This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the
Civil Commitment of
Dazey Mae Christi.
Filed September 17, 2002
Hennepin County District Court
File No. P20260099
James S. Dahlquist, 4821 Fremont Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55409 (for appellant Christi)
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, John L. Kirwin, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent Hennepin County)
Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Halbrooks, Judge.*
Appellant challenges the district court’s order committing her as mentally ill, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s determination that she is mentally ill and that no less-restrictive alternatives to commitment exist. Because the commitment was justified by findings based on evidence at the hearing, we affirm.
After punching a police officer on January 31, 2002, appellant Dazey Mae Christi was placed in custody and charged with obstructing legal process or arrest. On February 19, the district court determined that appellant was incompetent to stand trial on the criminal charge and filed a judicial petition to involuntarily commit appellant as a mentally ill person under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01.
Appellant was transferred to Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC). Dr. Dallas Erdmann, who the parties stipulate is an expert in psychiatric medicine, treated appellant. Based on his clinical evaluation of appellant and his review of available records, Dr. Erdmann concluded that appellant suffered from a “substantial psychiatric disorder,” specifically, a “thought and mood disorder” that is “most likely consistent with a diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder.” Citing several examples of her behavior, Dr. Erdmann stated: (1) appellant was emotionally unstable, easily frustrated and angered, and intrusive; (2) appellant exhibited delusional beliefs, including her run for governor on a marijuana legalization platform; (3) appellant’s disorder “certainly has affected her judgment, behavior and capacity to recognize reality” and it “also affects her ability to reason”; and (4) although appellant stated that she was HIV positive, she refused to consider taking medication. Dr. Erdmann concluded that appellant could not provide herself with the necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care and that she had demonstrated this inability by refusing medical care for her HIV status and by losing her housing. Dr. Erdmann also concluded that appellant presented a substantial likelihood of causing physical harm to herself or others based on the incident with the police officer and her intrusive behavior at HCMC. Dr. Erdmann recommended appellant receive “ongoing inpatient psychiatric hospitalization,” agreeing that this was the least restrictive alternative available.
The district court also appointed Dr. Terry F. Nelson, selected by the court, and Dr. Ray Conroe, selected by appellant, as court-appointed examiners. Dr. Nelson was unable to determine whether appellant has a major mental illness because she refused to complete psychological testing. Because appellant was “not in adequate control,” Dr. Conroe conducted a brief interview, noting appellant’s “impulsivity and her * * * inability to control her behavior.” Based on his brief examination of appellant, a thorough examination of her medical reports, and his observations of appellant’s testimony in court, Dr. Conroe diagnosed appellant as suffering from bipolar disorder. Although his diagnosis differed from that of Dr. Erdmann, both “indicate the presence of prominent disturbance of thought and mood.” Dr. Conroe agreed with Dr. Erdmann that appellant suffered from a major mental illness and needed inpatient treatment.
After the hearing on the commitment petition, the district court ordered appellant committed. This appeal followed.
On appeal from a judicial commitment, our review is limited to an examination of whether the district court complied with the statute and whether the commitment was justified by findings based on evidence at the hearing. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision, and the findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Id.
The district court must find a person is mentally ill by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (Supp. 2001). A mentally ill person is defined as
any person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, to reason or understand, which is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions and poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others as demonstrated by:
(1) a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a result of the impairment; [or] * * * *
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a) (Supp. 2001).
Appellant asserts the district court clearly erred by finding that she was mentally ill. We disagree.
The district court found that appellant suffered from a “schizoaffective disorder, which is a substantial psychiatric disorder of her thought and mood, which grossly impairs her judgment, behavior, and capacity to recognize reality.” Dr. Erdmann testified that appellant’s symptoms were consistent with schizoaffective disorder. Drs. Erdmann and Conroe both testified that appellant suffers from a mental illness that affects her thoughts and moods and that she needs inpatient treatment. Both doctors provided examples of appellant’s behavior to support their conclusions. Because the evidence supports the district court’s finding that appellant suffers from a mental illness, its finding is not clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the evidence sufficiently supports the district court’s conclusion that appellant posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm, because her symptoms of a major psychotic disorder, including delusional thinking, rapidly escalating mood, paranoia, and hostility, led her to assault a police officer. Dr. Erdmann testified that a substantial likelihood existed that appellant would cause physical harm to herself or others based on her incident with the police officer and her intrusive and aggressive behavior at the hospital. See In re Zemple, 489 N.W.2d 818, 820-21 (Minn. App. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence that person posed substantial likelihood of physical harm where evidence showed person slapped his father); In re Martin, 458 N.W.2d 700, 704-05 (Minn. App. 1990) (finding sufficient evidence that person posed substantial likelihood of harm to self or others where evidence showed person was easily provoked, verbally hostile, and threatened to assault hospital staff). Additionally, appellant’s failure to seek medical care or to secure food or sanitary shelter supports a finding that she poses a substantial likelihood of harm to herself by failing to provide for her necessities. See In re Emond, 366 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Minn. App. 1985) (upholding commitment based on recent failure to obtain medical care for open sores or to provide food or sanitary shelter).
Appellant also argues that the district court’s finding that no less-restrictive alternatives to commitment exist is clearly erroneous. We disagree. The district court found that appellant’s
illness cannot be adequately treated by dismissal of the Petition, voluntary inpatient or outpatient care, the appointment of a guardian or conservator, or a conditional release.
The least restrictive, appropriate, available placement is a commitment to continued impatient treatment. The Court considered group homes, but rejected them due to their inability to cope with [appellant’s] present behavior and needs, because she will not cooperate with treatment.
The court considered alternative treatments and provided reasons why it concluded that inpatient treatment was appropriate; these findings are supported by the evidence. Dr. Erdmann testified that appellant refused treatment for her HIV infection, and Dr. Conroe testified that appellant refused to complete psychological testing. Dr. Erdmann stated, and Dr. Conroe agreed, that “ongoing inpatient psychiatric hospitalization” was the appropriate course of treatment. Dr. Erdmann further stated that this was the least restrictive alternative available. Because the evidence sufficiently supports the district court’s finding that commitment was the least restrictive treatment and delineated the court’s rejection of other alternatives, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
Because the commitment was justified by findings based on evidence at the hearing, the district court did not err by ordering appellant’s commitment.
* The Honorable Daniel F. Foley, one of the founding members of this court, who continued to serve by appointment order from the supreme court after his retirement, fully participated in the consideration of this appeal. Due to Judge Foley’s untimely death before the filing of the opinion, Judge Halbrooks has been assigned as a substitute, and now joins the panel in issuing this decision.
 Appellant was discharged from her commitment in May 2002. Because collateral consequences attach to a commitment as mentally ill, this appeal is not moot. See In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 331 (Minn. 1999) (holding that because of early intervention provisions of Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, collateral consequences attached to appellant’s commitment as mentally ill and appeal was not moot).
 Respondent asserts that appellant has inadequately briefed this issue and thus has waived her claim. See In re Robb, 622 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001) (recognizing claim is waived where appellant cites two opinions without analysis or argument indicating how opinions support claim). We find appellant’s brief sufficient to permit review.