This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Filed March 21, 2006
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, 50 W. Kellogg Blvd., Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102-1657 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Wright, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
In February 1997, appellant Corey Michaels pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court sentenced Michaels to a 117-month prison term, to run concurrently with an unexpired sentence for a previous criminal-sexual-conduct offense. The court also imposed a 120-month conditional-release period. In 2005, Michaels filed a postconviction petition challenging the imposition of the conditional-release period and seeking a modification of his sentence. The sentencing court dismissed the petition as moot, reasoning that the conditional-release issue had been resolved by a previous order substituting the conditional-release period for the period of supervised release mandated by the statute in effect when Michaels committed the present offense. On appeal from the dismissal of his petition, Michaels challenges the imposition of the conditional-release period. Because we conclude that the conditional-release period was properly imposed, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
postconviction petitioner has the burden of establishing, by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, facts that would warrant reopening the
case. King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (
Michaels first argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his postconviction petition without a hearing and without making factual findings. We disagree.
postconviction court must grant an evidentiary hearing and make factual
findings for any petition filed unless the petition and the record as a whole “conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2004); Ives v. State, 655 N.W.2d 633, 635
(Minn.2003); Roby v. State, 531
N.W.2d 482, 483 (Minn.1995). To satisfy
his or her burden of proof under section 590.04, the petitioner must allege
facts that, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would entitle
him or her to the requested relief. State v.
Michaels did not allege any facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief. The district court did not therefore abuse its discretion by denying Michaels’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing and without making factual findings.
next argues that because the plea agreement did not mention a
conditional-release period and he was not informed about it at the plea
hearing, his plea was not intelligently made.
Michaels implicitly argues that the validity of his plea turns on what
he knew at the plea hearing rather than on what he may have subsequently
learned from the presentence-investigation report or the sentence itself.
Minnesota law, a plea by a defendant whose plea agreement does not mention a
mandatory conditional-release period and who is not advised about the
conditional-release period at the plea hearing will be deemed intelligent if
the defendant (a) is on notice at the plea and sentencing hearings that a
conditional-release period is a mandatory component of a sex-offender’s
sentence, and (b) fails to object at sentencing to the addition of the
conditional-release period to his negotiated plea. State
v. Rhodes¸ 675 N.W.2d 323, 327 (
the defendant in
was also present whenthe sentencing
court added a conditional-release period to his negotiated sentence and failed
to object. The sentencing court advised
Michaels was on notice about the mandatory conditional-release term at the plea
and sentencing hearings and did not object to it, the court reasonably inferred
that Michaels understood when he entered his plea that a conditional-release
term would be added to his negotiated plea.
See Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d at 327
(holding that petitioner’s failure to object supported postconviction court’s
inference that petitioner “understood from the beginning that the conditional
release term would be a mandatory addition to his plea bargain”). Under
on the repeat-offender statute, Michaels next argues that the
conditional-release period “charges a separate offense” and thereby violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple prosecutions for the
same offense. But the
conditional-release term is a mandatory component of a sex offender’s sentence,
not a separate charge. State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881 (
Michaels also argues that the imposition of a conditional-release period amounts to an additional sentence for the same crime and thereby violates the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. According to Michaels, by imposing a conditional-release period, the district court “improperly sentenced [him] for two offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident committed against the same victim.” But the district court did not sentence Michaels for two offenses; the conditional-release term was part of Michaels’s original sentence for the single offense to which he pleaded guilty. Micahels’s double-jeopardy challenge to the conditional-release period is therefore without merit.
Finally, Michaels argues that the conditional-release term violates the plea agreement. According to Michaels, because he did not know at the time of his plea that a conditional-release term would be added to his sentence, the sentence is manifestly unjust. But the claim that the state violated the plea agreement merely recasts the argument that the plea was not intelligent. Michaels’s failure to object to the sentence suggests that he understood from the beginning that the conditional-release term was mandatory and would be added to his plea bargain and belies his claim that the imposition of the conditional-release period violated the plea agreement. See Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d at 327 (concluding that failure to object to addition of conditional-release period to negotiated plea disproved defendant’s claim that state had promised to recommend sentence that did not include conditional-release period).
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
Michaels relies on this court’s unpublished
opinion in State v. Matusovic, for
the proposition that the addition of a conditional-release period to his
sentence was manifestly unjust. See No. C2-02-879, 2002 WL 31892795 (