This opinion will
be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Filed November 9, 2004
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 99005185
Terence Jerome Wilson, #203975,
970 Pickett Street North,
55003-1490 (pro se
Mike Hatch, Attorney General,
1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2134; and
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County
Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center,
300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55487 (for respondent)
and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Terence Jerome Wilson was convicted in 1999 of second-degree felony murder and
second-degree murder of an unborn child.
appeals from the district court’s denial of his second petition for
postconviction relief. Because the
issues now raised by Wilson
were known at the time of his first petition for postconviction relief, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his petition. We affirm.
review the postconviction court’s decision denying relief for abuse of
discretion. Dukes v. State, 621
N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn.
2001). This court’s inquiry is limited
to “determin[ing] whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the
postconviction court’s findings.” Scruggs
v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn.
1992). In the absence of an abuse of
discretion, this court will not disturb the postconviction court’s
petition for postconviction relief is Wilson’s
second. Wilson was represented by counsel in his
first postconviction petition and on appeal from the denial of that
petition. In his first petition, Wilson claimed that his
trial attorneys coerced him into pleading guilty, and that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel when his original appellate attorney “denied
him a right to appeal.” This court
affirmed the denial of postconviction relief.
v. State, No. C4-02-1029, 2003 WL 174474, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 28, 2003),
review denied (Minn.
Apr. 15, 2003).
In this second postconviction petition, Wilson argues that Minnesota’s
murder-of-an-unborn-child statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.2662(2) (2002), is
unconstitutional and violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the petition
without an evidentiary hearing concluding that Wilson’s
claims were procedurally barred because he did not raise them in his first
petition, and that Wilson’s
plea of guilty was constitutional. On
appeal, Wilson raises an additional issue—the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because of a
technical flaw in Minnesota’s
criminal statutes; specifically, the statutes under which he was convicted do
not contain enacting clauses, and, therefore, his convictions violate the state
constitution and are void.
Claims that were known, but not raised, in a
first postconviction appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief. Wayne v. State,
601 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Minn. 1999) (applying State
v. Knaffla, 309 Minn.
246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (the “Knaffla rule”)) to bar claims
that could have been raised in a previous postconviction petition); see also
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2002) (authorizing summary denial of second
or subsequent petition for similar relief on behalf of same petitioner). The Minnesota Supreme court has recognized
two exceptions to this rule:
(1) where a claim is so novel that its legal basis was not
available at the time of the previous appeal; and (2) where fairness demands,
even if the petitioner knew of the issue at the time of the previous appeal,
unless the petitioner “deliberately and inexcusably” failed to raise the issue
in an earlier appeal. Jones v. State,
671 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn.
2003) (quotation omitted). Neither
exception applies in the instant case.
arguments are based on principles of law that have not been altered in the two
years since his first petition for postconviction relief. And his argument challenging the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court is based on the same circumstances
that existed and were known at the time of his first postconviction
petition. Therefore, after review of
appellant’s claims, we conclude that they were all known, but not raised, at
the time of his first postconviction appeal.
Thus, they are barred by the Knaffla rule.