This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Jarred Dean Lind,
Gordon W. Shumaker, Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. K200600872
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and
Alan Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, 100 North Fifth Avenue West, #501, Duluth, MN 55802-1298 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue S.E., Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge, Lansing, Judge, and Minge, Judge.
Appellant Jarred Dean Lind contends that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence and to appoint substitute defense counsel. We affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its rulings. After remand from the supreme court, we reach the same conclusion and affirm.
Duluth police received reports of two separate armed robberies on August 10, 2000. They located two young males who fit the descriptions of the robbers and were able to arrest one, while the other fled. The investigation focused on appellant Jarred Dean Lind, who the police were told lived in the basement level of 315½ West 3rd Street, the entry door to which was painted blue.
Officers obtained a search warrant for that address. The applicant for the warrant stated in his affidavit that the place to be searched was the basement area of 315½ West 3rd Street and that the exterior door to that location was blue.
When the officers arrived at the residence, they discovered that the basement level had a separate address, 315 West 3rd Street. Before executing the warrant, officers telephoned the issuing district judge, explained the address error, and received the judge’s authorization to search 315 instead of 315½ West 3rd Street. During the search, they found Lind on the premises and arrested him.
With Lind in custody, two officers questioned him about the robberies, and they tape‑recorded the interview. They began by advising Lind of his Miranda rights. They then told Lind that he was under arrest for robbery and asked if he understood his rights and would be willing to talk to them. Lind replied: “I’d rather have an attorney be present.” One of the officers then indicated that if Lind wanted to speak with an attorney they would have to stop talking. Lind responded: “you can go ahead and question me I ain’t got nothing to hide or anything.” The officer stated: “Well you’ve, you mentioned that you wanted an attorney we’re gonna have to stop talking to you now. Okay?” Lind replied: “All right.” The officer stopped the tape.
According to the officer’s omnibus-hearing testimony, after he turned off the tape-recorder, Lind kept talking to another officer about his alibi. The officer then turned the recorder on again and continued with the interrogation.
Later in the interrogation, one of the officers again asked Lind if he understood his rights and was willing to talk to the police without an attorney. Lind said, “I will ‘cuz it’s on a recording.” The following occurred:
[Officer No. 1:] You know. So that, I mean, so that’s, so you understand you’re under no obligation to talk to us, right? Okay.
[Officer No. 2:] Yes/no?
[Officer No. 2:] You understand that? Okay. So should we continue then? Is that what you want to do?
Eventually Lind admitted committing both robberies, but he later recanted.
After being charged with two counts of aggravated first‑degree robbery and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, Lind moved to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his residence and the admissions he made during the police interrogation. The district court denied the motions. Lind also moved for the appointment of a different assistant public defender from the one representing him. The district court denied that motion. Eventually, Lind agreed to submit the case to the district court on stipulated facts. The district court found Lind guilty of the crimes charged. On appeal, Lind alleges that the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress and to appoint a substitute assistant public defender was in error.
D E C I S I O N
When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing–or not suppressing–the evidence.
State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999).
Lind agreed to a trial on stipulated facts. After the district court found him guilty, he appealed, contending that the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence and by denying his motion for appointment of substitute defense counsel. We held that the district court did not err in the challenged rulings and we affirmed.
The supreme court granted Lind’s petition for review, reversed “with respect to harmless error,” and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration consistent with In re Welfare of R.J.E., 642 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002). That case held that a “harmless error review should not be applied to trials on stipulated facts.” Id. at 713.
In our original opinion, we referred to harmless error as to the issue of Lind’s right to counsel, and we included mention of harmless error in a parenthetical describing the holding of a case we cited on the issue of appointment of substitute counsel.
In analyzing Lind’s claim that the district court erred by ruling that he had unequivocally waived his right to counsel before he made the admissions the district court declined to suppress, we applied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981), and State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 140 (Minn. 1999). Based on those authorities and the facts of this case, our intent was to hold that, because Lind unequivocally waived his right to counsel before he made the challenged admissions, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress the admissions. However, we also stated that any error in denying the motion was harmless.
On reconsideration after remand, we again conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Thus, a harmless error analysis is neither necessary nor appropriate under the facts of this case nor under R.J.E.
We also held that the district court did not err by refusing to appoint substitute defense counsel. We did not intend to premise this holding on harmless error and did not do so in the body of the opinion. Rather, the case we cited referred to harmless error, and we included that reference in the descriptive parenthetical after the case citation.
We have reconsidered this issue on remand and conclude that the district court did not err in denying Lind’s motion for appointment of substitute counsel. It is unnecessary to make a harmless-error review.