This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Suzan Zigich Olson,
Filed June 21, 2005
Robert H. Schumacher, Judge
Suzan Zigich Olson, Post Office Box 501, Beaver Bay, MN 55601 (pro se appellant)
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER, Judge
Appellant Suzan Zigich Olson challenges the district court's harassment restraining order prohibiting her from contacting respondent David Thompson and requiring that she stay away from his residence and his place of employment. We affirm.
In June 2004, Thompson petitioned the district court for a harassment restraining order under Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2002), alleging that Olson had been making harassing phone calls to him and to his place of employment. In his affidavit accompanying the petition, Thompson states that Olson "is intentionally trying to antagonize me for no reason at all. . . . I have asked her not to call me but [she] continues to do so anyway." The affidavit also states that Olson contacted Thompson's employer three times and incorrectly told his employer that Thompson did not have a valid driver's license. In addition, the affidavit states that Olson "made up these lies in an effort to get me terminated from my job."
Thompson testified at the hearing that his relationship with Olson stems from a child they had together, but he had relinquished his rights to the child "to get [Olson] out of my life." He testified that Olson called him at his girlfriend's home on May 31, 2004, and he told her not to call and hung up, but she called back. Thompson's girlfriend answered the phone and instructed Olson not to call back. Thompson also testified that during this time period that "she called my work, told [my] supervisor I did not have a license [and] called the supervisor's supervisor . . . told him I didn't have a license. Called him back. . . . April 29 I had a phone installed, unlisted number. The first call I got was her."
Following the hearing, the district court issued a harassment restraining order prohibiting Olson from having any contact with Thompson and requiring that she stay away from Thompson's residence and his place of employment. The district court specifically found that the harassing conduct consisted of the following:
[Olson] made unwanted calls to [Thompson] on April 29, 2004, May 31, 2004 (2 calls), and numerous calls to [Thompson's] employer as recent as June 2, 2004 for the purpose of harassing [Thompson] at his place of employment. Additionally, [Thompson] was harassed by repeated calls in prior years that [were] intended to have substantial adverse effects on [Thompson's] privacy; and the present calls are also made for [that] sole reason.
Olson argues the district court abused its discretion in issuing the order because there is insufficient evidence that she intended to harass Thompson, she believes Thompson lied under oath, and the district court considered testimony on issues not contained in Thompson's original petition. Olson provides no legal authority for any of her allegations. Allegations that are not support by legal citation are deemed to be waived. Ganguli v. Univ. of Minnesota, 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994).
We do not find any merit in
Olson's argument that the district court must limit the evidence it considers
to the facts set out in the petition. See
An appellate court reviews a
district court's grant of a harassment restraining order under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Witchell v. Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730,
Harassment is defined as
"repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that
have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse
effect on the safety, security or privacy of another." Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2002). A court may grant a harassment restraining
order when "the court finds at the hearing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment." Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(3) (2002). "The determination of what constitutes
an adequate factual basis for a harassment order is left to the discretion of
the district courts."
Here, it is uncontested that Olson made repeated phone calls to Thompson and to his employer. Thompson stated that the multiple phone calls he received from Olson were unwanted and that there is no reason for him and Olson to have any communication with each other. Further, although Olson testified that she made the calls to Thompson's employer because she "felt as though it was their right to know that [Thompson] did not have a driver's license," Thompson testified that Olson made the calls in an attempt to get him fired.
The district court did not accept Olson's testimony regarding her motivation in making the calls, instead finding Thompson's testimony and statements in his affidavit to be a more credible description of why the phone calls were made. We defer to the district court's determination. See, e.g. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843-44 (stating standard of review); Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating fact that "record might support findings other than those made by the trial court does not show that the court's findings are defective"). The evidence in the record reasonably supports the district court's finding that Olson was harassing Thompson, and issuance of the restraining order was therefore not an abuse of discretion.