This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).







Michael B. Scott,


Sebastian Joe’s Resources,

Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development,


Filed July 13, 2004


Wright, Judge


Department of Employment and Economic Development

File No. 7972 03



Michael B. Scott, 1810 Bryant Avenue South, Apartment #1, Minneapolis, MN  55403-3130 (pro se relator)


Sebastian Joe’s Resources, 4301 Nicollet Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55409-2072 (respondent)


Lee B. Nelson, Katrina I. Smith, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, 390 Robert Street North, St. Paul, MN  55101 (for respondent Commissioner)



            Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Wright, Judge.


U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N



Relator challenges the decision of the commissioner’s representative that he quit his employment without good reason attributable to the employer and, therefore, is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  We affirm.



Relator Michael Scott was employed as a customer service worker for Sebastian Joe’s Resources, Inc. from April 24, 2002, through April 10, 2003.  Throughout Scott’s employment, the owners received complaints about Scott’s behavior toward his supervisors.  On January 10, 2003, Scott received an oral warning from one of the owners about his conduct.  On April 3, Scott received a written warning for arguing with and swearing at his supervisor.   

During Scott’s shift on April 10, the shift supervisor, Chris Kleman, was training in two new employees.  Scott interfered with the training by giving the new employees instructions that were contrary to Kleman’s.  Later that evening, Kleman requested that Scott clean the ice cream dipper.  Scott removed all of the ice cream containers from the dipper and began cleaning.  Because the ice cream was melting, Kleman directed Scott to return the ice cream to the dippers.  When Scott refused to do so, Kleman returned the ice cream to the dippers.  Scott became upset and started shouting and hitting the dipper.  Scott told Kleman, “That’s it, I quit.”  Kleman then walked over to the time clock, punched Scott’s time card, and asked Scott to leave.  Scott refused to leave before speaking with the general manager, who was not at the location.  After a phone call to the general manager’s home, Scott went to the patio to wait for the general manager’s arrival.  That evening, the general manager directed Scott to set up a meeting with the owners.  At the meeting between Scott and the owners held the following week, the owners accepted Scott’s resignation. 

Scott applied for unemployment benefits.  Both the department adjudicator and the unemployment law judge determined that Scott was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  On appeal, the commissioner’s representative agreed, concluding that Scott quit his employment without good reason caused by the employer. This certiorari appeal followed.


We review the findings of the commissioner’s representative rather than those of the unemployment law judge.  Tuff v. Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn. 1995).  In doing so, we view the factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision to determine whether the evidence reasonably sustains them.  Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn. 1989). 

As an initial matter, we consider Scott’s claim that he was suspended during a meeting with the owners.  Credibility determinations are resolved by the commissioner’s representative and will not be disturbed on appeal.  Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995). 

The commissioner’s representative found that “the evidence provided by the employer regarding the final incident was more credible than that submitted by the applicant.”  The commissioner’s representative then concluded that “[o]n April 10, 2003, Michael Scott quit employment with Sebastian Joe’s Resources.”  Our review of the record establishes that, during his shift on April 10, 2003, Scott became upset, banged on things, and told Kleman, “That’s it, I quit.”  In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision of the commissioner’s representative, the record reasonably supports the finding that Scott quit his employment.

Having determined that Scott quit his employment, we next consider whether Scott quit his employment due to good reason caused by the employer.  Whether an employee has good cause to quit is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).  An employee who quits employment shall be disqualified from all unemployment benefits unless the employee quits due to “a good reason caused by the employer.”  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2002).  A good reason caused by the employer is one that is “directly related to the employment” and is significant enough to “compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remain[] in the employment.”  Id. at subd. 3(a)(1), (2) (2002). 

Because Scott maintains that he was terminated, Scott did not offer a legally sufficient basis for his decision to quit his employment.  Scott’s dissatisfaction with his work environment culminating in the altercation with Kleman on his final night of employment does not constitute “good cause” to quit as required under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd 3(a)(2).  We, therefore, conclude that Scott’s work environment did not constitute good cause to quit.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commissioner’s representative that Scott is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.


Scott argues for the first time on appeal that, because he was not granted a subpoena, he was unable to present evidence in support of his contentions that he was terminated without good cause.  Generally, we will not address an issue for the first time on appeal.  See Imprint Tech. Inc. v. Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 535 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that issues not raised below may not be raised for the first time on appeal).  Because Scott did not raise this issue before the commissioner’s representative and the record is not adequately developed for our review, we decline to consider this issue.