This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).







Wilma Putzier,

d/b/a Wilma Tours and Travel,





Richard Sand,



John J. Hofer, et al.,



Filed February 25, 2003


Willis, Judge


Ramsey County District Court

File No. C6993879



Michael C. Conn, Balogh Becker, Ltd., 4150 Olson Memorial Highway, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN  55422 (for appellant)


Kathleen M. Loucks, Gislason & Hunter, LLP, 9900 Bren Road East, Suite 215E, P.O. Box 5297, Minnetonka, MN  55343 (for respondent)


            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Appellant obtained a default judgment against respondent in a South Dakota circuit court and filed that judgment in Ramsey County District Court.  She challenges the district court’s order vacating the judgment.  Because we conclude that the district court did not err, we affirm.


            Huron Professional Baseball, Inc. (“Huron”) is a closely held South Dakota corporation that owned and operated the Huron Heaters, a professional baseball team.  In 1994, appellant Wilma Putzier entered into a contract to provide travel services to Huron, but Huron did not compensate her for the services she provided.

            In March 1997, Putzier filed a breach-of-contract action in a South Dakota circuit court against Huron, its directors, its officers, and its shareholders.  Putzier’s complaint named as a defendant respondent Richard Sand, a minority shareholder in Huron.

            Sand claims that he has never lived in or been employed in South Dakota and that he received his “shares of Huron as a gift from [George] Vedder, who was a majority shareholder in Huron.”  Sand admits that he had served as an attorney for the professional baseball league in which the Huron Heaters played.  He further admits that he visited South Dakota in his capacity as attorney for the league and that, while there, he interacted with Huron officers John J. Hofer and Melissa Smith-Hofer, who were also defendants in Putzier’s breach-of-contract action.  Sand maintains that he was not involved in the formation or performance of the contract between Huron and Putzier.

Putzier served Sand with a summons and complaint in Ramsey County, Minnesota, where Sand resides.  But Sand served no answer, and on March 9, 1998, the South Dakota circuit court ordered a default judgment for Putzier and against Sand in the amount of $26,052.

Putzier then filed the judgment in Ramsey County District Court.  On April 16, 2002, Sand brought a motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that the South Dakota circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.  The district court found that Sand “did not have sufficient contacts with * * * the State of South Dakota to establish personal jurisdiction over [him] in the State of South Dakota.”  Thus, the district court granted Sand’s motion to vacate the South Dakota judgment filed in the Ramsey County District Court.  Putzier appeals.



Though the record indicates that Sand did not bring his motion to vacate the South Dakota judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60, Putzier nonetheless argues that the district court erred by not applying that rule’s one-year limitation on motions for relief from judgment.  The application of court rules is a question of law, which we review de novo.  See Van Slooten v. Estate of Schneider-Janzen, 623 N.W.2d 269, 270-71 (Minn. App. 2001).

            A motion for relief from a judgment based on, inter alia, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be brought no later than one year after entry of the judgment.  See Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f).  Motions for relief from judgments based on other grounds must be brought within “a reasonable time.”  See id.  But

[a]fter a foreign judgment has been duly filed, the grounds for reopening or vacating it are limited to lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in procurement (extrinsic), satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that make a judgment invalid or unenforceable.


Matson v. Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1983) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, “[r]ule 60.02, which allows a district court to vacate a judgment, does not apply to foreign judgments as it does to Minnesota judgments * * *.”  State Inc. v. Sumpter & Williams, 553 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Minn. App. 1996) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 20, 1996).  Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by not applying the time limitation provided by rule 60.02.


            Putzier next argues that the district court erred by concluding that the South Dakota circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sand.  Judgments of foreign courts entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant “are not entitled to full faith and credit in Minnesota.”  Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 531 (Minn. 2002) (citing Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Minn. Stat. § 548.27 (2000)).  Minnesota courts will uphold a foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction if the foreign court (1) complied with the foreign state’s law providing jurisdiction and (2) exercised jurisdiction consistent with due process.  Id.  The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.  Id.

South Dakota’s long-arm statute provides that

[a]ny person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing * * * of any of the following acts:


            * * * *


(6)       Acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of any corporation organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within this state * * *; [or]


            * * * *


(14)     The commission of any act, the basis of which is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or with the Constitution of the United States.


S.D. Codified Laws § 15-7-2 (Michie Supp. 2000).

Putzier argues that Sand was one of Huron’s directors and is thus subject to personal jurisdiction in South Dakota under section 15-7-2(6).  Although Putzier has included in the appendix to her brief evidence suggesting that Sand was, at least at one point, a Huron director, this evidence does not appear in the district court file forwarded to this court.

This court “may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”  Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988) (citation omitted).  The record on appeal consists of the “papers filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any * * *.”  Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.  Because the evidence showing that Sand was a Huron director does not appear in the district court file, we conclude that it is outside of the record on appeal, and we will not consider it.

In her brief, Putzier also contends that Sand had sufficient contacts with South Dakota for the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.  A state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (quotation omitted).  A nonresident defendant’s “minimum contacts” are sufficient if he “purposefully avail[ed]” himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.  Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting and modifying Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958)), cited in Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 532.  The exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional where the nonresident defendant’s conduct and connections with the forum state are such that he “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980), or where the defendant “purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1985) (quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the record shows only that Sand owned shares in a closely held South Dakota corporation that entered into a contract that was allegedly breached.  Putzier has not established that Sand either was involved in the decision to enter into a contract with Putzier or had any influence over the performance of that contract.  Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by concluding that the South Dakota circuit court ordered the entry of the default judgment without having personal jurisdiction over Sand.