This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Mario F. Mancini,
Filed April 12, 2005
Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. K0-02-4361 & K2-02-4314
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Colleen Timmer, Assistant County Attorney, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102-1657 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public
Defender, James R. Peterson, Assistant Public Defender,
Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Toussaint, Chief Judge; and Lansing, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant pleaded guilty to second- and third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct. He challenges his sentences, arguing that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury by including a custody-status point in his criminal-history score and by imposing consecutive sentences after finding that his convictions were for “crimes against persons.” Because we find that the district court did not err, we affirm.
In November 2002, appellant Mario Mancini was charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b), (c) (2002). The subdivision 1(c) count was later amended to a charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2002). Mancini pleaded guilty to both charges. In accordance with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced him to 38 months for the third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and a consecutive 90 months for the second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. The mandatory minimum sentence for a conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h), is 90 months. Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 2(b) (2002).
challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that the application of the
mandatory minimum sentence in Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 2(b), violated
his plea agreement. We affirmed the
district court’s sentencing, but the Minnesota Supreme Court vacated the
opinion and remanded for reconsideration in light of Blakely v. Washington,
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). State v.
Mancini, No. A03-1455 (Minn. App. July 27, 2004), review granted and
argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it violates his Sixth
Amendment rights as described in Blakely v. Washington. In Blakely, the
applied Blakely to the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines in State v. Conger,
687 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (
Mancini argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by including a custody-status point in his criminal-history score when it calculated the presumptive sentence for his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court included a custody-status point because it found that Mancini was on probation when he committed the offense. Mancini argues that Blakely requires a jury determination that he was on probation because it is a fact that increases his sentence.
State v. Brooks, we held that Blakely does not require a jury
finding to establish custody-status points for the determination of a
criminal-history score. 690 N.W.2d 160, 163–64 (
Here, the district court did not err by including a custody-status point in Mancini’s criminal-history score and imposing the presumptive sentence for his third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Because a finding of a custody-status point fits within Blakely’s exception for facts of prior convictions, we conclude that the district court did not violate Mancini’s Sixth Amendment rights as described in Blakely.
Mancini also argues that the
district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by imposing consecutive
sentences rather than concurrent sentences.
The sentencing guidelines presume that sentences for multiple current
convictions will be concurrent.
addressed this issue in State v. Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. App.
2005). We observed that “[c]onsecutive
sentencing involves separate punishments for discrete crimes.”
Here, the district court imposed permissive consecutive sentences because Mancini’s offenses were crimes against persons. The statutes under which Mancini was convicted define criminal sexual conduct as “sexual contact with another person” and “sexual penetration with another person” under described circumstances. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.343, subd. 1, .344, subd. 1 (2002). These offenses are crimes against persons as a matter of law. We conclude that the district court did not violate Mancini’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury as described in Blakely by finding that his offenses were “crimes against persons” and imposing consecutive sentences.
The supreme court granted review in Conger, but stayed further
processing of that matter pending a final decision in State v. Shattuck,
No. C6-03-362 (