This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Paul Michael Reineke, petitioner,
Filed August 30, 2005
Otter Tail County District Court
File No. K6-95-68
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, Suite 1800, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
David J. Hauser, Otter Tail County Attorney, Otter Tail County
John Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
In this postconviction sentencing appeal, Paul Reineke argues that the district court’s upward durational departure is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Because Reineke’s conviction was final before the Supreme Court decided Blakely and because Blakely does not apply retroactively, Reineke may not obtain sentencing relief through collateral review, and we affirm.
F A C T S
The state charged Paul Reineke in January 1995 with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Reineke pleaded guilty under the terms of a plea agreement on July 10, 1995, to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (1994).
The district court sentenced Reineke to 200 months in prison and ten years of conditional release. This sentence amounted to a 90-month upward durational departure from the 110-month presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines. The sentencing court determined that substantial and compelling reasons justified the upward departure. The reasons, stated by the district court, included that Reineke exploited a position of trust, used physical force that was particularly cruel, threatened to rape the victim again and to kill her family, inflicted significant psychological and emotional harm, violated the victim’s zone of privacy, and used multiple methods of penetration.
Almost ten years later, on July 28,
2004, Reineke petitioned for postconviction relief and requested the
appointment of a public defender. The
district court appointed a public defender to represent Reineke on the sole
issue of whether Blakely v. Washington,
D E C I S I O N
petition is a procedural mechanism to obtain collateral review of a criminal
conviction. Hummel v. State, 617
N.W.2d 561, 563 (
Reineke was convicted and
sentenced in 1995 and did not institute a direct appeal. In 2004, the United States Supreme Court
issued Blakely v. Washington,
The Minnesota Supreme Court
recently held that “Blakely is a new
rule of constitutional criminal procedure unavailable for collateral use” and
it is not a “watershed” rule, which would require retroactivity. State
Because Blakely stated a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure, but
not a watershed rule, it is governed by the general tenet that the rule does
not apply to a case that was final at the time that Blakely enunciated the new rule.
Reineke’s case was final before Blakely
was decided, and consequently Reineke may not invoke the Blakely holding to support his petition for collateral review of his sentence. This analysis similarly applies to
convictions and sentences that were final prior to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Apprendi. See,
e.g., State v. Petschl, 692 N.W.2d 463, 471 (
For these reasons we conclude that Reineke is not entitled to postconviction review of his sentence in light of Blakely, and the district court correctly applied the law in denying Reineke’s motion for postconviction relief.