This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).






Jose Luis Morales-Reyes, petitioner,





State of Minnesota,



Filed April 18, 2006


Kalitowski, Judge


Hennepin County District Court

File No. 94064451


Robert Dildine, 2208 23rd Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55404 (for appellant)


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and


Katrina E. Joseph, Russell J. Platzek, Martin J. Costello, Hughes & Costello, 1230 Landmark Towers, 345 St. Peter Street, St. Paul, MN 55102-1637 (for respondent)


            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Appellant Jose Morales-Reyes challenges the order denying his postconviction petition, arguing that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea.  We affirm.



            A criminal defendant may seek postconviction relief in Minnesota under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2004).  The defendant-petitioner bears the burden of establishing facts alleged in the petition by a fair preponderance of the evidence.  Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2004).  To meet this burden, the petitioner must support his allegations with “more than mere argumentative assertions that lack factual support.”  Henderson v. State, 675 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 2004).

            “The decisions of a postconviction court will not be disturbed unless the court abused its discretion.”  Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 2001).  This court reviews “a postconviction court’s findings to determine whether there is sufficient evidentiary support in the record” and will not reverse a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Additionally, this court reviews conclusions of law de novo.  Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003).

            We will reverse “the district court’s determination of whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea only if the district court abused its discretion.”  Bolinger v. State, 647 N.W.2d 16, 20-21 (Minn. App. 2002).  “Criminal defendants do not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”  Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (quotations omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.  A manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.  Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 577.  A plea is intelligent when the defendant enters a guilty plea after he “has been informed of and understands the charges and direct consequences of a plea.”  State v. Byron, 683 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).

            In November of 1994 appellant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor giving false information to police in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1 (1992).  Under that statute, an individual is guilty of a misdemeanor if he gives a false identification card to a peace officer with intent to obstruct justice when that officer makes inquiries incident to a lawful investigatory stop or lawful arrest.  Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1.

            Appellant now argues that his plea was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent because the facts do not establish that he intended to obstruct justice; therefore, he pleaded guilty to a crime that did not occur.  But the evidence in support of appellant’s petition is limited here because appellant filed his postconviction petition more than ten years after he pleaded guilty.  See James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 2005) (stating that timeliness is a relevant consideration in determining whether a court should grant a postconviction petition).  Additionally, during the postconviction hearing, appellant testified that he did not tell the police his real name when they asked for it.  The police report states that instead, appellant produced another man’s driver’s license.  Appellant also testified at the hearing that he identified himself only after the officers discovered that the man on the driver’s license had an outstanding arrest warrant from Texas.  Based on this limited record, we conclude that appellant failed to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he did not intend to obstruct justice.  See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3.  Thus, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the record provides an adequate basis for appellant’s plea.

            Appellant further argues that his plea withdrawal is necessary to prevent manifest injustice because he now faces deportation.  But Minnesota courts have held that because deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, due process does not require that the court or his counsel inform appellant about the possibility of deportation.  Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578; Byron, 683 N.W.2d at 323.

            Because appellant did not meet his burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient to support his guilty plea, we cannot say that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s petition to withdraw his plea.