This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






John Henry Reed, petitioner,


State of Minnesota,


Filed October 1, 2002


Stoneburner, Judge


Hennepin County District Court

File No. 94094194


John H. Reed, 970 Pickett Street North, Bayport, MN  55003-1490 (pro se appellant)


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Suite 500, 525 Park Street, St. Paul, MN 55103; and


Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN  55487 (for respondent)


Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and


 Stoneburner, Judge.


U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N




            Appellant John H. Reed appeals from a postconviction court order denying his petition for postconviction relief from his 1995 conviction of second-degree intentional and felony murder.  Reed argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.  Because the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. 



“The decisions of a postconviction court will not be disturbed unless the court abused its discretion.”  Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 2001) (citation omitted).  Reed argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because the district court (1) failed to ascertain whether an attorney-client conflict existed; (2) erroneously admitted hearsay testimony; and (3) abused its discretion by permitting Reed to go to trial with a conflicted attorney.  We disagree.

            The district court denied Reed’s petition for postconviction relief for two reasons:  (1) the allegations in the petition were “unsupported by any specific facts and [were] stated in an overly general manner,” and (2) Reed “could have raised the issues in the present petition on appeal, but failed to do so,” barring consideration of those issues by the postconviction court.  See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).   

            In Knaffla, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that once a direct appeal is taken “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”  Id.  The Knaffla rule “generally includes claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the claim is such that the reviewing court needs additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions.”  Robinson v. State, 567 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1997).

            On June 30, 1995, Reed filed a direct appeal of his conviction, arguing that his constitutional right to counsel was violated because the district court failed to determine why he was dissatisfied with his public defenders.  State v. Reed, No. C9-95-1443, 1996 WL 208501, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 30, 1996), review denied (Minn. Jul. 10, 1996). 

            Reed was fully aware of the prosecutorial-misconduct claim, the hearsay claim, and the attorney-client conflict claim at the time of the direct appeal, and therefore these issues cannot be examined upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.  The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reed’s petition for postconviction relief. 

            Furthermore, Reed failed to allege facts to support his claim for postconviction relief.  See Robinson, 567 N.W.2d at 494 (“An evidentiary hearing is not required unless facts are alleged which, if proven, would entitle [an appellant] to relief.”) (citation omitted).  Reed’s brief is void of any specific factual evidence supporting any of his claims, including prosecutorial misconduct, hearsay, and attorney-client conflict.  See id. (“The [appellant’s] allegations must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support.”)(citation omitted).

Because Reed’s claims cannot be reviewed on an appeal from postconviction relief and because Reed did not provide sufficient factual support to support his claims, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Reed’s petition for postconviction relief.