This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
d/b/a Splat, You’re Out,
Anoka County District Court
File No. C7-03-6280
Joseph A. Wentzell,
Kenneth M. Wasche,
14735 Highway 65 Northeast,
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Peterson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
“On appeal from summary judgment, we ask two
questions: (1) whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the lower courts erred in their
application of the law.” State by
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.
Fabio v. Bellomo, 504
N.W.2d 758, 761 (
Appellant and respondent entered into a lease for a
commercial retail property located in
that because respondent subsequently mortgaged the property and assigned
appellant’s lease payments without reservation to his bank, respondent may not
now assert a claim for the unpaid rent. We
disagree. Respondent’s assignment of the
rents only served as additional security for respondent’s mortgage. And
Here, the assignment of rents as a security did not affect the lessee’s obligations to pay rent to the lessor absent the lessor’s default on an obligation secured by the rents. And it is undisputed that appellant continued to pay his rents directly to respondent after the assignment. Thus, we conclude that respondent’s assignment to his bank as security for his mortgage did not affect appellant’s obligation to pay respondent rents.
Appellant also argues that because respondent sold the property before the $15,000 became due on October, 1, 2002, respondent cannot assert a claim for the rent based on the defense that unaccrued rents run with the land. Appellant notes that after respondent’s sale to the third party, appellant was directed to pay all future unaccrued rents to the third party.
Appellant is correct that his
obligation to pay the $15,000 did not arise until it became due on October 1,
2002. See Ambrozich v. City of
And once rent has become past due,
it is a chose in action, or personal demand for money due, and it is not an
incident of ownership of the land. Orr
v. Bennett, 135
Appellate courts generally apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on
a case, unless a change in the law affects rights that were vested before the
change. See Interstate Power Co., Inc. v.
 See supra note 1.
 See supra note 1.