This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed August 2, 2005
Watonwan County District Court
File No. KX-04-10
Lamar Piper, Watonwan County Attorney, Courthouse, 101 South 7th Street, Box 518, St. James, MN 56081 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Willis, Judge.
1. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
The district court
has broad discretion in deciding whether to permit the withdrawal of a plea of
guilty. Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (
The rules of
criminal procedure provide two bases on which the district court may exercise
its discretion to allow a criminal defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty.
Appellant argues that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea
agreement because the plea was not voluntary.
A plea is voluntary if it is not made in response to improper pressures,
inducements, or promises. Alanis,
583 N.W.2d at 577. A criminal defendant
has the burden of establishing facts warranting the reopening of his case. King v.
State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 794 (
Appellant contends that (1) the court did not secure a valid waiver of rights from him; and (2) his plea was induced by pressure from defense counsel. But throughout the plea hearing, the court questioned appellant to insure the accuracy of his plea. Appellant produced no evidence of pressure from defense counsel.
Appellant contends that defense counsel impermissibly asked leading questions to establish the factual basis for his guilty pleas. The district court bears the primary responsibility to advise and interrogate the defendant in sufficient detail to establish an adequate factual basis for the plea.
[I]t is the trial judge’s sole and awesome responsibility to determine whether the plea he is being asked to accept is voluntary and that defendant’s admissions of the relevant facts and circumstances of his conduct establish that he committed the offense charged or an offense at least as serious as the offense to which he is tendering his plea.
v. Hoaglund, 307
Here, the court questioned appellant regarding the facts of the case until appellant denied having sexual intercourse with an “individual who was over 13 but under 16.” The court then asked if appellant was pleading not guilty and appellant stated, “I’m pleading guilty, man. You guys gave me a deal I couldn’t refuse.” The court then indicated that they were going back to trial and that the state would need to meet its burden of proof. Before the judge was able to call the jury back in, defense counsel asked for a minute with his client. After an off-the-record conversation, defense counsel asked leading questions to establish the remaining facts of the case.
The record shows that appellant had full understanding of the possible consequences. Appellant even commented that he was getting a “deal [he] couldn’t refuse.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea.
also argues that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his
guilty plea at sentencing, when the attorneys discovered that the presumptive
sentence in his plea agreement was incorrect.
On the record during the plea hearing, appellant agreed to the
guidelines sentence. The attorneys
believed at the time that the presumptive sentence would be 33 months. At sentencing it was discovered that the
presumptive sentence was between 38 and 43 months. Appellant made no request at that time to
withdraw his guilty plea because the presumptive sentence was higher than he
expected. This court does not review
matters not properly raised at the district court level and raised for the
first time on appeal.
2. Previously Stayed Sentence
Appellant also argues that the
district court erred in executing his previously stayed sentence consecutively
to the sentence for criminal sexual conduct.
A district court cannot make a previously imposed sentence run
consecutively to a subsequently imposed sentence. State
v. Klang, 320 N.W.2d 718, 719 (
Affirmed as modified.