This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






In the Matter of the Welfare of:

I.K.S.D., Child.


Filed October 29, 2002

Klaphake, Judge


St. Louis County District Court

File No. J501651177


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN  55103; and


Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, Angela K. Shambour, Assistant County Attorney, 403 Government Service Center, 320 West Second Street, Duluth, MN  55802 (for respondent county)


John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Charlann E. Winking, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN  55414 (for appellant child)


            Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Klaphake, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Sixteen-year-old appellant I.K.S.D. was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct for an incident involving a fourteen-year-old child who resided in the same group home as appellant.  Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his adjudications.  Because there was sufficient evidence to permit the district court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the charged offenses, we affirm.


            The reviewing court’s role in a sufficiency of the evidence case is limited to determining whether the defendant could reasonably have been found guilty, given the facts in evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from those facts.  State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Minn. 1998).  This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assumes the fact finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.  Id;  In re Welfare of D.A.H., 360 N.W.2d 676, 677 (Minn. App. 1985) (applying same standard to juvenile cases).  “The dispositive consideration * * * is not whether reasonable doubt existed, but whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that no reasonable doubt existed.”  State v. Walen, 563 N.W.2d 742, 750 (Minn. 1997). 

            Appellant was charged with two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct involving the use of force or coercion to accomplish sexual contact and two counts of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct involving engagement in nonconsensual sexual contact.  Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c) (Supp. 2001) (fourth degree); Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2000) (fifth degree).  For purposes of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, “sexual contact” is defined as the “intentional touching * * * of the complainant’s intimate parts [including] the touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts.”  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a)(i, iv) (Supp. 2001).  “Intimate parts” includes “the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being.”  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 5 (2000).  For purposes of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, “sexual contact” is the same, but does not include touching the buttocks through clothing.  Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1 (2000).

            The victim here testified to forcible and non-consensual sexual contact by appellant.  Appellant argues that this testimony is not corroborated, but the testimony of the complainant in a criminal sexual conduct prosecution need not be corroborated.  Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2000).  Further, the statements of other witnesses, including appellant, support details of the victim’s testimony, even if only the victim provided the ultimate evidence of sexual contact.  The district court made specific findings regarding credibility and noted that discrepancies in the victim’s testimony were minor and that appellant had a stronger motivation to lie than the victim. 

            Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to permit the district court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of these offenses.