This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Mabelu M. Werutaw,
Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development,
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development
File Nos. 18208 02, 3765 03
Howard L. Bolter, Borkon, Ramstead, Mariani, Fishman & Carp, Limited, Suite 100 Parkdale I, 5401 Gamble Drive, Minneapolis, MN 55416-1552 (for relator)
The Wackenhut Corporation, Monticello Location, c/o Sheakley Uniservice, Inc., P.O. Box 1160, Columbus, OH 43216-1160 (respondent)
Lee B. Nelson, M. Kate Chaffee, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, 390 North Robert Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent Commissioner)
Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
In this consolidated certiorari appeal, relator challenges the decisions of the commissioner’s representative that relator is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and must repay $11,187 in overpaid unemployment benefits. Relator argues that (1) the Department of Employment and Economic Development lacked jurisdiction over the employer’s appeal because it was untimely and (2) the record does not support the determination that relator was discharged for employment misconduct and, therefore, is required to repay the benefits he received. We affirm.
In February 2000, shortly after Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut) hired relator Mabelu Werutaw as a security guard, Werutaw was required to take a test to demonstrate his knowledge of company policies and procedures contained in the employee handbook and training manual. A score of 70 percent was needed to pass the test. Werutaw received a failing score of 67 percent. Despite Werutaw’s test performance, Wackenhut permitted him to work as a security guard at various work sites. A year later, Wackenhut audited its employee files and imposed a rule requiring employees to pass the test. Employees who had not passed the test were given an opportunity to retake it.
Wackenhut notified Werutaw of the need to retake the test. Werutaw challenged Wackenhut’s determination that he had not passed, claiming that the former human resources administrator advised him that he had passed. Werutaw also protested that, even if he had received a failing score, he should not be required to take the test again after more than one year of employment.
On November 15, 2001, while on a security assignment with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (Wells Fargo), Werutaw argued with his supervisor, Loney Gronskei, over retaking a different test required by Wells Fargo. During this argument, the requirement that Werutaw pass the policy-and-procedures test resurfaced. Gronskei advised Werutaw that he would not be assigned to a job until he passed the policy-and-procedures test. When Werutaw refused to take the test, Gronskei directed Werutaw to turn in his radio and identification badge and report to human resources.
Claiming that Wackenhut’s appeal of the Determination of Nondisqualification was untimely, Werutaw challenges the department’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The timeliness of an appeal presents a jurisdictional issue, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Harms v. Oak Meadows, 619 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Minn. 2000). Statutory time limits for appealing a department determination are strictly enforced. See Semanko v. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 309 Minn. 425, 429, 244 N.W.2d 663, 666 (1976). There are no statutory provisions for extensions or exceptions. Nieszner v. Minn. Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 499 N.W.2d 832, 837 (Minn. App. 1993). The department must dismiss an untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
Werutaw contends that Wackenhut was required to appeal the November 23, 2001, initial determination of eligibility within 30 days. Because Wackenhut failed to do so, Werutaw argues, the eligibility determination became final. Neither Minnesota law nor the record supports Werutaw’s contention.
Werutaw first argues that the department is jurisdictionally barred from considering Wackenhut’s appeal because Wackenhut did not file a timely protest. But the record establishes that Wackenhut successfully faxed its protest to the St. Cloud benefits center on November 29, 2001, six days after the initial determination of eligibility was issued. Wackenhut mailed a subsequent letter to the department regarding its protest on January 25, 2002. Thus, Wackenhut’s protest of the eligibility determination was timely filed. We note that, even if the protest wereuntimely, an untimely protest to the department’s eligibility determination does not serve as a jurisdictional bar to the department’s consideration of an appeal from the determination. See Lolling, 545 N.W.2d at 376.
Werutaw next asserts that the department’s one-year delay in deciding the issue of disqualification violates the statutory process. This argument also is unavailing. Although the department did not issue its determination of nondisqualification until November 1, 2002, nearly one year after receiving Wackenhut’s protest, the department was not required to make the determination regarding disqualification within any prescribed period of time. See Hart-Wilke, 550 N.W.2d at 313. While the delay was lengthy, there is no legal basis to conclude that the delay violates the statutory provisions governing this process.
Werutaw also argues that the department did not have jurisdiction to hear Wackenhut’s appeal because the appeal was untimely. As discussed above, the record establishes that the department issued its Determination of Nondisqualification on November 1, 2002. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(e), Wackenhut filed an appeal on November 26, 2002, squarely within the 30-day appeal period. Thus, Wackenhut’s appeal was timely filed, and the department had jurisdiction to hear it.
This court reviews the findings of the commissioner’s representative rather than the unemployment law judge. Tuff v. Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn. 1995). In doing so, we view these findings in the light most favorable to the decision of the commissioner’s representative to determine whether the evidence reasonably sustains the findings. Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn. 1989). Whether an employee committed unemployment misconduct is a mixed question of fact and law. Colburn v. Pine Portage Madden Bros., Inc.,346 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Minn. 1984). Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of fact. Scheunemann v. Radisson South Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. App. 1997). Whether the act constitutes misconduct is a question of law, which we review de novo. Ress, 448 N.W.2d at 523.
A single isolated incident based on a misunderstanding or a good-faith error in judgment that does not adversely affect the employer’s interests is not sufficient to find intentional misconduct. Sticha v. McDonald’s No. 291, 346 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. 1984) (finding no disqualifying misconduct where employee inadvertently misled employer to believe employee was taking time off for funeral rather than wake). Rather, the conduct must be deliberate and not accidental. Houston, 645 N.W.2d at 149.
 Werutaw devoted a significant portion of his appellate brief addressing his refusal to retake the Wells Fargo test. The record establishes, however, that Werutaw’s refusal to take the Wells Fargo test again disqualified Werutaw only from receiving job assignments at the Wells Fargo job site and was not the basis for his discharge from Wackenhut.
 On January 14, 2003, Werutaw applied for unemployment benefits following his separation from another employer. On February 5, 2003, the department issued a determination of nondisqualification for unemployment benefits unrelated to Werutaw’s employment with Wackenhut.