This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Richard Wayne Taylor,
State of Minnesota,
Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. K0-02-2075, K4-01-1307
Richard W. Taylor, Minnesota Correctional Facility-Rush City, 7600 525th Street, Rush City, MN 55069 (pro se appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeanne L. Schleh, Assistant County Attorney, Ramsey County Government Center, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102-1657 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
Taylor next argues that Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, .343 violate the Minnesota Constitution because they do not contain an enactment clause. Minn. Const. art. IV, § 22 provides in relevant part, “[t]he style of all laws of this state shall be: ‘Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Minnesota.’” In support of his claim, Taylor cites Sjoberg v. Sec. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, a case in which the enactment clause of an act was omitted. 73 Minn. 203, 75 N.W. 1116 (1898). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that an enactment clause is mandatory and that a statute without one is void. Id. at 214, 75 N.W. at 1119.
Minnesota follows the “journal entry rule” under which the journals of the legislature must be examined to determine whether the constitutional prerequisites to the enactment of a law have been satisfied. State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 187, 74 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1956). Copies of Minnesota statutes need not contain the enactment clauses of the statutes contained therein. See Minn. Stat. § 3C.08 (2002). A review of session laws containing the acts under which Taylor was convicted clearly establishes that they possess the constitutionally required enactment clauses. See, e.g., 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 367 art. 3, §§ 7, 8 (“Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Minnesota: . . .”); 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 374, §§ 2 – 4 (same). Taylor thus does not establish any facts to support his claim for postconviction relief. See Ledden v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2004 WL 2162853 at *4 (Minn. App. 2004). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied his motion for postconviction relief.