This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Kevin Craig Jurgens, petitioner,
Filed January 17, 2006
Ramsey County District Court
File No. K3-96-2528
John Stuart, State Public Defender, Philip Marron, Assistant Public
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, #1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street,
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Shumaker, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
The district court denied Kevin Jurgens’s postconviction plea-withdrawal petition without an evidentiary hearing, and he appeals. Because the petition, files, and record conclusively show that he is not entitled to withdraw his plea, we affirm the district court’s denial of Jurgens’s request for postconviction relief.
F A C T S
Kevin Jurgens entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct for engaging in sexual contact with an eleven-year-old child on August 10, 1996. In accordance with the plea negotiation, the district court sentenced Jurgens to forty-two months’ imprisonment with execution stayed on specific probationary conditions. The sentence also included a five-year conditional-release term and a fine of $7,500.
At the plea hearing, Jurgens testified that he did not remember the sexual conduct, but he remembered that he and his girlfriend spent the night at a friend’s house after an evening of drinking. He accepted the statement of his friend’s eleven-year-old daughter that in the early morning hours he came into the room where she was sleeping, walked over to her bed, and placed his hand on her vagina over her clothing. The child told him to stop. After falling back asleep, the child awoke as Jurgens was pulling down her pants. She again told him to stop, but he rubbed her vagina with his hand and then rubbed his penis on her hip and her vagina. The child began to cry and awakened her mother.
Jurgens testified that he did not recall these events, he did not contest any
part of the child’s statement of what had occurred. See
State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 261
In October 2002, after Jurgens violated his probation for the third time, the district court vacated the stay and executed the sentence. In October 2004, nearly eight years after he entered his guilty plea, Jurgens filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting withdrawal of his plea.
On appeal from the denial of a hearing and relief on his postconviction petition, Jurgens argues that his guilty plea was not accurate, intelligent, or voluntary and that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to withdraw his plea. Specifically, Jurgens argues that his plea was (1) not accurate because it lacked a factual basis for the intent element; (2) not intelligent because he was unaware of the conditional-release term, did not know the presumptive sentence, and received incorrect advice from his attorney about the viability of an intoxication defense; and (3) not voluntary.
D E C I S I O N
A petitioner seeking a postconviction remedy
has the burden of establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, facts
that warrant relief.
Once a guilty plea has been entered, a
defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw it. Alanis
v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (
Jurgens contends that his plea was inaccurate because it lacked an adequate factual basis for the intent element. He asserts that, because he mistakenly believed that he was in bed with his girlfriend, he did not have the requisite intent to commit the crime. The record does not factually or legally support this allegation.
Second-degree criminal sexual conduct
requires that the defendant intentionally touch the minor’s intimate parts and
act with sexual or aggressive intent. See
The record establishes that Jurgens placed
his hand on the child’s vaginal area, that he removed the child’s pants, and
that he placed his penis on her vagina. His
intent to act may be directly inferred from this conduct. See
State v. Hardimon, 310 N.W.2d 564,
Jurgens next asserts that, for three reasons, his plea was not intelligent. First, he contends that he was not informed of the conditional-release term or the potential fine. The record does not support this allegation.
plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the charges, the rights
that he waives by pleading, and the consequences of his plea. Kaiser
v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903 (
A conditional-release term is a direct
consequence of a guilty plea. State v. Henthorne, 637 N.W.2d 852, 856
(Minn. App. 2002), review denied (
presentence-investigation report recommended that Jurgens receive a
conditional-release term of at least five years. Jurgens did not object to
this recommendation, which suggests that he “understood from the beginning that
the conditional-release term would be a mandatory addition to his plea
reasoning applies equally to Jurgens’s claim that his plea was unintelligent
because he was unaware of the potential fine.
The mandatory minimum fine for second-degree criminal sexual conduct is
Jurgens next argues that his plea was unintelligent because he was unaware that the presumptive sentence for the offense provided for a stay of execution. The record contains a statement by Jurgens’s attorney that Jurgens was “looking at prison time if [he went] to trial and [was] convicted,” but the statement is not tied to an indication of the presumptive sentence. The district court properly informed Jurgens of the presumptive sentence. During a detailed discussion, the court explained that the facts supported an upward departure and that it would not grant a stay of imposition. The court then explained that, because it would not grant a stay, Jurgens possibly faced jail time if he were convicted by a jury. As the postconviction court noted, this risk assessment is not a statement of the presumptive sentence, but the district court’s evaluation of the severity of the conduct and the offense.
Finally, Jurgens argues that his plea was unintelligent because his attorney incorrectly advised him at the plea hearing that intoxication is not a defense to criminal sexual conduct. Jurgens has not demonstrated that his attorney’s advice was incorrect. Because criminal sexual conduct is a general-intent crime rather than a specific-intent crime, intoxication is not a defense. Lindahl, 309 N.W.2d at 767; Hart, 477 N.W.2d at 736; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.075 (1996) (specifying that intoxication may be considered when particular intent or state of mind is element of crime). This claim also lacks a factual basis. In the petition submitted to the court at his 1996 plea hearing, Jurgens stated that he did not “make the claim that [he] was so drunk or so under the influence of drugs or medicine that [he] did not know what [he] was doing at the time of the crime.” We agree with the district court’s determination that Jurgens has not alleged sufficient facts to show that his plea was not intelligent.
Jurgens lastly claims that his plea was not
voluntary. When the record
demonstrates the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a defendant cannot succeed on
a postconviction claim that the plea was involuntary. See
State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (
Jurgens’s petition and the underlying record conclusively show that Jurgens is not entitled to postconviction relief. In light of the transcript, the documents in the record, and Jurgens’s admissions at the plea hearing, Jurgens’s allegations are insufficient to show a manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his guilty plea. Because Jurgens cannot meet this burden, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.