This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Christopher Loyd Ivey, petitioner,
Filed April 4, 2006
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-05-1099
Christopher Ivey, Shantz 1-East,
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Angela M. Helseth,
Assistant Attorney General,
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Wright, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
Christopher Lloyd Ivey appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenges his indeterminate commitment as a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP) and as a sexually dangerous person (SDP). We affirm.
In 1993, appellant pleaded guilty to
first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal-sexual conduct; he was
sentenced to prison. During the
investigation of these crimes, appellant confessed to attempted rape and murder
In November 2003, appellant was
Appellant then brought this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed for the first time that his confinement was illegal because the initial hearing was not held within 44 days after the petition was filed as required by statute. After a hearing, the district court denied the petition. Appellant moved for amended findings; the district court also denied this motion. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
When the facts are undisputed, an
appellate court will conduct a de novo review of a decision on a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Joelson v. O’Keefe, 594 N.W.2d 905, 908
“Committed persons may challenge the
legality of their commitment through habeas corpus.”
“The hearing on the commitment petition shall
be held within 14 days from the date of the filing of the petition.”
Appellant argues that he did not
waive the statutory requirement that the hearing on the petition must be held
within 44 days or else be dismissed. He
did not, however, raise this argument at either of his commitment hearings,
even though it could have been raised there.
See In re Buckhalton, 503 N.W.2d 148, 151 (
Appellant contends that this is an
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time. “Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as not
only authority to hear and determine a particular class of actions, but
authority to hear and determine the particular questions the court assumes to
decide.” Irwin v. Goodno, 686 N.W.2d 878, 880 (
The district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over SPP and SDP commitments. Ivey, 687 N.W.2d at 669. Whether the hearing was timely under the statute does not raise an issue as to the court’s authority to decide a particular class of cases or a particular question. Consequently, we conclude that the issue of the timeliness of the hearing does not raise subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, this requirement may be waived. May, 477 N.W.2d at 915.
Appellant also contends that
fairness requires that his argument be considered because it is based on
information that was not available to him earlier. In the context of postconviction relief
proceedings, the supreme court has recognized exceptions to the general rule
that a criminal defendant is barred from later raising claims he failed to
raise in the appeal. Sessions v. State, 666 N.W.2d 718, 721 (
Appellant contends that fairness requires that he be allowed to argue in this habeas proceeding that he did not waive the 44-day requirement. He asserts that his argument is based on relevant information that he was not aware of earlier, including a claim that the first court-appointed examiner’s family medical emergency, which was the basis in part for the postponement of the hearing, did not exist. Even assuming that the exception in Sessions applies, these allegations do not meet the standard for requiring consideration of the issue on appeal based on fairness grounds.
Next, appellant contends that the district
court erred when it failed to grant him an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing may be required when
there are material facts in dispute. State ex rel.
Appellant also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for amended findings. First, he asserts that the court erred in holding that it initially set the trial for January 7, 2004. But the district court stated in its November 26, 2003, order that the matter would be heard on or before January 7 unless otherwise ordered by the court. Finally, he challenges the district court’s failure to include in its findings the fact that it did not appoint counsel until a week after the petition was filed, but he makes no showing that this was error.