This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed July 26, 2005
Anoka County District Court
File No. K7-04-957
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2134; and
Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kristen C. Larson, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka County Government Center, 2100 Third Avenue, Seventh Floor, Anoka, Minnesota 55303 (for respondent)
Bradford Colbert, Assistant State Public Defender, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, 875 Summit Avenue, Suite 254, St. Paul, Minnesota 55105 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Dietzen, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
The district court imposed consecutive sentences following appellant’s first-degree burglary and second-degree assault convictions. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the district court abused its discretion by sentencing appellant to an upward dispositional departure without providing substantial and compelling reasons, and (2) the district court’s consecutive sentence violates appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Because appellant received a permissive consecutive sentence that does not constitute an upward departure under the guidelines, and because Blakely is not applicable to permissive consecutive sentences, we affirm.
On January 23, 2004, appellant Nhia Lee and two other men entered M.L.X.’s residence. All three men had knives. One of the men held his knife to M.L.X.’s throat, asking her for money and the keys to a vehicle. M.L.X.’s brother-in-law, V.Y., was also in the home. Appellant and his accomplices removed V.Y. from his room. The men beat and tied up V.Y. When M.L.X. attempted to intervene, one of the men stabbed her repeatedly.
The state charged appellant with one count of first-degree burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2004), alleging that appellant assaulted a person within the building. The state also charged appellant with two counts of second-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2 (2004). Appellant pleaded guilty to all three counts.
The district count sentenced appellant to 52 months, executed, for the first-degree burglary charge, a guidelines sentence. The district court then sentenced appellant to 21 months, executed, for the assault against M.L.X., to be served consecutively to the burglary count. Characterizing the consecutive sentence as a departure, the court reasoned that the consecutive sentence was appropriate because of “the facts of the case.” The district court then sentenced appellant to 21 months for the assault against V.Y., to be served concurrently with the burglary count. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant first challenges his consecutive sentence,
arguing that the district court failed to articulate substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying a departure from the presumptive concurrent
sentence. The district court has great
discretion in imposing a sentence. If
the sentence is authorized by law, this court will not disturb it. State
v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (
We conclude that appellant’s
consecutive sentence is authorized by law because appellant received a
permissive consecutive sentence under the sentencing guidelines. The sentencing guidelines provide for both
presumptive and permissive consecutive sentencing. When a defendant has “[m]ultiple current
felony convictions for crimes against persons” and the presumptive disposition
for the offenses is commitment to the commissioner of corrections, the
guidelines permit the imposition of consecutive sentences.
The sentencing guidelines do not define what constitutes a “crime against a person.” Case law makes clear that the determination depends on the nature of the underlying conduct, not on how the crime is nominally classified. See State v. Myers, 627 N.W.2d 58, 62–63 (Minn. 2001)(holding that a consecutive sentence for obstructing legal process is a crime against a person if underlying conduct in committing the crime posed special danger to human life); State v. Notch, 446 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. 1989) (holding that burglary may qualify as offense against a person if “as committed” it is in fact a crime against a person).
Here, the district court convicted appellant of burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2004), which requires an assault of an occupant in the facilitation of the burglary. Accordingly, we conclude, as a matter of law, that appellant’s burglary conviction constituted a crime against a person. Appellant’s other conviction is for second-degree assault which, as a matter of law, is also a crime against a person. Therefore, it was within the district court’s discretion to impose permissive consecutive sentences.
Appellant next argues that
his permissive consecutive sentence violates his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial under Blakely v. Washington,
This court has applied Blakely
to Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines scheme, holding that “when a [district
court] imposes an upward durational departure from the presumptive, fixed
sentence established by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, the [district
court’s] reasons for departing must be supported by facts that were found by a
jury or admitted by the defendant.” State v. Conger, 687 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (
Appellant argues that the
sentencing judge’s determination of whether a conviction is a crime against a
person constitutes an improper finding of fact that increases the length of his
sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
We disagree. In State v. Senske, this court declined to
extend Blakely to consecutive
sentencing based on judicial findings that the offenses are “crimes against
persons.” 692 N.W.2d 743, 748–49 (
controlling authority on this issue.
There is no basis to require the jury to determine the permissibility of
multiple sentences under the Double Jeopardy Clause or Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1 (2004).
 The supreme court granted review in Conger,
but stayed further processing of that matter pending a final decision in State
v. Shattuck, No. C6-03-362 (