This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of: The Appeal of the Determination
of the Responsible Authority for the
Department of Human Services that
Certain Data about Rick McDeid are
Accurate and/or Complete.
Filed September 10, 2002
Department of Human Services
Ricky Lee McDeid, 1111 Highway 73, Moose Lake, Minnesota 55767 (pro se relator)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Amy V. Kvalseth, Assistant Attorney General, Suite 200, 525 Park Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55103 (for respondent)
Minnesota Department of Human Services, 444 Lafayette Road, St. Paul, Minnesota 55155 (respondent)
Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Hudson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
In this appeal from an adverse decision of the Minnesota Department of Administration (DOA), appellant argues that the DOA erred in rejecting his data practices act challenge to the accuracy of a statement in his individual treatment plan, which was developed following his commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Treatment Program. Specifically, appellant challenges the statement that he had a history of sexually abusing young boys and a pattern of forming relationships with vulnerable women who had young sons. Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence in the district court civil-commitment order was insufficient to support the statement; and (2) the admission of medical exhibits during the contested-case hearing before the administrative law judge contravened the patients’ bill of rights under Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 16 (2000). We affirm.
In an order filed July 22, 1999, the district court ordered appellant, Ricky Lee McDeid, committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Treatment Program (MSOP) as a sexual psychopathic personality and a sexually dangerous person, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subds. 18(b) and 18(c) (1998), respectively. McDeid appealed the district court’s order, arguing the district court lacked sufficient evidence to support its findings. We affirmed in In re McDeid, No. C4-00-166, 2000 WL 781279(Minn. App. June 20, 2000), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2000), cert. den. sub nom McDeid v. O'Keefe, 531 U.S. 1094, 121 S. Ct. 819 (2001).
The district court’s findings of fact and all trial exhibits were forwarded to MSOP and were part of McDeid’s treatment records. Thereafter, as required by statute, MSOP prepared an individual treatment plan (ITP) that contained an individual program plan (IPP) dated April 25, 2000. McDeid disagreed with several items in the IPP and challenged it, claiming that the report contained several inaccuracies. Based on McDeid’s complaints, the IPP was revised on June 26, 2000, and again on November 20, 2000.
McDeid subsequently challenged numerous data contained in the November 20, 2000, IPP. The Department of Human Services determined that the challenged data were accurate and complete. Pursuant to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (data practices act), McDeid appealed that determination to the DOA, and the matter was ultimately set for a contested-case hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The contested-case hearing was held on September 28 and October 25, 2001.
At the contested-case hearing, the ALJ accepted the district court’s 1999 findings of fact, including the following findings:
(1) McDeid had a 26-year history of engaging in relationships with young male family members and then sexually abusing them;
(2) in 1996, within one month after being released from prison on work release, McDeid commenced a relationship with a woman who appeared to his supervising agent to be very vulnerable and who had two young sons. Under the terms of McDeid’s work release, he was prohibited from having direct or indirect contact with juvenile males. Despite this restriction, McDeid had contact with this woman even after being specifically ordered not to do so;
(3) When McDeid was released from prison a second time in 1997, he continued his relationship with this woman; and
(4) in November 1996, McDeid was terminated from a work-release program after visiting the home of his “Christian sponsor,” who had two juvenile males in the home.
John Thompson, McDeid’s supervising agent, further testified that a single mother who had juvenile male children would be vulnerable to exploitation by McDeid, who has not completed sexual-offense treatment. In addition, Anita Schlank, Ph.D., L.P., Clinical Director of McDeid’s treatment program, testified that those professionals treating sex offenders have learned from offenders themselves that they seek out women to gain their trust in order to have access to their children. Dr. Schlank testified that relationships with women who have small children is part of McDeid’s offense cycle.
In its recommended decision, dated December 20, 2001, the ALJ concluded that McDeid did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged data in the IPP were inaccurate or incomplete. The ALJ recommended to the commissioner of the DOA that the matter be dismissed. The commissioner adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasoning and dismissed the matter. This appeal followed.
Although McDeid challenged numerous data at the contested-case hearing, he only appeals the commissioner’s decision relating to the accuracy of the following statement from the November 20, 2000, IPP:
The findings of fact indicate that Mr. McDeid has a history of sexually abusing young male children, and a pattern of forming relationships with women who appear vulnerable to exploitation and have young male children.
The commissioner found that appellant failed to prove the statement was erroneous. McDeid contends this finding is not supported by the evidence. He argues that because the statement is prefaced by the words “[t]he findings of fact indicate,” the remaining statements can only be supported by the evidence contained in the district court’s 1999 findings of fact. He therefore contends that the commissioner erred in relying on evidence outside the district court’s 1999 order; specifically, data collected and developed by various doctors since McDeid’s commitment to MSOP.
