakely does not apply
retroactively to convictions that became final between the release of Apprendi and the release of Blakely.
v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Minn. 2005) (holding Blakely announced a new rule). In Houston,
the supreme court also held that Blakely
was not a “watershed” rule and, therefore, it is applied retroactively only to
cases that were on direct review when it was released. Id.; see also Petschl,
692 N.W.2d at 472 (“Because the Blakely
rule does not improve the accuracy or fairness of a trial, we conclude that it
is not a watershed rule subject to retroactive application on collateral
review.”). Appellant does not suggest
any way to distinguish Houston,
and we conclude that Houston bars iss
postconviction claim for sentencing relief.
2. IAD Violation
also argues that the postconviction court erred in declining to vacate his 2003
conviction because his attorney failed to seek dismissal of the complaint based
on a violation of the “anti-shuttling” provision of the IAD.
“anti-shuttling” provision cited by appellant is triggered when a prisoner
files a request for final disposition. Appellant
filed a waiver of extradition, but there is no evidence in the record that he
filed a request for final disposition.
Although a request for final disposition constitutes a waiver of extradition,
a wavier of extradition does not seek disposition of criminal charges in
another state and does not constitute a request for final disposition. Cf. State v. Koehler, 448 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1989) (noting that
request for final disposition constitutes waiver of extradition), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 9, 1990). But there is another
“anti-shuttling” provision in the IAD that does not require a request for final
disposition. It is triggered when a
prosecuting attorney in the state that has lodged the detainer (here, Minnesota) presents “a
written request for temporary custody or availability” to the authorities in
the state where the prisoner is being held.
Stat. § 629.294, subd. 1, art. IV(a)(e) (2004).
unclear from the record whether the Red Lake County Attorney, or any other Minnesota official, made a written request to North Dakota for
temporary custody of appellant. The
Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the article IV(e) “anti-shuttling”
provision was not invoked when Nebraska
did not initiate a request for temporary custody. State
v. Reed, 668 N.W.2d 245, 252 (Neb.
2003). Here, there is no written request
for temporary custody in the file, and it is not clear how appellant went from North Dakota custody to the Red Lake County Jail without
a written request from the prosecution.
It is possible, however, that the prosecutor never requested that North
Dakota release appellant to Minnesota
custody. Without such a request, the “anti-shuttling”
provision in article IV(e) would not apply.
district court, in denying relief, relied on State v. Lewis, 422 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn.
App. 1988) (holding that IAD should not be “mechanically applied” without
regard to purpose of agreement). The
district court concluded that appellant was not prejudiced by his attorney’s
failure to raise a challenge based on the “anti-shuttling” provision because
appellant’s return to North Dakota
“did not frustrate [the] purpose [of the IAD].”
Lewis reading of the IAD
“anti-shuttling” provision has been effectively overruled. See
Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 156, 121 S. Ct.
2079, 2086 (2001) (holding that IAD cannot be construed in terms of purpose to
make violation of “anti-shuttling” provision “de minimis, technical, or harmless”). Bozeman
rejected the state’s argument that a one-day violation of the “anti-shuttling”
provision could be overlooked because it did not interfere with the prisoner’s
rehabilitation programs in prison and held that the IAD, as an interstate
compact sanctioned by Congress, is subject to federal construction just like
any other federal law. Id.
at 149, 122 S. Ct. at 2082.
two-part standard applies to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must first show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and second that,
but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994).
The second prong is met if the defendant shows that but for counsel’s
errors he would not have pleaded guilty.
Id. We conclude that
if the charges against appellant had been dismissed based on the alleged IAD
violation, appellant would not have pleaded guilty.
must still show that his attorney erred in failing to raise the issue because
the IAD “anti-shuttling” provision was violated. Because the record does not disclose whether
there was a request for temporary custody of appellant that would have triggered
the “anti-shuttling” provision in article IV(e) of the IAD, we remand that
issue to the postconviction court.
record indicates that appellant, who wanted to return to work-release status in
may have requested to return there. That
could constitute an implicit waiver of any “anti-shuttling” claim. See
generally State v. Wells, 638 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn.
App. 2002) (noting that 180-day IAD speedy-trial period may be waived even
without explicit waiver by defendant), review
Mar. 19, 2002). Appellant could also
have explicitly waived the “anti-shuttling” protection at the Rule 5/8
appearance. There is no transcript of
that appearance in the file. Therefore,
we also remand to the postconviction court to decide whether appellant waived
the “anti-shuttling” protection of the IAD, either implicitly or explicitly.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and