This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C4-01-2218

 

 

Jeremiah M. Jones o.b.o. Children, petitioner,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Rand L. Wilson,

Appellant.

 

 

Filed June 25, 2002

Affirmed

Halbrooks, Judge

 

 

Ramsey County District Court

File No. C801100809

 

 

Jeremiah M. Jones, 698 Wilson #2, St. Paul, MN 55106 (respondent pro se)

 

Rand L. Wilson, 836 East Lawson, St. Paul, MN 55106 (appellant pro se)

 

 

 

            Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Halbrooks, Judge, and Hanson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

HALBROOKS, Judge

            Appellant, pro se, challenges the district court’s issuance of a harassment restraining order against him.  Because the record supports the district court’s finding of harassment, we affirm. 

FACTS

            On behalf of his two minor children, respondent Jeremiah Jones filed an affidavit for a harassment restraining order against appellant Rand L. Wilson.  Appellant’s ex-girlfriend is married to respondent.  Respondent alleged that on or about November 7, 2001, appellant attempted to hit respondent’s sons with his car while they were riding their bikes.  Respondent also alleged that appellant watched his house and frequently followed his children.  Respondent requested that appellant stop harassing his children, have no contact with them, and be ordered to stay at least one block away from his residence. 

            The district court issued a temporary harassment restraining order on December 11, 2001, and set a hearing for December 20, 2001.  The temporary order required appellant to refrain from contact with respondent or his children. 

            The district court issued a harassment restraining order against appellant on December 20, 2001.  The order forbids appellant from stalking or following respondent and his children, states that appellant is barred from direct or indirect contact with respondent and his children, and requires appellant to stay at least a block away from respondent’s residence.  This appeal follows.   

D E C I S I O N

            We review harassment restraining orders under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Witchell v. Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Minn. App. 2000).  “Harassment” includes

a single incident of physical or sexual assault or repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target. 

 

Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000).  A district court may issue a harassment restraining order when the petitioner files an appropriate petition, the sheriff serves respondent with a copy of the temporary restraining order, and the court finds that reasonable grounds exist to support a finding of harassment.  Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(1-3) (2000). 

            The proper steps were followed in this case.  Respondent filed an appropriate petition, the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office served the temporary restraining order on appellant on December 14, 2001, and a hearing was held.  The district court’s determination that reasonable grounds existed to issue a harassment restraining order is supported by the record.

            Appellant’s primary argument is that it is respondent who is harassing him.  Appellant claims that respondent and his wife have denied him access to his personal possessions.  He also alleges that respondent put sugar in his gas tank and stabbed his tires.  Anything respondent has allegedly done to appellant is not part of the record and is not at issue in this appeal.  The issue on appeal is solely whether a reasonable basis existed for the restraining order against appellant.  As the district court implicitly found that appellant followed and stalked respondent and his children, the issuance of the restraining order was within the district court’s discretion. 

            Affirmed.