This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Earl C. Hill Bloomington Post 550, et al.,
City of Bloomington,
City of Minneapolis,
County of Hennepin,
Filed February 21, 2006
Affirmed; motion granted in part
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 05-3733
Ryan M. Pacyga, Pacyga & Associates, P.A., 980 Inwood Avenue North, Woodbury, MN 55128 (for appellants)
David R. Ornstein, Bloomington City Attorney, 1800 West Old Shakopee Road, Bloomington, MN 55431 (for respondent City of Bloomington)
Jay M. Heffern, Minneapolis City Attorney, Peter W. Ginder, Deputy City Attorney, Burt T. Osborne, Assistant City Attorney, 333 South Seventh Street, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55402-2453 (for respondent City of Minneapolis)
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Chapin, Assistant County Attorney, A2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent Hennepin County)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellants are establishments that are challenging the district court’s decision denying their motion for a temporary injunction to enjoin enforcement of ordinances that ban smoking in certain public places. Respondents made a motion to strike parts of appellants’ brief and appendix. We affirm and grant in part respondents’ motion to strike.
D E C I S I O N
The primary issue before us
is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants’
motion for a temporary injunction. “A
decision on whether to grant a temporary injunction is left to the discretion
of the trial court and will not be overturned on review absent a clear abuse of
that discretion.” Carl Bolander &
Sons Co. v. City of
This court considers five
factors in determining whether a temporary injunction should be granted: (1) the nature and relationship of the
parties; (2) the balance of relative harm between the parties; (3) the
likelihood of success on the merits; (4) public policy considerations; and (5)
any administrative burden involving judicial supervision and enforcement.
Because an injunction is an
equitable remedy, the party seeking an injunction must demonstrate that there
is no adequate legal remedy and that the injunction is necessary to prevent
irreparable harm. Cherne Indus.,
Inc., v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc.,278 N.W.2d 81,
The first Dahlberg factor requires the court to
consider the nature and relationship of the parties. Dahlberg,
272 Minn. at 274, 137 N.W.2d at 321. The
district court found, and the parties do not dispute, that the relationship
between and among the parties neither favors nor disfavors injunctive
relief. Appellants are establishments
doing business in either
The district court also
found that respondent
The second Dahlberg factor requires a district
court to balance the relative harm between the two parties. Dahlberg,
272 Minn. at 274-75, 137 N.W.2d at 321.
The district court found that the relative hardship criterion did not
favor the issuance of a temporary injunction because appellants failed to
demonstrate irreparable harm. Here,
appellants’ anticipated injuries were economic.
And injuries, however substantial, that can be adequately compensated
with monetary damages are generally insufficient to establish irreparable
harm. Miller v. Foley,317
N.W.2d 710, 713 (
Appellants argue that
respondents could claim discretionary immunity, thereby leaving appellants
without an adequate remedy at law. But
The third Dahlberg factor requires the court to
consider the likelihood of success on the merits. Dahlberg,
272 Minn. at 275, 137 N.W.2d at 321.
Appellants claim that the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act (CIAA), Minn.
Stat. §§ 144.411–.417 (2004),
precludes respondents’ ordinances. The
district court disagreed, finding that this factor weighed heavily against
granting a temporary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood
of success on the merits. The purpose of
the CIAA is “to protect the public health, comfort and environment by
prohibiting smoking in areas where children or ill or injured persons are
present, and by limiting smoking in public places and at public meetings to
designated smoking areas.”
Smoking areas may be designated by proprietors or other persons in charge of public places, except in places in which smoking is prohibited by the fire marshal or by other law, ordinance or rule.
Where smoking areas are designated, existing physical barriers and ventilation systems shall be used to minimize the toxic effect of smoke in adjacent nonsmoking areas. In the case of public places consisting of a single room, the provisions of this law shall be considered met if one side of the room is reserved and posted as a no smoking area. No public place other than a bar shall be designated as a smoking area in its entirety. If a bar is designated as a smoking area in its entirety, this designation shall be posted conspicuously on all entrances normally used by the public.
Minn. Stat. § 144.415 (emphasis added). And nothing in the rules interpreting the
CIAA “shall be construed to affect smoking prohibitions imposed by the fire
marshal or other law, ordinances, or regulations or to affect the right of
building owners or operators to designate their premises as smoke-free.”
The fourth Dahlberg factor requires the district court to contemplate the public policy considerations in granting or denying a temporary injunction. Dahlberg, 272 Minn. at 275, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. Without making findings on the health effects of smoking itself, the district court noted that respondents conducted extensive investigations and hearings before enacting their ordinances. The district court found that public policy considerations favored respondents. Appellants argue that public policy favors protecting appellants’ rights under the CIAA and promoting business interests, jobs, tax revenue, and economic growth. Respondents assert that the public is best served when it is free from exposure to second-hand smoke. Taking the facts in a light most favorable to respondent, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by finding that public policy favors respondents.
Finally, the fifth Dahlberg factor requires the district court to consider administrative burdens involving judicial supervision and enforcement. Dahlberg, 272 Minn. at 275, 137 N.W.2d at 322. The district court stated, and the parties do not dispute, that this factor neither favors nor disfavors relief. And the record provides no evidence of an unreasonable administrative burden if the temporary injunction were granted. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that this factor weighed neither in favor nor against granting the injunction.
Because the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in finding that three of the Dahlberg factors disfavored issuance of the injunction and that the other two factors were neutral, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion for temporary injunction.
Respondents moved to strike
parts of appellants’ brief and appendix pertaining to affidavits and a case out
of Hennepin County District Court.
Generally, this court will not consider evidence outside the district
court record and will strike documents in a brief that are not part of the
appellate record. State v. Dalbec,
594 N.W.2d 530, 533 (
Here, appellants included in the appendix to their brief nine affidavits completed after the district court’s March 25, 2005 order denying appellants’ motion for temporary injunction. Because those affidavits were not part of the district court record, respondents’ motion to strike those affidavits is granted.
The Hennepin County District
Court’s order contained in appellants’ appendix was also entered after the
district court’s order here. But a
reviewing court may consider cases, statutes, rules, and publicly available
articles that were not presented to the district court. Fairview
Hosp. Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d
337, 340 n.3 (
Affirmed; motion granted in part.