This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
John C. Gohl, et al.,
Washington Mutual, Inc., et al.,
Filed August 2, 2005
Reversed and remanded
Dakota County District Court
File No. C3-03-8234
Timothy D. Kelly, Jennifer M. Waterworth, Kelly & Berens, P.A., 3720 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellants)
John E. Brandt, Kelly S. Hadac, Murnane, Conlin, White & Brandt, 444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Dietzen, Judge; and Forsberg, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellants John Gohl and Vicki Gohl challenge the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of respondents Washington Mutual, Inc. and Washington Mutual Bank FA. In May 2003, appellants brought suit against mortgage-lender respondents to stop Washington Mutual FA from prosecuting a foreclosure and to enforce a settlement agreement made on October 28, 1996, with Washington Mutual’s predecessor in interest. Appellants claimed that respondents were in breach of contract for failure to refinance appellants’ mortgage as agreed to in the 1996 settlement. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that appellants’ claim was time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims. The district court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellants’ complaint with prejudice, but provided no analysis to support its order. We reverse and remand.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal from summary judgment,
this court asks whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State
by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (
As noted above, appellants sued respondents for breach of contract to stop foreclosure and to enforce the 1996 settlement agreement. In their motion for summary judgment, respondents simply argued that appellants were time-barred from bringing suit because more than six years had passed since the settlement was reached on October 28, 1996. In their reply memorandum, appellants argued that summary judgment should be denied because the date of respondents’ breach is a genuine issue of material fact, and the defense of recoupment allows appellants to assert their claim, even if time-barred by the statute of limitations. In this appeal, appellant raises these same issues, along with the argument that appellants are “estopped to assert the 1993 mortgage while it refuses to perform on the 1996 settlement agreement.”
The district court failed to address
the evidence submitted by appellants that because respondents’ breach of the
settlement agreement occurred after May 30, 1997, their action was not time-barred. Thus, while we make no judgment on the merits
of appellants’ cause of action, we reverse and remand for the district court to
make a determination, on a proper factual background, as to whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the time of respondents’ alleged
breach of the settlement agreement.
Because the district court did not address appellants’ recoupment or
estoppel arguments, we do not address them on appeal. See Thiele
v. Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (
Reversed and remanded.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.