This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Robert Cyril Begordis,
Affirmed; motion granted
Dakota County District Court
File No. K6-01-2049
Mark D. Nyvold, 332 Minnesota Street, Suite W-1610, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Debra Schmidt, Assistant County Attorney, Dakota County Judicial Center, 1560 Highway 55, Hastings, MN 55033 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Wright, Presiding Judge; Schumacher, Judge; and Willis, Judge.
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in failing to make a record of what had been received and reviewed in camera. Appellant requests that this court conduct an independent review of the documents received in camera to decide whether the district court abused its discretion in determining which documents were discoverable. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to impeach appellant with the nature of his military discharge and in excluding witness testimony that appellant had suggested counseling for the victim. Finally, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Sara Payne and appellant Robert Begordis were involved in a relationship from March 1996 through July 2000. In 1997, Begordis moved into a home in Inver Grove Heights with Payne, along with her then nine-year-old daughter, B.P., and eight-year-old son, M.P. In January 2000, B.P. reported to Payne that Begordis was “sexually harassing” her. Specifically, B.P. disclosed that Begordis had performed oral sex on her when Payne was away from the home or sleeping. Payne confronted Begordis, who denied B.P.’s accusations. Payne did not report B.P.’s disclosure to law-enforcement authorities. Over the months following the disclosure, when Payne asked B.P. whether “anything was going on,” B.P. told Payne that the sexual abuse had stopped.
In July 2000, B.P. told her friend, D.J., that she was being sexually abused by Begordis. D.J. repeated this information to her own therapist who reported B.P.’s allegations to Dakota County social services. Jody Lancaster, a social worker, interviewed B.P. while an Inver Grove Heights police officer watched the interview on a closed-circuit television. During the interview, B.P. reported that Begordis “touches me in the wrong spots.” B.P. clarified that she meant that Begordis touched her vagina and her breasts. B.P. also reported that Begordis touched her with his hand and that “sometimes he tries to lick me.” When asked if Begordis made B.P. touch him, B.P. reported that she touched his testicles and performed oral sex on him once or twice. Lancaster then interviewed Payne, who recounted B.P.’s earlier disclosure. But Payne also stated that she did not see any indication that Begordis had acted inappropriately toward B.P. Finally, Lancaster interviewed Begordis, who denied the allegations.
Begordis was charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2000). The state later amended the complaint to include two additional charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (h)(iii) (2000). Begordis moved for production of confidential documents regarding B.P.’s mental and physical health and an in camera review by the district court. Following an in camera review, the district court released those documents that it determined to be potentially relevant and exculpatory.
Before the trial, Begordis moved to admit evidence that B.P. made prior false accusations of sexual abuse and that she was taking medication for a mental disorder that affected her ability to testify truthfully. Outside the presence of the jury, the district court heard testimony from B.P.’s former therapist, her brother, a boy in her class, and a child-protection investigator. The district court subsequently denied Begordis’s motion, concluding that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. The district court also limited any inquiry regarding B.P.’s medication to the name of the medication.
B.P. testified at trial that Begordis touched her breasts and her vagina with his hand and performed oral sex on her several times when her mother was either away from the home or sleeping. B.P. also testified that she touched Begordis’s penis and performed oral sex on him once or twice. Payne testified that B.P. disclosed the sexual abuse in January 2000; Begordis threatened that, if he went to jail because of B.P.’s accusations, he did not know “what would happen” to Payne and B.P. upon his release; and Begordis did not want B.P. to receive counseling because he did not want anyone interfering in their lives.
Begordis’s friend, Scott Schroeder, testified that Begordis enjoyed a good reputation in the community for veracity, honesty, and moral character. To rebut Payne’s testimony regarding Begordis’s disapproval of sending B.P. to counseling, the defense attempted to elicit testimony that Begordis had requested that Payne send B.P. to counseling. But the district court sustained the state’s objection to this testimony.
To rebut Schroeder’s reputation testimony, the state questioned Begordis as to the status of Begordis’s discharge from the military. Over his counsel’s objection, Begordis testified that he was given an “early out” called a “BCD discharge.”
Begordis was convicted of all charges and sentenced to an 86-month prison term on one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal followed.
Begordis next challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings at trial. A defendant has the burden of establishing both an abuse of discretion and prejudice resulting from the ruling. State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1994). If there is any reasonable doubt that erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the verdict, then a new trial is warranted. State v. Naylor,474 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 1991).
Begordis next contends that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Schroeder’s testimony that Begordis suggested that B.P. receive counseling. Begordis proffered this testimony to rebut evidence that Begordis objected to the counseling. Begordis maintains that this testimony was admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) as a prior consistent statement.
A prior consistent statement is admissible if two conditions have been met. First, the declarant must testify at the trial and be subjected to cross-examination concerning the statement. And second, the statement must be consistent with the declarant’s prior testimony. Slater v. Baker, 301 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn. 1981). Because Schroeder’s testimony preceded that of Begordis, who is the declarant of the statement, the district court properly excluded the proffered statement.
Finally, Begordis contends that the state failed to prove that he committed multiple acts of penetration to support his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Our review of a claim of insufficient evidence is limited to a careful analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach a guilty verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume the jury believed the testimony that supports the conviction and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, reasonably could conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988).
A person who engages in sexual penetration or sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if “the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2000). A person who engages in sexual penetration or contact with a person under 13 years of age is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if “the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant; and . . . the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2000). “Sexual contact” includes “the intentional touching of the complainant’s bare genitals . . . by the actor’s bare genitals . . . with sexual or aggressive intent . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(c) (2000). “Sexual penetration” includes “cunnilingus, fellatio or . . . any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings . . . of the complainant’s body by any part of the actor’s body.” Id., subd. 12(1), (2)(i) (2000). “Significant relationship” includes “a situation in which the actor is . . . an adult who jointly resides intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the complainant and who is not the complainant’s spouse.” Id., subd. 15(3) (2000).
Our review of the record establishes that there is ample evidence to support the convictions of first-degree and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Begordis resided in B.P.’s household and had a significant relationship with B.P. Begordis took an active role in disciplining B.P., and B.P. called Begordis “dad” at times. B.P. testified that Begordis sexually abused her beginning when she was 9 until she was 12. The record also establishes that Begordis engaged in multiple acts of oral sex with B.P. during this period. Thus, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is an abundance of evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Begordis committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (h)(iii).
 Begordis moves to strike from the state’s appendix a letter from the district court’s law clerk to Begordis’s counsel dated September 10, 2002. Begordis argues that the letter should be stricken because it is not part of the record. Under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01, papers filed with the district court, the exhibits, and the transcripts comprise the record on appeal. A partial stamp on the letter is inconclusive as to whether it shows that the letter was indeed filed with the district court or simply shows that the letter was received by the county attorney’s office on September 12, 2002. We note that, in order to sustain a verdict, an appellate court may “permit omissions to be supplied by documentary evidence of a conclusive nature.” Chahla v. City of St. Paul,507 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Dec. 14, 1993). The letter identifies the jurisdictions that had responded to the order for production and the nature of the documents, if any, that were produced. The letter also identifies those counties from which a response was expected and states the district court’s intention to issue its order upon receiving a response from these jurisdictions. But the letter is inconclusive as to the nature of any response received from the remaining jurisdictions. We, therefore, grant the motion to strike while noting that our in camera review enables us to address the parties’ arguments without consideration of the September 10, 2002 letter.
 Begordis contends that, because the district court did not indicate that it had received records from Morton County, North Dakota, or Golden Valley County, North Dakota, all documents sought may not have been produced.