This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A03-1839

 

 

Ambrose Cornell Davis,

Appellant.

 

vs.

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

 

 

Filed June 8, 2004

Affirmed
Crippen, Judge
*

 

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 00021814

 

Ambrose Cornell Davis, O.I.D. #208454, MCF–Stillwater, 970 Pickett St. North, Bayport, MN 55003-1490 (pro se appellant)

 

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN  55101-2134; and

 

Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN  55487 (for respondent)

 

            Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Crippen, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

CRIPPEN, Judge

            Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief claiming that the postconviction court erred by concluding that appellant raised or could have raised his postconviction claims in his initial appeal to this court.  Because the court correctly applied the law, we affirm. 

FACTS

            In May 2000 appellant Ambrose Davis pleaded guilty and was convicted of first-degree aggravated robbery.  He appealed the conviction, claiming both that he was coerced into pleading guilty to the robbery charge in order to make possible his lung surgery in Illinois, and that he was innocent.  See State v. Davis,No. CX-02-452, 2002 WL 31415491 (Minn. App. Oct. 29, 2002) (Davis I).  This court affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence.

            In October 2003 appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea, and he was innocent.  The postconviction court dismissed appellant’s petition finding that his claims were barred because:   (1) whether appellant voluntarily entered his guilty plea and whether he was actually innocent were fully decided in his initial appeal to this court; and (2) appellant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim could or should have been raised in his initial appeal.  On appeal to this court, appellant contends that the postconviction court erred by denying him an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his claim that he did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea.   

D E C I S I O N

            “Once a defendant has had a direct appeal, ‘all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.’”  Wilson v. State, 582 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. 1998) (quoting State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976)); cf. Ives v. State, 655 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 2003) (recognizing exceptions for known but novel claim, not reasonably available at time of appeal, and in interests of justice).

1.  Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s decision to deny him an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether his guilty plea was entered as a matter of coercion or duress.  In Davis I, this court considered this claim and determined that “given that [appellant] did not deem it necessary to have the operation at any time during his three months in Illinois prior to his incarceration,” appellant did not appear to feel coerced into accepting the plea agreement in order to have the operation.  Davis, 2002 WL 31415491, at *2.   Because appellant raised this claim in his initial appeal, and this court considered and decided the claim, the postconviction court was correct in concluding that he was barred from having the claim considered and decided a second time.  Similarly, appellant asserted but was denied relief on his appellate claim that he was innocent.

2.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Appellant argues that the postconviction court erred by not ordering an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  He further contends that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be excused from the Knaffla rule because an attorney who handles both a trial and appeal is unlikely to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against himself.  But here appellant had two different attorneys representing him, one in the district court and one on appeal, and we are not faced with a case where there is suspicion that appellant’s counsel failed to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in an effort to protect himself. 

            Because at the time of his first appeal appellant was represented by counsel and was aware of the incidents supporting his current allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that appellant’s claim was barred.  He makes no assertions that explain why the claim was not made earlier or that state unique interests of justice for current review of the issue.

Affirmed.

 

 



* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.