This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Carole L. Anderson,
Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development,
Filed June 7, 2005
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 4443 04
Carole L. Anderson,
Charles F. Knapp, Daniel G. Prokott, Faegre & Benson, LLP, 2200 Wells Fargo Center, 90 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondent Cargill, Inc.)
Lee B. Nelson, Linda A. Holmes, Department of Employment and Economic Development, E200 First National Bank Building, 332 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent commissioner)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Schumacher, Judge; and Poritsky, Judge.
The commissioner’s representative determined that pro se relator is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she quit employment without good reason attributable to her employer. Relator (1) challenges a number of findings by the commissioner’s representative and (2) argues that she showed good reason to quit her job. We affirm.
Cargill, Inc. hired relator Carole Anderson as a data-entry specialist in
January 2002. When
about her exact job responsibilities,
In a short statement, I was never really certain what my responsibilities were. They kept increasing. I was never recognized for what I had accomplished and what I was doing, and finally, the final job description that I received was, after two years or two-and-a-half years actually, was actually a demotion.
This court reviews
the findings of the commissioner’s representative rather than those of the
unemployment-law judge. Tuff v.
Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (
1. Factual Findings of the Commissioner’s Representative
Anderson next claims that the job description presented at the last meeting on December 22 was her final job description, in contrast to the commissioner’s finding that “[t]he human resources manager believed that she and Anderson were very near agreement in the terms of the job description when Anderson resigned.” But the human-resources manager testified that at the December 22 meeting, “We were very, very close to having an agreement, and I disagree wholeheartedly that . . . we had great differences on what the job required and what had to be done.” Because there is evidence reasonably tending to support this finding, we will not disturb it.
Finally, without argument, Anderson refers us to her submission to the commissioner’s representative and certain portions of the ULJ’s hearing transcript to further challenge the commissioner’s representative’s decision. Having reviewed those documents, we again conclude that there is no basis to disturb the factual findings of the commissioner’s representative.
B. Good Reason to Quit
In general, “[a]n applicant who quit[s] employment shall be [disqualified from] all unemployment benefits.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (Supp. 2003). But an employee who quits her employment may qualify to receive unemployment benefits if she “quit the employment because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2003). A good reason caused by the employer is one “(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; and (2) that is significant and would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (Supp. 2003).
Q: . . . Why did the [December 22] meeting come about?
A: It was supposed to . . . discuss the job description some more.
Q: Okay. And so did you, in fact, do that at the meeting?
A: Yes, we did.
Q: Okay. And so at what point did you decided to leave?
A: I decided to leave when I knew that I was [being] demoted, nothing was going to change. . . .
(Emphasis added.) She then explained that she was demoted because she would report to someone “one step further down from management.”
average, reasonable worker would not quit under these circumstances. The record reflects that both McGreavey and
Blackwood were constantly working with
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
Cargill uses the term “trade entry physical” to describe the position. A letter from Cargill’s human-resources
department refers to
 The revisor’s office inadvertently substituted the term “ineligible for” for the term “disqualified from” in Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subds. 1, 4, 7, 8(a) (Supp. 2003). See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subds. 1, 4, 7, 8(a) (2002) (using term “disqualified from”); 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2, § 11 (making other changes to Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1, but retaining term “disqualified from”); 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2, § 20(j), (k) (directing revisor to change the term “disqualified from” to “ineligible for” only in Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 12, and then to renumber to Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13b).