This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of
Clark Albert Bailey, a/k/a Clark Kruger.
Filed January 3, 2006
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Concurring specially, Randall, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-P3-77-368556
L. Kraker, David L. Kraker & Associates,
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, John L. Kirwin, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Randall, Judge; and Dietzen, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
This expedited appeal is from an order denying the motion of appellant Clark Albert Bailey, a/k/a Clark Kruger, for relief from a judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f), which the district court treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Bailey challenges his indeterminate commitment as a psychopathic personality on a number of grounds. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
this court will review a decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de
novo where the pertinent facts are undisputed.
Joelson v. O’Keefe, 594 N.W.2d
905, 908 (
to the legality of a commitment will generally be brought through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
limited issues that may be raised for review in a habeas proceeding are lack of
personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, the unconstitutionality of the law
under which the person was confined, and violation of fundamental
constitutional rights. State ex rel.
court determined that most of Bailey’s claims had been raised in two previous
habeas challenges and were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. “Collateral estoppel precludes the
relitigation of issues which are both identical to those issues already
litigated by the parties in a prior action and necessary and essential to the
resulting judgment.” Ellis v.
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
argues that his claims are not barred by collateral estoppel because, in the previous
district court proceedings, he was not given an evidentiary hearing to address
the issues raised. First, Bailey sought
an evidentiary hearing in his 1999 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court and this court rejected
the argument. In re Commitment of Bailey, No. C5-00-872, 2000 WL 1664977, at *3
(Minn. App. Nov. 7, 2000) (holding ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim not
properly raised in habeas action), review
contends that in his habeas challenge that the district court decided in 1995 and
in this court’s 1996 decision on review, the incorrect standard of proof of
clear-and-convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was
used. See Kruger v. Comm’r of Human Servs., No. C4-95-1866, 1996 WL 5786
Bailey also argued in that habeas proceeding that the factors for commitment were not met and that the district court failed to apply In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994). Kruger, 1996 WL 5786, at *2. We agree with the district court in this case that the argument there constituted an attempt to raise essentially the same issue Bailey seeks to raise now in his burden-of-proof argument, namely, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the commitment.
the extent it was not raised previously, we disagree with Bailey on the merits
of his burden-of-proof argument.
Bailey’s commitment was governed by the psychopathic personality statute
in effect in 1977, Minn. Stat. §§ 526.09-.11 (1976), which incorporated
the commitment proceedings of the then-applicable civil-commitment statutes,
Next, Bailey contends that his commitment was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the commitment was not commenced pursuant to the statutory requirements. This precise issue was explicitly raised in Bailey’s 2000 appeal. In re Bailey, 2000 WL 1664977, at *2. Bailey is barred from raising this issue again under the collateral-estoppel doctrine.
Bailey argues that his due-process rights were violated because the
civil-commitment court found him to have an utter lack of power to control his
sexual impulses, conflicting with the criminal court finding that he was guilty
of intentional conduct. The district
court explicitly rejected this argument in 1995, and Bailey did not raise this
issue to this court in his appeal of the decision at that time. See
Kruger, 1996 WL 5786, at *2-3. The
fact that Bailey did not raise this issue in that appeal does not relieve him
from the preclusive effect of the decision.
See Thompson v. Wood, 272
N.W.2d 357, 358 (
RANDALL, Judge (concurring specially).
I concur in the result.