Admissibility of the Evidence
As a preliminary matter we turn to McDeid’s argument that the evidence considered by the ALJ should have been limited to the evidence presented to the district court at the 1999 commitment hearing. The trial court has “wide latitude in determining relevant evidence, and its decision controls unless this discretion was abused.” Raleigh v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625, 275 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. 1978). Relevant evidence is defined as:
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 401.
The purpose of an IPP is to identify the patient’s problems and treat them. Therefore, limiting the evidence at the contested-case hearing to the evidence before the district court would not serve the purposes of ensuring an accurate IPP. Moreover, as respondent correctly notes, although on appeal McDeid only challenges one sentence from the November 20, 2000 IPP, the IPP data he initially challenged and tried at the contested-case hearing encompassed data collected while he was in the treatment program, as well as data from the district court’s file from his 1999 commitment hearing. Thus, evidence of McDeid’s current treatment and medical status is relevant to the determination of whether the IPPs are erroneous. The commissioner did not err in considering this evidence.
The data practices act imposes upon officials responsible for government data a duty to “establish procedures to assure that all data on individuals is accurate, complete, and current for the purposes for which it was collected.” Minn. Stat. § 13.05, subd. 5 (2000). The purpose of the data practices act is to
prevent confusion, mistake, embarrassment, ridicule, or other harm that the subject of government data could suffer if the data are not accurate and complete. The authority of the Commissioner must be construed in light of this purpose.
Hennepin Cty. Community Servs. Dep’t v. Hale, 470 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. July 24, 1991).
On appeal from an agency decision, the party seeking review bears the burden of proving that the agency’s conclusions violate one or more provisions of Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2000). Markwardt v. State, Water Resources Bd., 254 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 1977). Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2000), provides that this court reviews the commissioner’s decision to determine if the decision was:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
McDeid argues that the commissioner’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as:
1. Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
2. More than a scintilla of evidence;
3. More than some evidence;
4. More than any evidence; and
5. Evidence considered in its entirety.
Cable Communications Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Communications P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. 1984) (citation omitted). If an administrative agency engages in reasoned decisionmaking, we will affirm, even though we may have reached a different conclusion had we been the fact-finder. Id.at 669. We presume the agency’s decision to be correct and show deference to the agency’s conclusions within its area of expertise. Id. at 668.
Here, the first part of the challenged data, that “[t]he findings of fact indicate that Mr. McDeid has a history of sexually abusing young male children,” is sufficiently supported by the district court’s 1999 findings of fact. The district court found that McDeid had sexually abused seven minor boys: in 1965, D.P., his ten-year-old uncle, which occurred while McDeid was a minor himself; in 1977, T.L., his 12-year-old male cousin; in 1984, J.P., his eight-year-old nephew; in 1984 and 1985, J.L., his 15-year-old male cousin; between 1989 and 1991, N.L., his 9- to 11-year-old nephew; between 1989 and 1991, J.M., his 6- to 9-year-old son; and in 1991, M.M., his 15-year-old son. We hold that the commissioner’s decision as it relates to this challenged data is supported by substantial evidence, and McDeid did not bear his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that this data was incorrect.
McDeid also challenges the second sentence of the item, that “[t]he findings of fact indicate that Mr. McDeid has * * * a pattern of forming relationships with women who appear vulnerable to exploitation and have young male children.” He argues that the only evidence in the district court’s findings of fact that would support the finding that he formed relationships with vulnerable women to have access to their minor male children were the findings that he abused his own sons. He argues that he did not get involved with his former wife to obtain access to the children because they were born after he married her. Next, he argues that none of the other incidents involved using women to obtain access to children.
But several of the district court’s findings of fact support the commissioner’s conclusion that McDeid did not bear his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that this item was incorrect.
First, the district court found that in 1996, within a month after being released from prison for his criminal-sexual-conduct offenses, McDeid commenced a relationship with a woman who appeared to his supervising agent to be vulnerable and who had two young sons. The supervising agent was concerned about the relationship and closely monitored it. McDeid’s release terms prohibited direct or indirect contact with juvenile males. McDeid again sought the same woman out upon his release from prison in 1997. The district court found that McDeid continued to have contact with this woman although he was forbidden to do so. In addition, while in prison, McDeid spoke to her a week before the 1999 commitment hearing and the morning testimony was scheduled to begin. The district court found that McDeid’s relationship with the woman was “indicative of a relapse into [his] prior offending behavior.” Moreover, based on testimony of the court-appointed psychologists who examined McDeid prior to his 1999 commitment, the district court also found that this relationship was “very similar to the relationship in which McDeid was involved when he last offended,” inferring that McDeid’s last offense also involved a vulnerable woman with a boy he felt he could abuse.
