This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).







Norman Darnell Toney,


City of St. Paul, et al.,


Filed January 7, 2003


Mulally, Judge*


Ramsey County District Court

File No. C900009084



Jordan S. Kushner, 636 Sexton Building, 529 South Seventh Street South, Minneapolis, MN  55415 (for appellant)



Manuel J. Cervantes, St. Paul City Attorney, John H. Stechmann, Assistant City Attorney, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, 500 City Hall/Courthouse, St. Paul, MN  55102 (for respondents)



            Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and Mulally, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            This lawsuit arose out of the seizure and impoundment of a gold Jaguar registered to Malcolm Carr.  Claiming that Malcolm Carr is his alias, appellant Norman Darnell Toney, Jr. attempted to have the car released to his mother when he was incarcerated.  Respondents City of St. Paul and Deputy Police Chief Tom Redding refused to release the car, and appellant brought this action against them, alleging claims for money damages and injunctive relief.  In this appeal from the district court order granting respondents summary judgment, appellant argues that the district court erred in ruling, without respondents having made the argument, that appellant could not prove he was the owner because he had registered the vehicle under an alias.  We affirm.


            On appeal from a summary judgment, this court considers whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law.  State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).  We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve any doubts as to the existence of an issue of material fact against the moving party.  Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn. 1981).

            The district court concluded:

[Appellant] offers no documentation whatsoever that he purchased, registered, repaired, or even drove the Jaguar in his own name.  [Appellant] cannot state from whom he bought the car or when the sale occurred.  As proof of ownership [appellant] provides an affidavit stating he registered the car illegally * * * and offers an admittedly false title in the assumed name. 


            Even if [appellant] can establish his use of the name Malcolm Carr, so what?  There may be dozens of people using that assumed name in Ramsey County, since it is, by definition, not a true identity.  Even if the [appellant] is a Malcolm Carr, he has not offered any evidence whatsoever that he is the Malcolm Carr that owns the Jaguar.  [Appellant’s] claim upon the Jaguar offers only the false title, under the assumed name, and [appellant’s] assertion that he is the owner.


            Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that the record contained insufficient evidence to prove his identity as the Malcolm Carr who owned the Jaguar because respondents conceded that issue for purposes of their summary judgment motion.  But appellant’s identity as Malcolm Carr goes to the issue of standing.  A “potential litigant must allege injury in fact, or otherwise have a sufficient stake in the outcome, to have a court decide the merits of a dispute.”  Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 529 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. App. 1995) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995).  Unless appellant can establish his identity as the Malcolm Carr who owned the Jaguar, he cannot establish any injury as a result of the Jaguar’s impoundment.  Standing cannot be waived and  may be raised at any time.  See Patzner v. Schaefer, 551 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating “[t]he question of standing is not subject to waiver * * *: we are required to address the issue even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us.”)  (quoting United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995)) (quotation omitted); see also Cochrane, 529 N.W.2d at 433 (stating “[s]tanding may be raised at any time.”) (citation omitted).

            Appellant argues that due to respondents’ concession, he did not present additional evidence on the issue of his identity as Malcolm Carr.  But appellant did submit additional evidence in connection with his earlier summary judgment motion and while he now contends that he would have presented further evidence, he does not identify that evidence.  See Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 155, 173, 210 N.W.2d 298, 308 (1973) (holding appellant’s claim that additional facts might have been developed at the trial was insufficient to defeat summary judgment motion).

As the district court explained, the record contains evidence that appellant used the alias Malcolm Carr but no evidence connecting appellant to the Jaguar.  Absent such evidence, appellant cannot establish any injury to himself resulting from the Jaguar’s impoundment.  Because we conclude that appellant lacks standing to assert a claim, we need not address appellant’s arguments concerning the city’s storage files.  The district court properly granted summary judgment for respondents.


* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.