may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Bernard Wartman, petitioner,
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Crow Wing County District Court
File No. C9030940
Richard C. Kenly, Kenly Law Office, P.O. Box 31, Backus, MN 56435 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Joel A. Watne, Assistant Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant challenges the decision by the district court sustaining the revocation of his driver’s license under the implied-consent law. Based on appellant’s failure to raise with sufficient specificity in the petition for judicial review of his driver’s license revocation the claim he now makes on appeal, we affirm.
On March 29, 2003, Nisswa Police Officer Brandon Rothwell arrested appellant John Bernard Wartman for DWI and transported him to the Crow Wing County Jail. At the jail, appellant waived his right to consult with an attorney and agreed to submit to implied-consent testing, which showed an alcohol concentration of .13. The district court found that after explaining to appellant that his alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit for driving, Rothwell gave a document to appellant and said that it would be his license for the next 180 days. The court found that Rothwell then directed appellant’s attention to a second set of documents, told appellant that the license plates on his vehicle were going to be removed, and, referring to the second set of documents, said, “This will be your seven day temporary permit so you don’t get in trouble, okay?” Appellant replied, “All right.”
Appellant testified that the only documents he received were a notice and order of license plate impoundment, a summons, an order for release, and a notice of judicial determination. Appellant recalled receiving the first two documents the night he was arrested and the other two documents the following morning. Appellant testified that he did not receive any other documents and specifically denied receiving the seven-day temporary license.
The district court concluded:
Rothwell . . . informed [appellant] that he was being given a seven day temporary license which would allow him to legally drive his motor vehicle for the seven days following his arrest. [Appellant] was handed the document containing the seven day temporary license, and subsequently asked if he had any questions regarding this information. These acts by the officer placed [appellant] on sufficient notice that [appellant] had a seven day temporary license to legally drive his motor vehicle subsequent to his arrest.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(b)(3) (2002), requires a petition for judicial review of a driver’s license revocation to “state with specificity the grounds upon which the petitioner seeks rescission of the order of revocation.” “The purpose of the petition’s specificity requirement is to give the Commissioner notice of the issues upon which he must present evidence.” Smith v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 401 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1987). The application of a statute to undisputed facts involves a question of law, and the district court’s decision is not binding on this court. O’Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn. 1996).
The facts relevant to determining whether appellant complied with the specificity requirement of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(b)(3), are undisputed. Appellant argues on appeal that “[i]t is not adequate notice that an arresting officer tells the Appellant to sign a document and then subsequently has other officers take this document away from the Appellant.” Specifically, appellant’s claim on appeal is that he received the notice of revocation, which sets forth a driver’s appeal rights, and the seven-day temporary license, but those documents were taken away from him while he was in jail and not returned to him upon his release.
Appellant’s petition for judicial review described the grounds on which he sought rescission of the revocation of his driver’s license as follows: “There was no notice of revocation served on [appellant], notifying [appellant] of the reason for or the length of the revocation. No seven-day temporary license also violates due process. [Appellant] was denied due process when s/he was denied a seven day hardship temporary license.” At the hearing on appellant’s petition, his attorney stated that appellant’s claim was that “he was never given the seven-day temporary license.” Consistent with his description of his claim to the district court, appellant testified that the documents he received did not include the notice of revocation, and he specifically denied receiving the seven-day temporary license.
Appellant’s description of his claim in the petition for judicial review and at the hearing did not put the state on notice that it needed to present evidence that the notice of revocation and temporary license were returned to appellant when he was released from jail. The state responded to, and the district court addressed, the claim that appellant actually made in his petition for judicial review, not the claim that he now makes on appeal. The claim that appellant makes on appeal was not raised in appellant’s petition for judicial review. See Eveslage v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 353 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 1984) (holding that district court erred in rescinding revocation based on a ground not raised in petition for judicial review); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (this court generally will not consider matters not presented to and decided by the district court).
Even if appellant had stated with sufficient specificity in his petition for judicial review the claim that he now makes on appeal, his argument that he was denied due-process rights is not persuasive. A person does not have standing to claim a violation of a constitutional right unless the person can show a direct and personal harm resulting from the alleged denial of a constitutional right. City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Minn. 1980).
Appellant has not shown that he was prevented from driving during the seven-day period when he was entitled to drive or that he failed to assert any of his appeal rights. On the contrary, appellant testified that he drove until April 5, which was seven days after his arrest, based on his understanding that the temporary license plate he was issued allowed him to drive during that time period. Also, appellant exercised his right to obtain judicial review of his driver’s-license revocation.
Appellant has not demonstrated that he is entitled to rescission of the revocation of his driver’s license. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of his petition for judicial review of his driver’s license revocation.