Second, on November 1, 1996, only three months after McDeid was placed on work release, his work release was revoked because he twice visited the home of his “Christian sponsor,” who had two juvenile males living at the residence.
Based on the testimony of the court-appointed doctors, the district court also found that McDeid had an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced in part by the fact that McDeid “slipped into old behavior patterns while on supervised release that likely indicated ongoing grooming behavior” and that McDeid “lapsed into offending behaviors while on release, immediately be[coming] involved in an obsessive relationship with a woman with two juvenile sons.”
In addition, the district court’s findings show that McDeid’s son, M.M., was born in 1976 to a woman who was not his former wife and that he did not know about that son’s existence until July 1991, when M.M.’s mother came to McDeid for child support. He then abused M.M. in August 1991. An inference may properly be drawn from these findings of the district court that McDeid used the mother’s need for child support to gain access to M.M., whom McDeid abused when he took M.M. on a trip to his cabin one month after the mother contacted him for child support.
Furthermore, the commissioner’s conclusion is clearly supported by evidence received solely during the contested-case hearing before the ALJ. Specifically, Dr. Schlank, who was part of McDeid’s treatment team, testified that relationships with women who have small children is part of McDeid’s offense cycle. In addition, John Thompson testified that the mere fact of being a single mother who has juvenile male children renders that woman vulnerable to exploitation by McDeid, who has not completed sexual-offense treatment. Although the testimony from Schlank and Thompson was obviously not a basis for the district court’s 1999 findings of fact, their testimony nevertheless supports the gist of the challenged IPP statement regarding McDeid’s pattern of relationships with vulnerable women with young male children. Based on the record as a whole, McDeid did not bear his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that this data was incorrect, and the district court’s 1999 findings of fact, which were adopted by the commissioner, sufficiently support the IPP statement that McDeid has “a pattern of forming relationships with women who appear vulnerable to exploitation and who have young male children.”
McDeid also argues that the admission during the contested-case hearing of medical exhibits that were not considered at the 1999 commitment hearing contravened Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 16 (2000), because they contained “individually identifiable medical data” that were reviewed by counsel for the DOA and offered and admitted into evidence without prior notice to him and without his consent.
Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 16, part of the patients bill of rights, provides:
Patients and residents shall be assured confidential treatment of their personal and medical records, and may approve or refuse their release to any individual outside the facility. * * * This right does not apply to complaint investigations and inspections by the department of health, where required by third party payment contracts, or where otherwise provided by law.
Over forty exhibits were entered into evidence at the contested-case hearing. Some of these exhibits contained medical records of McDeid, but McDeid’s counsel specifically stated he had no objection to the admission of these exhibits. After the hearing, McDeid’s attorney submitted two post-trial briefs to the ALJ, dated November 16, 2001, and November 27, 2001, respectively. Neither brief challenged the admission of McDeid’s medical documents.
After the ALJ’s decision, McDeid challenged the admission of the medical records in a January 11, 2002 letter to the commissioner of the DOA claiming that: (1) no exhibits should have been admitted that were not admitted to the district court at the 1999 commitment hearing; (2) he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the professionals who prepared the reports; and (3) some of the documents had been sealed by the district court’s order, and the attorney general’s office therefore did not have the right to access them. But McDeid did not raise these issues at the contested-case hearing before the ALJ. A litigant who fails to object to the admission of an exhibit waives any challenge to the admission of that evidence on appeal. Steiner v. Beaudry Oil & Serv., Inc., 545 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21, 1996). See also Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and * * * [i]n case the ruling is one admitting evidence a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record.”). In administrative hearings, an objection to the admission of evidence must be made at the time the evidence is offered. Cup Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 566 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). We need only consider issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). We conclude that McDeid waived his right to contest the admissibility of the medical records by his failure to object at the contested-case hearing.
Furthermore, in his January 11, 2002 letter, McDeid did not allege any error on the basis of Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 16, when contesting the ALJ’s recommended order to the commissioner; and the commissioner did not consider such an argument. A party may not obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different theory. Id. Because McDeid: (a) agreed to the admission of exhibits containing his medical records, and (b) failed to raise an argument before the ALJ or the commissioner that Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subd. 16, barred introduction of the medical records, he has forfeited the opportunity to raise the issue here on appeal.
 In December 1992, McDeid pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the second degree following several instances of sexual abuse against his sons, J.M. and M.M. McDeid was sentenced to 78 months in prison and was scheduled to be released from the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Stillwater on April 7, 1999. Aitkin County’s Certified Petition for Judicial Commitment was filed on April 2, 1999.
 John Thompson, McDeid’s supervising agent, testified that he knew the woman in question through his prior work as a social worker and believed that she was a vulnerable woman who had herself been sexually abused as a child. See July 22, 1999 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Commitment, at 8.
 See Cup Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001) (where more than one inference may be drawn from evidence, findings must be upheld).