This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
John Doe 43,
The Order of St. Benedict of the Roman Catholic
Church, a/k/a, St. John’s Abbey,
Father Dunstan Moorse, et al.,
Filed June 15, 2004
Stearns County District Court
File No. C0-02-2764
Jeffrey R. Anderson, Kathleen O’Connor, Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., E-1000 First National Bank Building, 332 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellant)
Robert T. Stich, Leo I. Brisbois, Stich, Angell, Kreidler & Dodge, P.A., The Crossings, Suite 120, 250 Second Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Wright, Presiding Judge; Schumacher, Judge; and Willis, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s claim for damages resulting from alleged sexual abuse by a teacher at a boarding school operated by respondent religious order. Appellant argues that the district court erred by rejecting appellant’s arguments that (1) fraudulent concealment by a defendant tolls the statute of limitations in a case of sexual abuse; and (2) respondent had a fiduciary duty to him that excuses any delay in discovering respondent’s fraud. Because we find no fraudulent concealment that tolls the statute of limitations and because we decline to determine if a fiduciary relationship exists, we affirm.
In 1980, appellant Bill Quenroe began attending St. John’s Preparatory School in Collegeville, Minnesota, as a 15-year-old high-school sophomore, and left the following year. St. John’s is owned and operated by respondent, the Order of St. Benedict of the Roman Catholic Church (the Order). Respondent Dunstan Moorse, a priest and employee of the Order, was an instructor at St. John’s and taught Quenroe’s theology class. Quenroe claims that in 1981, while he was visiting Moorse in his office, Moorse sexually abused him. In September 1992, in connection with a lawsuit brought against Moorse and the Order by another former student who claimed Moorse had sexually abused him, Quenroe signed a statement in which he says that the 1981 incident made him feel “very uncomfortable” and that he wanted “to get out of [Moorse’s] office” but admits that he did not tell anyone else about the alleged abuse at the time.
In April 1995, Quenroe attempted suicide and was hospitalized April 9-10. Quenroe contacted the Order and on April 24, 1995, met with Father Timothy Kelly, then the abbot of St. John’s. During that meeting, Quenroe described to Father Kelly his sexual abuse by Moorse. Quenroe requested, and, under the terms of a confidential written agreement, the Order agreed to provide, payment for counseling and therapy for Quenroe. The Order continued to pay for Quenroe’s counseling and therapy at least through 2002. Father Kelly did not tell Quenroe that the Order had any information concerning other allegations of sexual abuse against Moorse.
In 2002, the then-abbot of St. John’s publicly revealed that the Order knew that some sexual molestation of students by Moorse may have occurred while Moorse was an instructor at St. John’s. The Order’s files show that it may have known about allegations of sexual abuse by Moorse as early as 1984. Documents dated between 1984 and 1987 reflect church officials’ concern over complaints of sexual misconduct against Moorse and question whether Moorse should continue teaching. In September 1986, Moorse left St. John’s and was transferred to the Archdiocese of Santa Fe. In 1987, Moorse returned to Minnesota and became an instructor at Benilde-St. Margaret’s High School in St. Louis Park.
In June 2002, Quenroe sued Moorse and the Order, alleging sexual battery, and, against the Order, breach of fiduciary duty, fiduciary fraud and conspiracy to commit fiduciary fraud, fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, negligent retention and/or supervision, negligent failure to warn/and or instruct, and vicarious liability. In February 2003, respondent moved for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal on the ground that Quenroe’s claims were time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (2000). On July 1, 2003, the district court granted respondent’s motion and dismissed with prejudice Quenroe’s claims against the Order. This appeal follows.
On appeal from summary judgment, this court must ask (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). The district court properly grants a motion for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993) (citation omitted). On appeal, this court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.” Id. Nonetheless, the non-moving party may not rest on mere averments; a genuine issue for trial must be established by substantial evidence. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69-71 (Minn. 1997). No genuine issue of material fact exists “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 69 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).
In 1989, recognizing the unique nature of injuries caused by sexual abuse, the legislature enacted a special limitations provision for sexual-abuse claims, a law commonly referred to as the “delayed-discovery statute.” Claims for injuries caused by sexual abuse are subject to the following:
Subd. 2. Limitations period. (a) An action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.
Subd. 3. Applicability. This section applies to an action for damages commenced against a person who caused the plaintiff’s personal injury either by (1) committing sexual abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligently permitting sexual abuse against the plaintiff to occur.
Minn. Stat. § 541.073, subds. 2(a), 3 (2002).
In Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996), the supreme court explained that damages claims for injury caused by sexual abuse are entitled to a limitations period different from other personal-injury claims because of the “difficulties attendant on the victim’s often repressed recollections.” Id. at 3. Many victims of sexual abuse, especially young children, are “psychologically and emotionally unable to recognize that they have been [sexually] abused.” W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn. 1998). Interpreting Minn. Stat. § 541.073, the supreme court concluded that, as a matter of law, “one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused.” Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. The ultimate issue to be determined under the delayed-discovery statute is “the time at which the complainant knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.” Id. Knowledge of the abuse is determined by applying an objective, reasonable-person standard. Id. In W.J.L., the supreme court concluded that the statute of limitations on a sexual-abuse claim begins to run when a victim is abused “unless there is some legal disability, such as the victim’s age, or mental disability . . . which would make a reasonable person incapable of recognizing or understanding that he or she had been sexually abused.” W.J.L., 573 N.W.2d at 681.
 A 1978 deacon’s evaluation states that “teenagers posed the most difficulties in [Moorse’s] pastoral relationships.” There is, however, no mention of possible sexual misconduct in the evaluation. The first documentation of what the Order calls “improper behavior” is dated 1984.
 The motion was brought only as to Quenroe’s claims and not those of his co-plaintiff, John Doe 43.