This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Wallace James Beaulieu,
Filed April 4, 2006
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Beltrami County District Court
File No. K8-04-1648
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Timothy R. Faver, Beltrami County Attorney, Randall R. Burg, Assistant County Attorney, 619 Beltrami Avenue Northwest, Suite 40, Bemidji, MN 56601 (for respondent)
Wallace James Beaulieu, OID#
153635, 1000 Lakeshore Drive, Moose
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Minge, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
Appellant Wallace James Beaulieu challenges his conviction of and sentence for failure to register as a predatory offender in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a), (c) (2004). Because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and appellant’s other claims of error are without merit, we affirm.
Appellant, a predatory offender, was charged with failing to register his address, as required by the predatory-offender registration statute, in October 2004. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the predatory-offender registration statute is civil/regulatory in nature and, therefore, could not be enforced against him, an enrolled Leech Lake Band tribal member, for conduct occurring on the Leech Lake Indian Reservation. The district court denied the motion.
At trial, appellant stipulated that he had a duty to register as a predatory offender in October 2004, and that he had a prior 2002 conviction for violating the predatory-offender-registration statute.
members of appellant’s family resided on
The jury found appellant guilty of failure to register as a predatory offender. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 24 months in prison.
Appellant argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct, that police violated appellant’s fourth amendment rights, that the sentence was based on inaccurate information, and that applying the amended predatory-offender registration statute to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
predatory-offender registration statute makes it a crime for a predatory
offender to knowingly violate any provision of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)
(2004). The minimum sentence for an
offender who has a prior conviction under the statute is two years.
evidence established that appellant, upon his release from jail on October 7,
court has held that the predatory-offender registration statute is a
civil/regulatory statute that the state lacks jurisdiction to enforce against
an enrolled tribal member on an Indian reservation. State
v. Jones, 700 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Minn. App. 2005), review granted (
Here, the state did not claim that appellant
was living elsewhere on the reservation.
The state presented evidence that appellant was no longer living at
Cabazon test applied in Jones recognizes that the state may not
have authority to enforce its laws against tribal members for conduct occurring
on their reservation. Id. (applying California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.
Ct. 1083 (1987)); see also State v. Stone,
572 N.W.2d 725, 732 (
also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knowingly
violated the statute. In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, this court conducts a painstaking analysis of the
record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the factfinder to reach the
verdict it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (
The state presented substantial
circumstantial evidence, consisting of law enforcement visits to Beaulieu
Circle, the responses and testimony of family members questioned there about appellant’s
whereabouts, appellant’s encounter with police in Fosston on October 14, and
his arrest in Duluth on November 2, all of which tended to prove that appellant
was no longer maintaining his residence at 7355 Beaulieu Circle. While there was some family testimony to the
contrary, appellant’s uncle testified that appellant was only at his house for
three or four days, and his cousin testified that he saw appellant come once
for his clothes, and then didn’t see him.
The weight and credibility of the conflicting evidence was for the jury
Appellant argues that the state was required to prove, as an element of the offense, where appellant’s new primary residence was. Appellant, however, was not charged with failing to register a new, known primary residence. The complaint charged him generally with knowingly failing to register. The jury instructions described the charge as “knowingly violat[ing] any of the requirements to register,” including failure to register a new address, and failure to give written notice “that the person is no longer living or staying at an address.” Thus, the jury could have found appellant guilty based on his failure to provide notice that he was no longer living at 7355 Beaulieu Circle, without the state having to prove a new primary residence.
The state presented ample evidence
from which the jury could conclude that appellant was no longer living at
Appellant also argues that the
prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct, and that a prosecution witness
gave misleading and prejudicial testimony.
A conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the
misconduct, when considered in light of the whole trial, impaired the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.
prosecution witness testified that he was attempting to verify appellant’s
residence when he drove to
Appellant also challenges the prosecutor’s use of the terms “predator” and “predatory offender.” But the stipulation provided that appellant had a duty to register “as a predatory offender,” and there was no objection to the prosecutor’s use of that term. Therefore, appellant has waived that claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Appellant also argues that the
prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in referring to his intoxicated
state both in Fosston and in
Appellant also argues that the
police violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they conducted their
investigation at the homes of his relatives.
Appellant did not raise this issue in the district court, and has,
therefore, waived the issue.
Finally, appellant argues that his
sentence should be reduced to a year and a day because he does not have the
prior conviction required for the two-year minimum sentence. See
Finally, appellant argues that
various amendments to the predatory-offender registration statute have been
applied to him in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The predatory-offender registration statute
does not violate ex post facto when applied to offenders who committed their
qualifying offenses before the statute was enacted. State
v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 247 (