This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Willie G. Scott,
Filed January 10, 2006
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 95103407
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael K. Walz,
Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center,
Willie G. Scott, MCF-Stillwater,
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Huspeni, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant challenges his convictions of attempted murder in the first degree and assault in the second degree. He argues that the jury selection system violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because appellant waived his equal protection claim when he failed to raise the issue in his direct appeal and first petition for postconviction relief, we affirm.
Willie G. Scott was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree and
assault in the second degree on June 7, 1996.
He appealed those convictions, arguing that the prosecutor committed
serious misconduct during the closing argument.
State v. Scott, No. C8-96-1962,
1997 WL 360598, at *1 (
filed a petition for postconviction relief in May 2002, arguing that (1) he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on the victim’s statement that police
coerced him into testifying; (2) the complaint was defective; (3) he was denied
his right of effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the district court abused
its discretion in ordering an upward durational sentencing departure. The district court denied appellant’s
petition, and on June 10, 2003, this court affirmed the district court. Scott
v. State, No. C3‑02‑1748, 2003 WL 21321571, at *1 (
On November 16, 2004, appellant filed another petition for postconviction relief, this time arguing that the jury selection process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court denied the petition and this appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment which
carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set
aside.” Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (
a party has directly appealed his criminal conviction and subsequently files
petitions for postconviction relief, a postconviction court generally will not
consider matters raised in the direct appeal or matters that were known to the
defendant and could have been raised in previous petitions. Jones
v. State, 671 N.W.2d 743, 746 (
Here, appellant challenges his 1996 convictions on the ground that the jury selection process violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. But appellant did not raise this claim either in his 1996 direct appeal or in his 2002 petition for postconviction relief. Additionally, appellant offers no evidence that his claim is novel or that fairness and justice require relief. We therefore conclude that he has waived his equal protection argument, and is not entitled to a new trial.
if we, for the sake of further analysis, were to address appellant’s claim on
the merits, we would find no equal protection violation. To establish that an equal protection
violation occurred in the context of jury selection, the defendant must show
that the selection procedure “resulted in substantial underrepresentation of
his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs.” Castaneda
v. Partida, 430
appellant argues that the petit jury selection process discriminated against
African Americans and therefore violated his right to equal protection. But appellant has failed to show that African
Americans have been underrepresented over a significant period of time. Appellant asserts that at the time of his
1996 trial, African-American citizens comprised 5.65% of the
Moreover, even if
appellant could establish underrepresentation, he fails to show that it has
occurred for a significant time period. See Castaneda, 430
argues that his equal protection rights were violated because
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 Appellant argued in his 2004 petition to the district court that the jury selection process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court, however, only addressed whether the jury selection process violated the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Sixth Amendment requires that the jury venire reflect a fair cross-section of
the community. Taylor v.
appellant must show: (1) that the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the group in question was not fairly represented in the jury venire; and (3) that the underrepresentation was a result of a systematic exclusion of the group in question from the jury selection process.
State v. Willis,
559 N.W.2d 693, 700 (
In his appellate brief, appellant again argues that the selection process violated his right to equal protection, but he uses the equal protection and Sixth Amendment standards interchangeably. But because appellant never mentions the Sixth Amendment before this court, and he criticizes the district court and respondent for not addressing his equal protection argument, we address only the equal protection issue.
Appellant asserts that the 1995 census estimate shows that 46,722 of the
 Proof of systematic exclusion is not required
to establish an equal protection violation.
See Castaneda, 430