This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Richard A. Hastings,
Kay E. Haman,
M.L.H., a minor child,
Filed June 15, 2004
Clay County District Court
File No. F0-96-50411
Bonnie J. Askew, 118 Broadway, Suite 301, P.O. Box 227, Fargo, ND 58107 (for respondent)
Kay E. Haman, 924 Sixth Street South, Fargo, ND 58103 (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Halbrooks, Judge, and Minge, Judge.
Appellant, pro se, challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for compensatory parenting time. Because we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
M.L.H., now eight, is the daughter of appellant Kay Haman and respondent Richard Hastings. Her custody is with respondent; appellant has supervised parenting time. See R.A.H. v. K.E.H., No. C9-01-1114 (Minn. App. 26 Feb. 2002) (affirming district court’s custody award and visitation determination).
Despite this court’s affirmance of district court custody and parenting time decisions, appellant, acting pro se, continued to challenge them. In May 2002, appellant moved for a substantial modification of parenting time; her motion was denied. In January 2003, appellant moved for unsupervised parenting time. The district court again denied the motion, ordered appellant to pay respondent $500 in attorney fees, and said it would “not entertain further such motions until it receives evidence that [appellant] has addressed, pursuant to a valid psychological examination, the mental health concerns set forth in its [prior order].” Appellant did not comply with either this order or the order to pay respondent $500 in attorney fees. In July 2003, she brought another motion, alleging that she had been deprived of parenting time. The district court denied the motion and reiterated that it would address no further motions until appellant complies with the order of 27 January 2003. Appellant now argues that the denial was an abuse of discretion.
D E C I S I O N
The district court has extensive discretion in deciding parenting time questions and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995).
The district court held a hearing on appellant’s allegation that she had been deprived of parenting time. Testimony from the director of the parenting time center indicated that appellant wanted visitation twice weekly, on Tuesdays and Sundays, and that she had 36 visits of the 43 visits scheduled between January and July. The director also testified that they schedule parenting time one month in advance and that parties are free to make changes to the parenting time schedule, within the center’s hours of operation. The director also noted that M.L.H. had not requested more parenting time with appellant. The district court acknowledged that the parenting time had been difficult to manage and denied the motion.
Appellant also alleges that, throughout these proceedings, various witnesses and respondent lied to the district court judge, who should have disbelieved them and believed appellant. But this court gives due regard “to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Even if appellant’s challenges to the credibility of respondent and other witnesses were timely, this court could not address them.
Finally, appellant asks for the removal of the district court judge. The record does not show, and appellant does not claim, that she ever raised this issue before the district court, so it is not properly before this court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (this court does not address matters not presented to the district court).
We see no abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant’s motion.
 In her brief, appellant asks this court to address many issues outside the scope of this appeal, i.e. “to restore my custody, no supervised visits, makeup time for what [I’ve] lost, a new trial, an evidentiary hearing, and a new guardian ad litem.” These issues are either untimely or the subject of the previous appeal, and we do not address them. While courts may provide some latitude to pro se litigants, wholesale relaxation of all rules and requirements is not permitted. Liptak v. State ex rel. City of New Hope, 340 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minn. App. 1983).