This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Darryl Shane Murphy,
Filed May 24, 2005
Mille Lacs County
File No. K9-03-906
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Kristen M. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General, 1200 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2130; and
Jan Kolb, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Mille Lacs County Courthouse, 635 Second Street Southeast, Milaca, MN 56353 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Marie Wolf, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Poritsky, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant, Darryl Murphy, challenges his
conviction of second-degree felony murder.
Appellant was convicted on January 21, 2004—after a jury trial—and was
later sentenced to 180 months in prison, the presumptive sentence for his
crime. Appellant argues that the district
court erred in ruling that (1)
D E C I S I O N
1. Composition of Jury Pool
argues that because he was convicted by a jury that did not represent a fair
cross section of his community, his conviction should be overturned. Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal
defendants are entitled to trial by a jury selected from a “fair cross section”
of their community. See
The United States Supreme Court, in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-67, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668-70 (1979), articulated a three-part test for determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of a violation of the “fair cross section” requirement. The defendant must show that
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
the key part of the showing required of a defendant challenging a venire on Sixth Amendment grounds should be that over a significant period of time—panel after panel, month after month—the group of eligible jurors in question has been significantly underrepresented on the panels and that this results from “systematic exclusion,” that is, unfair or inadequate selection procedures used by the state rather than, e.g., a higher percentage of “no shows” on the part of people belonging to the group in question.
Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 543. The Williams
court also noted that, in
while appellant acknowledges that this is “a very difficult standard to meet,”
he argues that he made a prima facie showing because “
record indicates that
In answering questions from the district court regarding the presence of Native Americans on juries in the county, the court administrator testified that (1) he had been the court administrator for four years; (2) it is common that Native Americans have a minimal presence on some panels; (3) in his estimation 50 or 60% of panels would not have a Native American representative; and (4) there are no procedures designed to systematically exclude Native Americans from jury panels.
jury manager for
stated above, the Sixth Amendment “does not guarantee a criminal defendant a
jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community.” Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 542. And, while appellant’s arguments that he
satisfied the first two parts of the Duren test are persuasive, on this
record, he did not—and could not—satisfy the third part of the test. This record cannot support the conclusion
that a group of eligible jurors has been significantly underrepresented over a
significant period of time. While the
testimony of the
Notwithstanding this conclusion, we urge county officials to review county procedures, including its transportation policy, to attempt to better achieve juries that represent a fair cross section of the community. See id. at 544 (noting that the fact “[t]hat the underrepresentation is not the result of systematic exclusion does not justify complacency or satisfaction with the inclusiveness of the system”).
2. Batson Challenge
also challenges the district court’s denial of his Batson challenge, contending
that the state’s proffered reasons for striking the one juror that identified
himself as partially Native American were pretextual. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
86, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 (1986) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution bars the state from exercising a peremptory strike on the
basis of a prospective juror’s race).
This court reviews a Batson challenge for clear error, and we
affirm unless the record or the applicable law does not support the district
court’s ruling. State v. Reiners,
664 N.W.2d 826, 830-31, 834 n.3 (
Supreme Court, in Batson, established a three-pronged test for trial
courts to determine if a peremptory strike was based on racial
discrimination. Batson, 476
Appellant first argues that the district court failed to conduct a proper Batson analysis because the court asked the state to provide a race-neutral reason for excluding A.K. immediately after appellant’s counsel stated that he thought A.K. was Native American. But our review of the record indicates that the court adhered to the three-step Batson analysis. And, while the court expressed some trepidation as to whether appellant could make a prima facie showing regarding A.K., it nonetheless performed the full analysis. See State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864, 868-69 (Minn. 1991) (stating that a prima facie case is established by showing (1) that a member of a racial minority has been peremptorily excluded and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race).
state was then required to proffer a race-neutral reason for its peremptory strike. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. Here, the state offered three: (1) A.K.’s financial and transportation
issues; (2) A.K.’s prior DWI conviction and his residual negative feelings
about it; and (3) A.K.’s responses to questions “about the slot limits and
treaty negotiations” between the Mille Lacs Reservation and the State of
Specifically, the district court found that A.K.’s financial issues were “weighing on his mind and . . . there’s obviously a certain degree of reluctance on his part,” and “[t]hat is a valid consideration by itself in exercising a peremptory challenge.” The court also stated, with regard to A.K.’s DWI conviction, that A.K. “was maybe the only, if not only one of one or two that expressed a strong feeling that . . . the process did not work as it should.” Further, the district court found that although not a basis for a challenge for cause, the state’s concerns regarding A.K.’s prior convictions were a valid consideration in support of an exercise of its peremptory strike. In conclusion, the court stated, “I believe that the—that defendant has failed to prove that the elimination of the juror was purposeful racial discrimination and not as a result of these two other valid considerations.”
now argues that the district court’s analysis was fatally simplistic. But discriminatory intent is not a presumed
reason for a peremptory strike; discrimination must be inherent in the
proponent’s “race neutral” explanation for the strike. State v. McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373,
it is well settled that “considerable deference must be given by a reviewing
court to the [district] court’s finding on the issue of intent because the
finding typically will turn largely on an evaluation by the trial court of
credibility.” State v. Greenleaf,
591 N.W.2d 488, 500 (
that the district court erred when it refused to depart downward from the
presumptive sentence. But the decision
to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within the district court’s
discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that
discretion. State v. Givens, 544
N.W.2d 774, 776 (
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
These selection criteria are in accordance with Rule 806 of the Jury Management Rules for the District Courts, which are promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court.